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Abstract
MIKHAIL BONTCH-OSMOLOVSKI: Essays in Labor Economics: Work-related
Migration and its Effect on Poverty Reduction and Educational Attainment in Nepal.
(Under the direction of Thomas Mroz.)
This dissertation is composed of two self-contained essays, which are concerned with the
effects of work-related migration in Nepal on the outcomes of households with migrants. In
the first essay, I evaluate the impact of work-related migration of adult males on the educa-
tional attainment of their children. I develop a framework of household decision-making and
estimate migration decision and enrollment outcomes jointly under several sets of assump-
tions. I use lagged level of migrant networks as instrumental variables to identify selection of
the migrants within the household. I find that migration of a father increases the probability
of enrollment of his children in school by 16% points on average.
In the second essay (co-authored with Michael Lokshin) we measure the impact of lo-
cal and international work-related migration on poverty in Nepal. We apply an instrumental
variable approach to deal with nonrandom selection of migrants and simulate various scenar-
ios for the different levels of work-related migration, comparing observed and counterfactual
household expenditure distribution. Our results indicate that one fifth of the poverty reduction
in Nepal occurring between 1995 and 2004 can be attributed to higher levels of work-related
migration and remittances sent home. We also show that while the increase in international
work-related migration was the leading cause of this poverty reduction, domestic migration
also played an important role. Our findings demonstrate that strategies for economic growth
and poverty reduction in Nepal should consider aspects of the dynamics of domestic and in-
ternational migration.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation seeks to provide a partial answer to a very broad question: What are the
costs and benefits of economic migration? In this introduction, I will demonstrate the overall
importance of this question from both theoretical and practical points of view and highlight
some of my more important results.
The practical importance of evaluating the costs and benefits of migration lies primarily
in the fact that migration has become increasingly widespread and appears to have had a
large impact on the world economy. This is illustrated by quotations from the 2009 World
Development Report. According to the report, currently 200 million people-about 3% of
the world’s population-are foreign-born, and the share of migrants is even greater in poor
and middle-income countries. This is a large number to begin with, but the share of the
population directly affected by migration is still larger. While some migrants move together
with their families, other migrants leave families behind and send remittances back home.1
Remittances constitute the most tangible and immediate outcome of migration and a well-
defined measure of migration impact. The total amount of remittances sent to developing
countries was estimated at $283 billion in 2008, up from $230 billion in 2006. This amount
1For example, in the case of Nepal (the country which I use as a case study to investigate the effects of
migration), adult male migrants make up five percent of the population. At the same time, thirty percent of the
population reside in the households of these migrants and are thus directly affected by migration.
is more than twice the amount of all international aid directed towards developing countries.
Overall, remittances make up 2% of GDP of all developing countries, but in some countries
the share of remittances in GDP is larger. 2 The total number of internal migrants in the world
is not documented, since it is harder to define and to measure. The extent of labor mobility
within a given country can be judged somewhat by household survey data. Estimates of the
share of internal migrants in the working population range from 40% for Paraguay and Bolivia
to 10% in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.
According to the World Development Report (2009), the largest international migration
flows originate in developing countries in the South and move to the OECD countries of the
North. These flows account for 37% of all migrants. The second biggest flow, South to South
migration, accounts for 24% of all international migrants. In particular, migrants from South
Asia account for 13% of all international migrants. In the dissertation, I investigate the effects
of migration using the example of Nepal, a poor developing country in South Asia.
Nepal is an important case to study because of the exceptional extent of labor migration in
the country: almost 14% of households reported receiving remittances from within Nepal in
2003-04, and almost 18% of households reported receiving remittances from abroad. Overall,
almost one third of the households in Nepal had either an internal or international migrant. Ac-
cording to the estimates of the Nepalese Rastra Bank, international remittances sent through
official channels contributed 17% to the country GDP in 2007-2008. However, there is no
official account for the contribution of internal migration. The main destination for interna-
tional migrants in Nepal was India (65% of all international migrants). High-income Middle
Eastern countries accounted for 18% and other countries in South Asia accounted for 7%. As
concerns internal migration flows, rural-to-rural migration accounts for 69% of the migrants
and rural-to-urban - for 26%.
2For example, in Tajikistan and Moldova remittances make up 45% and 38% of GDP.
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Migration policy in many countries is the subject of debate: should immigration be en-
couraged or discouraged? Regulated or not regulated? Should emigration out of country be
encouraged or discouraged? Some countries, like China, attempt to control internal migra-
tion. Others, like North Korea, restrict emigration. Almost all countries control international
immigration using regulatory measures such as entry visas and work permits. (Nepal is an ex-
treme example of the results of such policies: Nepalese citizens need visas for every country
in the world besides India.) If governments did not regulate migration at all, then the level of
international migration would likely be much higher.
The main questions of the policy debate - whether migration should be regulated and if
so, how–are normative, requiring a value judgment. To make an informed decision in this
matter, one needs to know the answers to various positive questions concerning effects of
migration on different economic entities and population subgroups. These positive questions
include: does immigration lower wages for native workers? Does internal migration increase
congestion and crime rates in the cities? Does migration of a household member help to
increase consumption in that household? The answers to these questions vary by the choice
of the outcome of migration, the choice of the migration event, and the reference population
on which the effect of migration in that outcome is evaluated.
This dissertation is concerned with the so-called "direct" consequences of migration: the
reference population consists of the migrants themselves and their households, and our inter-
est is focused on the impact of migration on the household that a migrant has left behind. The
direct effect of migration is sometimes called "partial-equilibrium effect", because it does not
take into account the "general-equilibrium" effects of migration realized through changes on
the local labor market, spill-over effects from remittances, and other indirect effects brought
about by migration. Ignoring "indirect" effects in the analysis requires extra caution in the
interpretation and generalization of the results. This is especially true when the results in-
volve simulating large changes in migration rates, which can substantially change the general
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equilibrium.
The two essays which make up the dissertation are devoted to the direct effects of mi-
gration on two different yet complementary aspects of household behavior: household con-
sumption and household investment. In the first essay, in Chapter 2, I attempt to answer the
following question: what is the effect of migration of a household member on his/her house-
hold’s welfare, in terms of per capita consumption? This choice of welfare measure has both
advantages and disadvantages. Consumption is usually measured better than income in the
survey data; it is less noisy and better reflects long-term household well-being. It is also a
standard measure of welfare, allowing for cross-country comparisons with the results of other
studies. Finally, using per capita consumption in application with the poverty lines calculated
by the World Bank allows us to estimate the effects of different migration policies on poverty
rates in Nepal. One drawback of using per capita consumption is that it ignores the direct
effect that migration can have on household welfare through the economies of scale and lower
household size.
The second essay, in Chapter 3, complements the first one, shifting the focus from con-
sumption to investment. I investigate the impact of migration on the investment of households
in human capital, specifically, in the education of children. I attempt to determine the effect of
migration of a household member on the school enrollment of that household’s children. The
urgency of question comes from concerns that migration of a father may lower his children’s
educational outcomes, due to absence of parental supervision, family disruption or other neg-
ative effects. For example, McKenzie and Rapaport (2005) find that boys living in a migrant
household in Mexico have 20% lower chance of finishing school. It must be acknowledged
that enrollment in school can not be interpreted as a complete measure of educational achieve-
ment; this is particularly true in the context of Nepal, where many children remain enrolled
in school for several years without advancing to the next grade. In other words, enrollment is
4
necessary for educational achievement, yet in and of itself not sufficient. The advantage of us-
ing enrollment outcome is that it is well defined, easily measured and allows for cross-country
comparisons.
I calculate effect of migration on both of the outcomes (consumption and enrollment) by
comparing the counterfactual outcomes that a household would have with and without a mi-
grant. The main analytical challenge lies in constructing the correct counterfactuals. First of
all, as usual, the two potential outcomes are never observed simultaneously. An economet-
ric model of each outcome (with and without migration) needs to be estimated to determine
appropriate unobserved counterfactual outcome. Second, the econometric model needs to
account for the possibility of confounding factors, which influence both migration and con-
sumption or enrollment outcomes. Finally, to identify the effect of migration one needs to
have proper identification restrictions. In this case, the variables that affect migration out-
come, but do not directly influence either the consumption or enrollment outcomes. In both
of the essays I deal with these problems using a common analytical approach. In the first
essay, I develop an econometric model in which the migration event in the household and the
counterfactual consumption outcomes are estimated jointly. In the second essay, the migration
outcome of each adult male in the household and the enrollment outcomes of each child are
estimated jointly. Both of the econometric models take into account the correlation between
the error terms in migration and outcome equations and use established migrant networks as
the instrumental variables for the identification of the parameters. My findings indicate that
there are large and positive effects of migration on both household consumption and school
enrollment of children in the household. In the first essay, I find that having a migrant working
in Nepal increased the household’s per capita consumption by 45%, relative to what it would
be if the migrant remained in the household. In the second essay, I find that migration of
a father increases the probability of enrollment of a child by about 16 percentage points on
5
average, while migration of a brother or uncle increases enrollment probability by 7 percent-
age points. I estimate that the positive effect of migration is larger for poor households. In
particular, among landless rural households, migration of a father raises the probability of a
child’s enrollment by 28 percentage points.
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Chapter 2
Work-related migration and poverty
reduction in Nepal
(co-authored with Michael Lokshin)
2.1 Introduction
Work migration and remittances, along with the higher agricultural growth, are usually con-
sidered the key factors behind declining poverty in Nepal since 1996. Indeed, more than a
million prime-age (mostly male) adults are currently working outside Nepal. Remittances
from expatriates grew at 30 percent per year and from less than 3 percent of GDP in 1995
to about 15 percent by the end of 2003 (World Bank 2004) , exceeding the combined share
of tourism, foreign aid, and exports. According to official government statistics, about 1 bil-
lion dollars comes into the country as remittances, and inflows through private and unofficial
channels could be even larger (Thieme 2003) .
The growing numbers of migrants who secure work and send remittances back home have
a profound effect on many socioeconomic, demographic, and political issues in Nepal. At
the same time, we are unaware of any research that formally investigates the micro-level rela-
tionship between work-related migration and household well-being in Nepal. A few, mostly
descriptive, studies by Nepali scholars establish no causal relationship between work-related
migration, remittances, and poverty (for example, Acharya 2001 and Chhetry 1999, 2002; see
also Kumar 2003). With this paper, the intention is to fill this gap by providing empirical
evidence of the effect of migration and remittances on poverty in Nepal.
While a large body of literature on international migration exists, the empirical research
of the impacts of work-related migration and remittances on poverty and inequality is limited.
A macro-level study of 74 low- and middle-income countries by Adams and Page (2005) find
that remittances have strong poverty-reducing impact. Adams (1989, 1991) presents micro-
evidence on the importance of remittances for poverty reduction in rural Egypt, while Adams
(2005) summarizes the results of micro-level analysis in several countries, finding that poverty
reduction in Bangladesh, Ghana, and Uganda could be attributed to the effects of remittances.
Gustafsson and Makonnen (1993) report that removing remittances in Lesotho would raise
the poverty rate from 52 to 63 percent, and Barham and Boucher (1998), in examining the net
effects of migration and remittances on income distribution in Nicaragua, find that migration
and remittances increase average household income and income inequality when compared
with the no-migration counterfactuals. Du, Park, and Wang (2005) studied the effects of
migration and remittances on poverty in China, finding that without migration and remittances
the aggregate poverty rate would increase from 14.4 to 15.4 percent. Other recent papers by
McKenzie and Rapoport (2005) and McKenzie et al. (2006) estimate the overall impact of
remittances on income distribution in Mexico taking into account their direct and indirect
effects on receiving households and the spillover effects on neighboring communities.
In this paper, we model the effect of remittances and work migration on consumption of
households with a migrant. Using the cross-sectional sample of the nationally representative
Nepal Living Standard Survey of 2004, we estimate a model of household migration deci-
sions jointly with the consumption equations by the method of full information maximum
likelihood (FIML) with instrumental variables. The method takes into account unobserved
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household characteristics that could simultaneously affect household migration decisions and
household income. We simulate counterfactual expenditure distributions to determine the ef-
fect of work-related migration on the levels of aggregate poverty and inequality in Nepal.
While most of the recent studies on the effect of migration on inequality and poverty have
controlled for heterogeneity and selection in terms of unobserved characteristics, to the best
of our knowledge this is the first paper using FIML to estimate the trivariate selection model
in this context. The novelty of the paper resides on separating different effects of domestic
and international migration on household welfare.
The results of our simulations show that almost 20 percent of the decline in poverty in
Nepal between 1995 and 2004 can be attributed to increased work-related migration and re-
mittance inflows. If the level of migration and the amount of remittances remained at the
1995 level, the poverty rate in Nepal would increase from the currently observed 30 percent
to 32 percent; the mean per capita expenditure would decline from about 15,000 to 14,000
NPR. Two-thirds of this increase in poverty can be explained by the higher number of the
would-be-poor among the households with international migrants. Work-related migration
and remittances, however, have only marginal impact of the changes in income inequality in
Nepal.
2.2 Data and Measures
The analysis in this paper is based on the data from the second (2004) round of Nepal Living
Standard Survey (NLSS). We also use the data from the first (1996) round of NLSS and Nepal
Census of 2001 for descriptive results and to construct the aggregate lagged data at the ward
and district levels.
The NLSS is a nationally representative survey of households and communities conducted
between June 1995 and June 1996 (NLSS-I) and April 2003 and April 2004 (NLSS-II) by the
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Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics. Both rounds use similar modules to collect data on the
household consumption of a wide range of food and nonfood items. The survey’s instruments
gather detailed information about the household demographic composition, the labor status
of the household members, their health and educational achievements, and various sources of
household income, including income in-kind, individual wages, and remittance and transfers
received in the year preceding the survey (Central Bureau of Statistics 2006).
We use per capita consumption expenditure as an indicator of household welfare. Our
consumption aggregate includes monthly household expenditures on food and nonfood items,
imputed housing expenditures and a stream of services from durables, as well as cash expendi-
tures and imputed expenditures for home-produced goods. To assure comparability across the
regions, all monetary indicators (household consumption, values of remittances, wages, and
so on) are deflated to 2004 all Nepal prices. The poverty line for the analysis is constructed
using cost-of-basic-needs approach. The cost of the poverty basket in 2004 all Nepal prices
equals NPR 7,694 per year per person–equivalent to US107orUS590 in PPP (World Bank
2006).
A serious data limitation is that households with migrants can only be identified if they
reported remittances in the previous year. Three groups of households could be misclassi-
fied under this definition. The first group consists of households with migrants who send no
remittances. These could be households with a migrant who has just departed and is in the
process of establishing him or herself, or households where a migrant brings the remittances
home rather than sending them. The second group comprises households that receive remit-
tances but do not report them. Such households might be afraid of revealing information on
remittances because of the tax consequences or due to concerns for personal safety. Finally,
some households could receive remittances from individuals who are not household members.
Classifying the households in these groups as having no migrants would bias estimates of the
impact of migration on household consumption. Although the direction of the bias is unclear
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a priori, the size of the bias is proportional to the sizes of these three groups of households.
To assess the extent of such misclassifications, we compare the proportion of migrants
in the total population from the 2001 Nepal Census with the proportion of households with
remittances in the NLSS data. The proportion of domestic migrants in the 2001 Census (4.8
percent) is statistically close to the proportion of migrants from households receiving domestic
remittances in the NLSS (5 percent). The census-calculated proportion of households with
international migrants (14 percent) is lower than the NLSS proportion of household receiving
remittances from abroad (18 percent). The official statistics report about 1,000,000 prime-age
male expatriates working outside Nepal. The equivalent NLSS figure is about 900,000. These
relatively small discrepancies indicate that the bias resulting from misclassified households
would most likely also be small1.
2.3 Migration and Remittances in Nepal: Descriptive Anal-
ysis
The history of foreign employment in Nepal dates back almost 200 years, when Britain began
recruiting men from the hillsides of Nepal, known as Gorkhas into the British armed forces.
After India’s independence in 1947, the Indian military also began enlisting Nepali men. Cur-
rently, about 3,500 Nepali solders serve in the British army and more than 50,000 Nepalese
are enlisted in the Indian military. India was the first country to attract civilian migrants from
Nepal. The inflow of working migrants to India has increased sharply since the 1950s (Shed-
don 2005)2.
1We are leaving out the sample of households that migrate together. We argue that the effect of omission of
such households on our results is small. Kollmair et al., (2006) show that a small number of households migrates
from Nepal to other countries and settle there. Our analysis of the 2001 Nepal Census indicates that only 1.78
percent of households changed the district of residence during five years prior to the Census.
2The "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" signed by the Indian and Nepali governments in 1950 allowed Nepali
nationals to enter India without a visa and work there with no restrictions (Thapliyal 1999).
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The Foreign Employment Act of 1985 was the first legislative document to officially rec-
ognize the benefits of international migration (Jha 1999). Around that time, foreign labor
migration from Nepal extended from India to the countries of the Southeast and Far East,
and later to Arab Gulf States. The total number of Nepali migrants working abroad reached
750,000 in 1997, contributing about NPR 35 billion to the country’s economy in form of re-
mittances (Sheddon, Gurung, and Adhikari 2000). The reform of the administrative system
during 2000 and 2001 resulted in a boost in both domestic and international migration. Before
the reforms, passports could only be obtained in the country’s capital, but under the new regu-
lations, district offices were given the authority to issue passports and other travel documents
(World Bank 2006).
Domestic migration has increased in Nepal since the success of government’s efforts to
control endemic malaria in the Terai in early 1950s. The inter-district migration constitutes
13.2 percent of domestic migration (Central Bureau of Statistics 2003), while rural-urban
migration represents 25.5 percent and rural-to-rural migration 68.2 percent. The poor rural
regions of the mid- and far-west underwent a net out-migration, with migrants moving from
the mountainous and hillside areas to the Terai and urban areas. These regions were also the
most affected by the Maoists insurgency over the past 10 years (Do and Iyer 2007).
The NLSS is the first data source to provide statistically accurate estimates of levels of and
trends in work-related migration from Nepal and on the amount of money sent home in remit-
tances. According to NLSS, 23 percent of households in Nepal received remittances in 1995,
and that proportion climbed to about 32 percent in 2004. Further, the share of households
with remittances from abroad grew from 10 to 17 percent between the survey’s two rounds.
The average amount of remittances increased from about NPR 22,000 or 36 percent of mean
household yearly consumption expenditure in 1995, to NPR 35,000 or 44 percent of mean
expenditure in 2004.
The procedures for sending remittances to Nepal have been simplified over the last several
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years. National Bank of Nepal granted permits to 26 firms specialized in remittances transfers
and manpower agencies are being permitted to open foreign exchange account in local banks
in the receiving countries. The joint venture of Nepal-based Everest Bank and the Punjab
National Bank in India allows migrants to open a bank account in India with their Nepalese
identification card and remit money to Nepal (Thieme et al. 2005). In addition to the formal
channels, working migrants use micro-credit organizations (knows as chit), and societies and
committees run by migrant workers to send money to their families (Bhattrai 2007).
Figure 1 shows the incidence and the amount of remittances by household size for 1995
and 2004. Focusing first on the top panel of the graph, the proportion of households receiving
remittances grows monotonically with household size. For example, in 2004 only about 10
percent of households with two or three members received money from abroad, while that
proportion is more than three times higher for households with 11 or more members. The
changes in the amounts of remittances by household size are shown on the lower panel of
the graph. The plot indicates that in 1995 households with different sizes received almost the
same amount of money, while the 2004 data show that remittances increase with household
size3.
The incidence of remittances is higher in rural than in urban Nepal. The proportion of
households receiving remittances from within the country increased only marginally between
1995 and 2004, and even declined in Kathmandu (top section of Table 1). At the same time,
the share of households receiving money from abroad increased uniformly across the country.
For example, the rural eastern hills–the poorest region in Nepal–registered a fourfold increase
in the number of households receiving money from abroad; that proportion more than doubled
in "other urban areas" of Nepal. Thus, the overall increase in the proportion of households
with remittances could almost entirely be attributed to the growth of remittances from abroad.
3An alternative explanation for these results could be that larger households have higher probability of having
a migrant and a higher probability of having more than one migrant (implying more remittances)
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There is no clear pattern in the distribution of the recipients of the remittances by the size
of landholdings. The largest increase in the incidence of both domestic and international
remittances is registered among households with two and more hectares of land.
Looking at the proportions of households receiving remittances by caste (bottom part of
Table 1), Dalit households have the highest probability of receiving money from outside Nepal
(25 percent), while the incidence of external remittances is much lower among Newars and
Terai Janjatis. At the same time, only 10 percent of Dalit households receive remittances from
Nepal. This might suggest that poor job opportunities at home prompt Dalit households to
concentrate their job search efforts abroad.
Individual profiles constructed using NLSS data reveal that almost all international mi-
grants are male (97 percent) aged 15 to 44 years, and either sons or husbands of the person
receiving remittances. Brothers represent about 10 percent of the total number of donors. In
1995, 85 percent of Nepali migrants worked in India, and the rest were spread among Malaysia
(11 percent), Bhutan, and Hong Kong. As of 2004, international migrants were living in 10
countries: 65 percent worked in India, 18 percent in Arab countries, and about 2 percent in
United Kingdom, while some migrants lived as far away as Japan and the United States. Re-
mittances from abroad constituted 76 percent of the total remittances in 2004. The largest
share of international remittances came from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emi-
rates (35 percent), followed by 30 percent from India, 17 percent from other Asian countries,
and the remainder from United Kingdom, United States, and other countries.
The correlations between household income and the incidence and amount of remittances
are shown in Figure 2. The main difficulty in illustrating this relationship is that current
income is endogenous to the remittances. We attempt to address this problem by constructing
a two-year-lagged asset index to proxy for pre-migration income4. Overall, the incidence of
4The lagged asset index was constructed based on the estimated cash value of the flow of services provided
by the durable goods. In our calculations, we included only durable assets purchased by households at least two
years prior the date of the survey (2001 and older). In justifying the exogeneity of the lagged asset index, the
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remittances (or migration) is higher among (asset) poor households. It reaches 35 percent for
the poorest households in Nepal and declines monotonically to about 10 percent for the richest
households. The correlation between the amount of remittances and household wealth goes
in the opposite direction. Households with the highest lagged asset index receive significantly
larger amounts of money from working migrants than do poor households. These results,
however, could indicate that households receiving the largest remittances have been receiving
them for a long time, resulting in an accumulation of durable assets (Stark 1978).
2.4 Work-Related Migration and Poverty:
Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Specification
Remittances sent home are the most tangible benefit of work-related migration for Nepali
households. On the production side, remittances enable households to overcome the con-
straints of credit and risk on their ability to engage into modern and more productive activities
(Stark 1991). Remittances can be spent on housing and schooling, and a significant proportion
directly supports household consumption. But remittances are only one of the consequences
of migration. When a young, able, and productive male household member leaves home, mul-
tiple adjustments need to be made among those left behind. Migration changes the relative
productivity of the remaining household members; affects household preferences in terms of
risk aversion and uncertainty; and provides new information–for example, on new technology,
type of crops, and so on. Women who previously worked in the labor market may find it opti-
mal to stop working and devote all their time to home production (Nandini 1999). Agricultural
households might decide to augment their income with off-farm activities. Migration also has
implications for the health and educational attainment of the migrant’s children (Hilderbrandt
fact that the major increase in work migration in Nepal was initiated by the reforms of the administrative system
of 2001 was taken into consideration (see Section 3).
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and McKenzie 2004; McKenzie and Rapoport 2005).
The observed consumption behavior and poverty status of households receiving remit-
tances are determined by the cumulative effects of these changes. Finding valid instruments
to disentangle the effect of remittances from the overall impact of migration can be prob-
lematic. Even if such instruments exist, the question of the effect of migration on household
well-being has more policy relevance than a narrower question focusing only on the effect of
remittances. The goal of this study is to analyze the impact of work-related migration and
remittances on the consumption of households at home and to estimate the effects of work-
related migration on aggregate poverty and inequality in Nepal. As in any impact assessment,
the welfare impact of work-related migration should be judged relative to the counterfactual
of what have been observed in its absence. In particular, we model how the observed income
distribution compares to the counterfactual distribution without migration and remittances.
Our theoretical framework relies on several assumptions. First, we assume that households
have a choice to send a migrant to work within Nepal or abroad. This assumption imposes
certain restrictions on the sample for empirical estimations. We also assume that migration
has to be planned ahead. Before the migration takes place, multiple arrangements need to
be made. If traveling abroad, a Nepali migrant has to apply for and obtain a visa, get an
international passport, and purchase a ticket. And a migrant’s household incurs expenses
in the form of migration broker fees and traveling costs (Bhattrai 2005)5. This preparation
process could take several years depending on the country of destination. This assumption is
crucial for our identification strategy.
Consider a simple two-period model of household utility maximization6. In time period 1,
a household decides that one of its members will migrate. This involves three possible states:
5Fees to obtain travel documents, such as entry and identity cards charged by intermediaries vary by country
and could be as high as US$15,000 (Yamanaka 2000).
6Several studies support the argument that migration is a household utility maximization decision (for exam-
ple, Stark and Levhari 1982; Low 1986; Hoddinott 1994; Agesa and Kim 2001; Bhattacharyya 2005).
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migration abroad, migration within Nepal, and no migration. Each state has an associated
cost for a household. Such costs could, in case of migration, include transportation costs,
visa and document processing fees, money to cover initial expenses, and so on. To decide
whether to embark on migration or not, a household compares its expected net benefits in
each state (in period 2) and selects the state with a highest utility payoff. Households observe
the realized labor market outcomes in time period 2: once settled in the new location, migrants
inform households about their wages and local market conditions become known. With this
information, households make decisions about member participation and market work hours
and investment, adjusting their consumption level accordingly.
In the simplest form, a household chooses between two states: to send or not send a house-
hold member to work in another location, whether locally or abroad. Let U be the household
utility function which depends on household consumption (Ct) and the household character-
istics Xt in period t, (t = 0, 1). The household income Yt comprises wage and non-wage
income, as well as income from home-production. R is the expected benefits of migration
(which could be positive and negative, including remittances and other consequences of mi-
gration). Let z define a set of regional factors affecting the cost of migration P (X0, z0), Pz < 0
assumed at period 0. The household utility maximization can then be expressed in the form:
max[U(Y1(X1) +R(X1)) + U(Y0(X0)− P (X0, z0), U(Y1(X1)) + U(Y0(X0))] (2.1)
The first term in (2.1) is the household’s indirect utility if it decides to proceed with migration,
and the second term is the indirect utility in the case of no migration. The model predicts that
the reduction in the cost of migration, P , and the higher expected returns from migration
increase the probability of a household choosing to send a migrant. This specification can be
extended to a case with three states of migration: international migration, migration inside
Nepal, and no migration.
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We assume that utility of a household in state s can be linearly approximated as
Uis = Xiγs + Ziςs + ηis, s = 1, 2, 3 (2.2)
where Zi is a vector of household characteristics that includes both Xi and zi, γ and ς are
vectors of parameters, s is an indicator describing household migration choice, and ηi’s are
the error terms. The household selects the migration state s if
Uis > max(Uij)j 6=s, s = 1, 2, 3 (2.3)
Consumption Cis in a particular state is observed only if that state is chosen:
Cis = βsXi + µis, if Uis > max(Uij)j 6=s (2.4)
where βs is a vector of parameters, and µi’s are the error terms.
The estimation of equation (2.4) in three states (migration abroad, migration within Nepal,
and no migration) using ordinary least squares (OLS) enables inferences to be made about the
returns to the observed household characteristics in each state under the assumption of inde-
pendence of the error terms in equations (2.2) and (2.4) - that is, if we assume no systematic
unobserved differences in household characteristics by migration state. Then it is possible to
predict the counterfactual consumptions for households in the sample if international, internal
or no migration decisions have been made. The probability of a household choosing migra-
tion state s could be estimated by a standard multi-nominal model. The inferences about the
aggregate impact of work migration on poverty and inequality might also be obtained (see, for
example, Adams 1991, 2005 and Taylor and Wyatt 1996).
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However, some unobserved household and/or potential migrant’s characteristics could af-
fect both the household’s decision to migrate and the household’s consumption7. For exam-
ple, it might be optimal for a household to send a member with high entrepreneurial abilities
abroad. These abilities, which are usually unobserved by a researcher, could also allow a
migrant to earn higher wages in comparison with the average migrant worker and send more
money back home. The challenge for our empirical strategy is to estimate the system of equa-
tions (2.2) - (2.4) controlling for such unobserved factors.
If error terms µ’s and η’s are not independent, the nonrandom selection of households into
different states will result in a correlation between the explanatory variables X and errors µ’s
in equation (2.4). To obtain unbiased and consistent parameter estimates under an assumption
of joint dependence of the error terms, we use the method of full information maximum like-
lihood (FIML). The method estimates the household consumption equations jointly with the
equation describing the household choice of migration state allowing for the correlation of the
error terms across equations. The detailed discussion of our estimation methodology is shown
in Appendix 8.
To estimate the impact of remittances and migration on poverty and inequality in Nepal,
we simulate the counterfactual expenditure distributions under different migration scenarios.
7Migrant selection was studied by Chiswick (1978), and Borjas (1987, 1990, 1991) developed a model of
self-selection based on unobserved migrant characteristics. The problem of self-selection of migrants was also
studied by Docquier and Rapoport (1998), Aydemir (2003) and Kanbur and Rapoport, (2005). Barham and
Boucher (1998) build their model on the assumptions of potential endogeneity of household’s migration and
labor force participation decisions. A recent study by McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2006) using the survey
of the winners of a migration lottery concludes that migrants are positively selected in terms of both observed
and unobserved skills.
8Several recent papers attempt to estimate the effect migration and remittances on poverty using the matching
estimator methodology. Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda (2006) investigate the effect of remittances on poverty con-
ditions among Mexican households. They use the propensity score matching approach to match the remittances
receiving households with household that have similar characteristics but do not receive remittances. McKenzie,
Gibson and Stillman (2007) apply matching approach to study the effect of migration on income and poverty of
families with migrants in Tonga. Being econometrically more robust than the method we rely on, the matching
methods disregard, by construction, the difference in unobserved characteristics between households with and
without migrants. In this paper we argue that such unobservables have a strong effect both on the household
migration decision as well as on the household consumption.
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The FIML estimation of equations (2.2) - (2.4) identifies the parameters of five-variate dis-
tribution of the error terms. The observed outcomes of the migration decision truncate the
joint distribution of consumption for each individual. Though analytical expressions for such
truncated distributions are unattainable, we recover the distributions by randomly drawing the
error terms from the five-variate truncated normal with 1,000 replications. This way, we gen-
erate the simulated universe of 3,620,000 household expenditures with a different realization
of conditional errors. The poverty rates and Gini coefficients (or any other statistic) could then
be calculated for the particular counterfactual scenario. Confidence intervals for the inequality
and poverty measures are estimated by the jackknife method (see Appendix for the detailed
description of the simulation technique).
2.4.1 Identification Strategy
Our theoretical model guides an identification strategy for the empirical estimation. The fact
that migration and consumption decisions are separated in time allows us to assume that cer-
tain factors (variables) affecting the migration decision in time period 1 have no direct impact
on household consumption in period 2. Such variables could be used as instruments in the
FIML estimation of equations (2.2) - (2.4). A variation in these instrumental variables would
identify the causal effects of migration and remittances on household consumption because
the effect of this variation is entirely channeled through household migration decision. We
use two instruments to identify the separate effects of international and domestic migration on
household consumption.
The first instrument, the proportion of migrants in a ward in 2001, is constructed based
on 2001 Nepal Census (Central Bureau of Statistics 2003). That proportion could be inter-
preted as a proxy for the extent of village-level migration networks. We argue that household
consumption in 2004 should not be directly affected by the migration networks in 2001. Car-
ringon, Detragiache, and Vishwanath (1996) and Munshi (2003) test the role of networks in
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promoting migration and find a greater propensity toward migration in villages with existing
migrants–meaning that there is propensity for new migrants to follow in the footsteps of ex-
isting migrants. When in the host country, Nepali migrants develop extensive social networks
that link them with their relatives and friends at home (Yamanaka 2000). Such networks lower
the costs of migration for villagers by providing information about job opportunities outside
Nepal, helping potential migrants secure employment, supplying credit to cover reallocation
expenses, and ameliorating housing costs upon arrival. Indeed, as Thieme (2003) shows, in
Nepal, migrants tend to follow their co-villagers and migrate to the same destinations. They
are also likely to fill the same niches in the labor market in the host county. Relying on a sim-
ilar identification strategy, Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2005)
analyze the effects of migration on children’s health and schooling outcomes in Mexico; Du et
al. (2005) study the relationship between migration and rural poverty in China; and Taylor and
Mora (2006) investigate the effect of migration on expenditure patterns of rural households
in Mexico. We expect this instrument to affect the probability of international migration and
have small or no influence on the probability of migration within Nepal.
To construct an instrument for the domestic migration, we use data from the first round of
the NLSS. The variable for this instrument is the proportion of domestic migrants in a district
in 19959. The underlying rationale is similar to the one discussed above, and we expect this
instrument to have a positive and significant effect on the probability of domestic migration.
Our identification strategy requires that lagged migrant networks influence household con-
sumption only through current migration. The presence of ward or district characteristics or
shocks that simultaneously influence migration and household consumption would violate our
identification restrictions. For example, better road infrastructure in a ward or its proximity to
9We tried to add the proportion of migrants abroad in a district in 1995 as an instrument. This variable
adds no extra identification power to our estimations, most likely because of a low district-level variation in
foreign migration in 1995. In a specification with a distance to India as an instrument for abroad migration and a
difference in non-agricultural employment in the district of residence and in contiguous regions as an instrument
for domestic migration, both instruments were insignificant in the selection equation
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a large urban center could reduce the costs of migration and, at the same time, affect a house-
hold’s returns on productive activities by providing better access to markets. We endeavor
to control for time-persistent unobserved factors by including a set of ward-level character-
istics in our empirical specification. In particular, we include variables that specify local
labor-market conditions, the occupational structure of the population in a ward, and the set of
dummies for aggregated educational levels. In addition, we use the ward-level lagged (1995)
mean expenditure and expenditure Gini. These variables describe the lagged regional poverty
situation and can capture many unobserved factors affecting both the household’s migration
decision and its current consumption level. Nevertheless, we cannot completely rule out the
presence of latent local characteristics that are correlated with our instruments and simultane-
ously affect household consumption behavior.
We can speculate about the effects of unobservable time-variant characteristics on our
results. By having a larger number of migrants, locations with extensive migrant networks
receive more remittances compared to those with fewer migrants. If invested in the develop-
ment of local infrastructure, remittances would raise the local capital stock, and that in turn
might positively affect residents’ current earnings and incomes (see for example, Dustmann
and Kirchkamp 2002). Past migration could also influence current consumption through its
effect on the local labor market. Higher levels of remittances may increase aggregate demand
and hence the demand for labor (Funkhauser 1992). The out-migration of prime-age males
might tighten local labor markets, allowing better job opportunities for workers in the home
communities.
Both scenarios would lead to a downward bias in our estimates. The consumption levels of
nonmigrant households living in locations with more migrants would be positively affected by
externalities related to work-related migration. The counterfactual consumption of a house-
hold with a migrant–that is, had that migrant stayed home–would be overestimated because
of these externalities, thereby reducing the estimated impact of migration and remittances. In
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that case, our results would provide lower bounds for the true effect of work-related migration
on household consumption.
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption of separability of household’s migra-
tion and consumption decisions. In our model, households first decide about the work-related
migration of its members and then about the household consumption. In the alternative frame-
work of life-cycle maximization with perfect foresight and endogenous migration decision
(Mesnard 2004) the exclusion restrictions for our instruments would not be valid. We can
argue, however, that the sequential model of household decisionmaking better describes the
behavior of households in a highly uncertain political and economic environment of Nepal.
2.4.2 Explanatory Variables and the Sample for Estimations
The predictions of the theoretical model determine the choice of our explanatory variables.
The descriptive statistics for the main explanatory variables are reported in Table 2. These
variables could be grouped conceptually into two categories. The first group describes factors
affecting the household production. These include the household demographics, education of
female household members, and variables describing ethnicity. We also include variables on
a lagged land ownership and lagged asset index as proxies for household wealth. The lagged
asset index was constructed based on the estimated value of the flow of services provided
by the durable goods. In our calculation, we include durables purchased by households at
least two years prior the date of the survey (2001 and older). We then divided all households
in our sample into four groups according to the percentiles of their lagged asset index. Our
specification also contains a variable on amount of pensions received over the past year. The
second group of variables comprises characteristics related to the region and ward.
We restricted our sample to households that actually have or could have a working migrant.
We excluded from the sample 30 households of migrants living alone. We also excluded 235
households without migrants whose members were not of working age (that is, children and
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the elderly). Using the language of impact evaluation, we therefore only estimate the "LATE"
effect of work-related migration and remittances on the well-being of Nepali households.
2.5 Results
The results of the FIML estimation of equations (2.2) - (2.4) are shown in Table 3 (discrete
part of the model) and Table 4 (continuous part of the model)10. Focusing first on the re-
sults for the choices of migration states, households living in wards with a historically higher
proportion of international migrants are significantly more likely to migrate abroad compared
with households without migrants. Households residing in districts with larger shares of do-
mestic migrants are more likely to send their members to work in locations within Nepal. This
relationship is consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model and indicates that our
instruments have a significant effect on the households’ choice of migration status.
Large households and households with a higher proportion of adult women and the elderly
are more likely to have a migrant. Compared with Brahman and Chhetri, other castes are less
likely to migrate within Nepal, and the Newars prefer not to migrate abroad. Land ownership
does not affect the probability or destination of work-related migration, whether locally or
abroad. The probability of a household having a domestic migrant is higher among poorer
households compared with wealthier households (based on the percentiles of the lagged asset
index). At the same time, individuals from both the poorest (those who reported no durables)
10According to the likelihood-ratio test, the specification that assumes that the error terms in equations (2.2)-
(2.4) are independent is rejected in favor of the FIML estimation. The estimation results of the system of
equations (2.2)-(2.4) assuming joint independence of the error terms are provided in Appendix. Three pairwise
tests of the equality of coefficients between the regressions in equation (2.4) are rejected with at least 0.01
percent significance. The test on equality of coefficients in all equations is rejected with χ2(68)=149.32 (Prob >
χ2=0.0000), and the test on equality of coefficients between the consumption equation for abroad and domestic
migrant is rejected with χ2(34)=67.72 (Prob > χ2=0.0005). We attempted to estimate the system of equations
(2.2)-(2.4) using a Semi-Parametric Maximum Likelihood estimator (for example, Mroz 1999), which relaxes
the assumption of joint normality of the error terms in these equations. However, we were unable to achieve
convergence even with the minimal number of points of support. For that reason, we reverted to the more
restrictive FIML estimator.
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and the wealthiest households are more likely to work abroad. We might speculate that the
members of the wealthy households tend to migrate to Gulf States, while the poorest migrants
mainly work in India.
Individuals residing in Katmandu are less likely to migrate compared with those living in
other areas of Nepal. This could be attributed to better labor market conditions in the coun-
try’s capital. The probability of international migration is higher among households from the
rural western mountains and hills. Households in wards with a higher proportion of illiterate
residents are less likely to have a member migrate to locations within Nepal, and households
in the wards with a large share of self-employed residents are more likely to have members
migrate for work within Nepal.
Table 4 shows the results of the FIML estimation of consumption equations for the three
states of migration. Overall, the observed household characteristics, in particular geographical
and ward characteristics play a more important role in determining the level of consumption
in households without migrants compared with those with a migrant. While a household’s
human and productive capital has a strong effect on consumption in households without mi-
grants, these factors become less important for households with a migrant when remittances
contribute a significant share to the household budget. By comparing the estimation results of
a three-choice model with the results of a model where international and domestic migration
destinations are combined into one category, the log-likelihood test rejects the equality of the
coefficients in the consumption regressions for international and domestic migrants. This jus-
tifies the assumptions of our theoretical model about the differences in returns on productive
and human capital characteristics between international and domestic migrants.
The demographic composition and particularly the dependency ratio have a significant
impact on per capita consumption expenditure. Households with larger shares of children aged
0 to 3 years have lower per capita consumption relative to other households.11 Households
11The effects of household demographic variables will be different if we adjust for economies of scale on
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with better educated female members have higher per capita consumption levels. The size
of landholdings has a positive and significant impact on household consumption regardless
of migration state. For households with international migrants, those possessing more than
two hectares of land have significantly higher per capita consumption compared with landless
households. Households from the upper percentiles of the lagged asset index and households
receiving pensions have higher per capita expenditure regardless of migration status.
Our estimations also demonstrate strong regional variation in the level of household con-
sumption for households without migrants: households residing in Katmandu have lower lev-
els of consumption expenditures compared with households from other regions of Nepal. For
households with international and domestic migrants, the regional effects are less pronounced.
The coefficients on the distance-to-market variable are insignificant in the estimation of the
probability to migrate and only significant in the consumption equation of households with-
out migrants. These results seem to contradict the work of Fafchamps and Shilpi (2003) who
find strong correlations between the distance to markets and the level of well-being of Nepali
households.
Finally, certain local conditions seem to be significantly correlated with levels of house-
hold well-being. For example, households in wards with a high proportion of illiteracy are
significantly poorer compared with the households in wards with better-educated population.
Households either without migrants or with domestic migrants residing in wards with larger
shares of self-employment are comparatively worse-off.
To ascertain the validity of our instruments we conduct a range of diagnostics tests. In the
Hausman (1978) test for the endogeneity we compare the coefficients in three consumption
equations estimated by FIML (Table 4), which are consistent in the case of endogenous se-
lection, with the estimates obtained under the assumption of no selection (Table A4.1). The
household size. This could be relevant for Nepal where the majority of the population lives in large households.
However, currently there are no studies that assess the magnitude of economies of scale in Nepal, so we rely on
the per capita definition.
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later estimates are efficient under an assumption of no selection, but are inconsistent if sample
selection is present. The hypothesis of no selection is strongly rejected by the Hausman test
with χ2=147.04 and Prob> χ2=0.0024.
Another potential concern is the robustness of our results in the presence of weak instru-
ments. We investigate that issue by adopting the weak instruments test by Stock and Yogo
(2002). In particular, to investigate the weakness of the instrument for abroad migration, we
calculate the value of Kleibergen-Paap (KP) Wald F statistic, in an instrumental variable linear
regression of household expenditure on household characteristic and endogenous dummy for
having an abroad migrant. Internal migration instrument is tested in a separate linear regres-
sion. For the abroad migration instrument- the hypothesis of weak instrument is rejected, with
the KP F statistic of 39.466, and the critical values of Stock-Yogo test of 16.38 for 10% size
of the Wald test. For the instrument of internal migration we obtain similar results12.
2.5.1 Simulations
Using the estimated parameters of the system of equations (2.2)-(2.4), we simulate the effect
of migration and remittances on distribution of per capita consumption under various counter-
factual regimes of migration. Different levels of domestic and international migration are sim-
ulated through the changes in the values of the two instruments. When predicting household
expenditures in a counterfactual state with no migration we use information on the number of
distinct senders of remittances and their age and gender to adjust the household size for the
presence of would-be-migrants, as well as all variables constructed using the household size
and shares of various age-gender groups. A detailed discussion of the simulation technique is
presented in Appendix.
We construct four counterfactual scenarios (Table 5). The first column of Table 5 shows
12We are unaware of the test of weak instruments for the non-linear models. The results of the tests conducted
under an assumption of linearity of the dependent variables, while qualitatively supporting the choice of the
instruments, cannot be directly applied to FIML estimation.
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the actual rates of poverty, mean expenditure, and inequality for households exhibiting the
three different states of migration13. In 2004, 29.9 percent of the Nepali population had per
capita consumption below the poverty line; average per capita consumption was NPR 14,930
per year, and the Gini inequality reached 0.409.
In the scenario of no migration (the second column in Table 5), households with migrants
have the same returns on their observed characteristics as households without migrants: the
size of the migrant households is increased by the number of migrants, and remittances are
set to zero. Our simulations show that without migration the overall poverty rate in Nepal
would have increased from the current 30.0 to 33.6 percent. The share of the poor among
households with a domestic migrant would have risen to about 46 percent, and for households
with an international migrant poverty would have increased to 35 percent. Inequality would
remain virtually unchanged. The consumption expenditure of households without a migrant
would remain unaffected, while the average consumption of households with domestic or
international migrants would fall.
In the second scenario the values of our two instruments are adjusted such that the aggre-
gate proportions of domestic and international migrants are the same in 2004 as they were in
1995. This simulation results in higher overall poverty (a change from 30.0 to 31.8 percent),
and higher poverty rates both among households with domestic migrants (a change from 22.9
to 30.0 percent) and among those with international migrants (32.8 to 37.2 percent). Inequal-
ity would decline. We can decompose the change in poverty between 1995 and 2004 into 3
components. These components represent the contributions of the changes in domestic and in-
ternational migration (non-migrant households sending a migrant) to the total poverty change,
13The three groups of households in Table 5 are defined based on their observed (actual) household migration
outcome. For example, the poverty rate for households without migrants remains unchanged between actual
and no migration scenarios. The counterfactual poverty rate of 30.5 percent should be interpreted as the poverty
rate for households without migrants in the observed state. At the same time, the poverty rate for a group of
households with a migrant within Nepal increased from 22.4 to 45.6 percent, which shows the change in poverty
status for households from this group under the counterfactual scenario when all migrants stay home.
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and the interaction component. This decomposition demonstrates that the growth in interna-
tional migration between 1995 and 2004 decreased the total poverty by 1.2 percentage points,
while the growth in internal migration and the interaction component are responsible for a 0.6
percentage point reduction in poverty in Nepal.
The last two columns of Table 5 present the results of simulations for the hypothetical sce-
narios of a 10-percentage point growth in the levels of domestic and international migration.
These simulations are based on implicit assumptions that this growth is caused by a decrease
in the cost of migration and that the average amount of remittances a migrant sends home
remains constant. Both scenarios lead to lower overall poverty rates, but the impact of the
increase in domestic migration is larger. Poverty in Nepal would be reduced by 2.4 percent-
age points if domestic migration were 10 percent higher, and poverty would decline by 0.5
percentage points if international migration were 10 percentage points higher. Both scenarios
lead to rising inequality.
The important conclusion that emerges from these simulations is that the elasticity of
poverty reduction in Nepal over the past decade is significantly higher for domestic migration
than it is for international migration. One explanation for the different effects of domestic and
international migration could be that remittances derived from work in foreign countries are
more likely to be invested in productive assets and real estate. This is often attributed to the
notion that households receiving international remittances tend to treat such funds as positive
transitory income shocks that should be invested. Local remittances are treated as a mixture of
transitory and permanent income and are more often used for consumption (Alderman 1996;).
At the same time, the surge of investment in housing that creates new employment opportuni-
ties for the local labor force could have a positive impact on local poverty rates (Adams 1998).
Our estimation strategy overlooks such effects. It is not clear whether our results would hold
if the general equilibrium consequences of changes in migration and remittances were taken
into account.
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In attempts to disentangle heterogeneity in the impact of migration and remittances on
poverty, we simulate poverty rates for different types of households (Table 6). Households
with a migrant living in other urban areas of Nepal and in rural western Terai experienced the
most significant boost in consumption. Dalit households appear to gain less from sending their
members to work in other regions of Nepal or abroad. Relative to the counterfactual scenario
of no migration, landless (probably urban) households or those owning large land plots seem
to benefit more from migration.
With an estimated increase in poverty of 3.6 percentage points, based on the counterfac-
tual of no migration, the impact of changes in migration for work (together with associated
remittances) in Nepal is somewhat lower than the impacts for other countries, even though
most of these studies estimate the impact of remittances only. Adams (2005) attributes the ef-
fect of remittances to 5 percentage points of poverty reduction in Ghana, 6 percentage points
in Bangladesh, and 11 percentage points in Uganda. Completely removing remittances would
raise poverty rates by 8 percent points in Lesotho, while the poverty rate in poor areas of China
would increase by 1 percentage point in the absence of migration and remittances (Du, Park,
and Wang 2005). On a macro level, Adams and Page (2003) estimate the remittance elasticity
of poverty to be of around -0.35. Our model predicts a slightly higher elasticity of -0.51.
2.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis and Caveats
Our main empirical specification relies on stringent assumptions that limit our estimation
sample and restrict the set of variables included in the model. In this section we demonstrate
how our results would change if these assumptions are relaxed14.
The comparison of the main simulation results with simulations under an assumption of
14The simulated results for inequality and mean consumption expenditures for these specifications are avail-
able from the authors on request. The results of FIML estimations of the system of equations (2.2)-(2.4) under
different specifications are shown in Appendix.
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a joint independence of the error terms in equations (2.2)-(2.4) (simulation 1 in Table 7) re-
veals a systematic relationship between the decision to migrate and the level of household
consumption, which is not accounted for by observed household characteristics. The differ-
ences in the returns on unobserved characteristics of households with a migrant between the
actual and counterfactual scenarios account for more than 60 percent of the impact that work-
related migration and remittances have on aggregate poverty rates. This indicates significant
self-selection on unobservable characteristics that provide higher returns to the households if
one of their members migrates.
We simulate the counterfactual distribution of consumption using a specification that in-
cludes remittance amounts in a set of explanatory variables. The results of this estimation are
biased because remittances could be endogenous to consumption and are most likely badly
measured in our data. Nevertheless, the magnitudes of the estimated effects of migration and
remittances are similar for this and our preferred specification. Under the counterfactual of no
migration, the poverty rate increases by 4.5 percentage points versus 3.6 percentage points in
the preferred specification. For the 1995-96 scenario, the simulated changes in poverty rates
based on a specification that includes remittance amounts are equal to 1.4 percentage points,
while the preferred specification predicts about a 1.9 percentage point change in poverty. The
simulated poverty rates under the specification where the amount of remittances is instru-
mented with the age of a migrant are very close to the poverty rates obtained from uninstru-
mented specification.
We next compare our main results with the simulations based on an unrestricted sample.
We find that including the previously excluded households in our estimation (that is, those
without men of working age and those consisting only of single men) increases the poverty
rates in the counterfactual scenarios. Overall, however, the poverty impact of migration for
the unrestricted sample is consistent with our main results.
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We test the sensitivity of our results for the alternative classification where migrants to In-
dia are categorized as domestic migrants. The concern here is that characteristics of migrants
to India could be similar to the characteristics of domestic migrants. Such migrants predom-
inantly come from the rural Terai region of Nepal and are usually involved in agricultural or
manual labor for low wages (Bhattrai 2007). At the same time, Nepalese working in Arab
countries in the Gulf and the Far East are educated, employed in the better paying jobs, and
can send more money home. Hence, combining households with migrants from India with
those from other countries potentially underestimates the impact of international migration.
The comparison of simulations based on this categorization with those based on the pre-
ferred specification results in relatively small differences in the simulated poverty rates. The
increase in the poverty rate under the scenario of no migration is smaller (2.8 percentage
points) compared with the increase in poverty simulated with the preferred specification (3.6
percentage points). The scenario using 1995/96 levels of migration resulted in a 1.8 percent-
age point increase in poverty in the specification reclassifying Indian migrants versus a 1.9
percentage point increase using the specification classifying migrants to India as international
migrants.
Finally, we estimate our model for alternative measures of household welfare such as
household income and non-durable consumption expenditure. This would allow us to com-
pare our results with the results of other papers that often use these measures of household
wellbeing. Moreover, one might argue that a household with a migrant will behave as a
household without one member in terms of consumption of non-durables (once controlling for
observed and unobserved characteristics) while behaving as a complete household in terms of
consumption of durables, because they expect the migrant to return. Table A6 in Appendix
presents the results of simulations based on these alternative measures. The simulated changes
in non-durable per capita expenditure for different migration scenarios are similar to the sim-
ulated changes in total per capita expenditure. The simulations based on household income
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are similar to the simulations based on preferred specification for all households. For house-
holds with a migrant abroad, the decrease in income is larger than the decrease in per capita
expenditure in the scenarios of no migration and migration at the level of 1995/96. However,
these differences could be driven to a large degree by the misreporting of income.
There are several qualifications to and possible caveats on our results. First, our results are
obtained using the 2004 cross-sectional data. We have no instruments to control for possible
household- or community-level endogeneity. In this sense, our estimations of the impact of
work-related migration are valid only to the extent that unobserved family and community
characteristics are captured by the variables included in our empirical specification.
Second, our analysis focuses only on the direct impact of migration and remittances on
households with a migrant. Migration and remittances improve the welfare of households in
the sending communities by stimulating local economic development. Migrants channel re-
mittances into productive investment at home. Even when some households spend most of the
remittances on current consumption, the resulting demand for goods and services can be met
by other working adults in the community, thus generating strong positive externalities. We
argue that our estimates provide lower bounds on the actual impact of migration for work and
remittances on poverty in Nepal. Taking into account the general equilibrium consequences
of work-related migration would demonstrate an even larger impact on living standards of
Nepal.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper attempts to explain the role of migration and remittances in reducing poverty in
Nepal between 1995 and 2003. We compared the observed poverty and inequality rates with
the rates calculated under counterfactual scenarios. To construct these counterfactuals we esti-
mated the model of household consumption expenditure identifying observed and unobserved
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differences in the returns on household characteristics based on migration status.
The results of our simulations show that almost 20 percent of the decline in poverty in
Nepal between 1995 and 2004 can be attributed to increased work-related migration and the
resulting remittances sent back home. In the absence of migration, the poverty rate in Nepal
would increase from the currently observed 30.0 percent to 33.6 percent, and the mean per
capita expenditure would decline from 15,000 to 14,000 NPR. Almost 58 percent of the ag-
gregate increase in poverty could be accounted for by a higher number of the would-be poor
among households with members who migrated internationally. Migration and remittances
have only a marginal impact on income inequality in Nepal.
Migration and remittances have a strong impact on the living conditions of households
with a migrant. The poverty rate among households with a member who migrates within
Nepal would be twice as high as current levels if the migrant had stayed home. The poverty
rate for households with a migrant working abroad would also be substantially higher had
their members not migrated.
Our findings have important implications for public policy. They emphasize the role of
migration for work and remittance inflows in raising the living standards of recipient families
and reducing aggregate poverty in Nepal. Hence, strategies for economic growth and poverty
reduction in Nepal should incorporate various aspects of the migration dynamics. Our results
demonstrate that policies promoting both domestic migration and the export of labor–if such
export were accompanied by remittances–could also have an important effect on poverty re-
duction in Nepal. Given that Nepal has such a plentiful supply of labor, migration for work
provides employment and earning opportunities for a significant segment of the labor force.
Unless the labor market situation changes dramatically, increasing numbers of Nepali men
and women will seek job opportunities outside Nepal; migration and remittances could be
expected to play even a greater role in the future economic development of the country.
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Table 1: Percent of households receiving remittances by regions of Nepal and total 
 Receive remittances  
from Nepal 
Receive remittances  
from abroad 
Receive any 
 remittances 
 1995/96 2003/04 1995/96 2003/04 1995/96 2003/04 
Regions       
   Kathmandu 14.3 7.8 3.6 5.7 17.9 13.5 
   Other urban areas 13.1 17.1 6.0 14.3 19.2 31.3 
   Rural West  mount/hills 10.6 11.1 19.6 29.4 30.2 40.4 
   Rural Eastern mount/hills 11.1 16.9 2.0 9.3 13.1 26.2 
   Rural western Terai 12.0 12.6 10.6 19.2 22.6 31.8 
   Rural eastern Terai 14.7 14.6 11.0 18.1 25.7 32.7 
Land holdings a year ago.                                  
   No farm plot 11.3 14.8 10.2 13.2 21.4 28.0 
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha 13.1 14.3 11.7 18.5 24.7 32.8 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 11.7 11.7 10.7 20.0 22.5 31.8 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 12.8 13.7 11.4 17.5 24.2 31.2 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  11.9 17.3 6.2 18.3 18.1 35.6 
Caste       
  Brahman\Chhetri 13.4 15.8 11.1 19.9 24.5 35.7 
   Dalit 12.0 9.8 15.1 24.7 27.0 34.5 
   Newar 13.2 14.3 3.6 7.8 16.8 22.1 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  9.8 14.6 9.4 15.4 19.2 30.0 
   Muslim\Other Minorities 13.1 12.1 11.4 18.3 24.4 30.3 
Total 12.3 13.9 10.6 17.7 23.0 31.6 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of main explanatory variables for migrant and non-migrant 
households, 2004 cross-section  
 
Non-Migrant 
households 
Domestic migrant 
households 
International migrant 
household 
 Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. 
Household per capita expenditure x105 1.640 0.036 1.755 0.069 1.606 0.067 
Household Demographic (before migration)     
   Household size  5.683 0.050 5.803 0.114 6.491 0.107 
   Share of  children age 0-3 0.092 0.002 0.066 0.004 0.091 0.004 
   Share of  children age 4-7 0.101 0.003 0.062 0.004 0.099 0.005 
   Share of  children age 8-15 0.192 0.004 0.149 0.007 0.163 0.006 
   Share of  adult men 16-64 0.031 0.002 0.080 0.007 0.040 0.004 
   Share of women 16-64 0.286 0.003 0.279 0.006 0.279 0.004 
   Share of  elderly age 65+  0.298 0.003 0.364 0.007 0.328 0.006 
   Number of married couples  1.314 0.014 1.205 0.034 1.491 0.034 
Maximum  education of women  1.011 0.027 1.035 0.057 1.052 0.052 
Ethnicity 
    
   Brahman/Chhetri 0.290 0.009 0.356 0.021 0.349 0.019 
   Dalit 0.073 0.005 0.058 0.010 0.113 0.013 
   Newar 0.086 0.006 0.076 0.012 0.032 0.007 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  0.273 0.009 0.283 0.020 0.233 0.017 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities 0.279 0.009 0.227 0.018 0.273 0.018 
Land holdings a year ago  
    
   Landless households 0.246 0.009 0.232 0.018 0.174 0.015 
   Farm plot < 0.5 hectares 0.366 0.010 0.374 0.021 0.402 0.019 
   Farm plot: 0.5-1 hectares 0.211 0.008 0.190 0.017 0.224 0.017 
   Farm plot  1-2 hectares 0.121 0.007 0.131 0.015 0.141 0.014 
   Farm plot > 2 hectares 0.056 0.005 0.073 0.011 0.059 0.009 
Lagged durable asset index  
    
   No assets    0.397 0.010 0.409 0.022 0.431 0.020 
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.222 0.008 0.246 0.019 0.212 0.016 
                      (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.209 0.008 0.216 0.018 0.212 0.016 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) 0.172 0.008 0.129 0.015 0.144 0.014 
Geography dummies 
    
   Katmandu 0.075 0.005 0.034 0.008 0.018 0.005 
   Other urban areas 0.107 0.006 0.128 0.015 0.084 0.011 
   Rural Western mountains/hills 0.172 0.008 0.170 0.016 0.359 0.019 
   Rural Eastern mountains/hills 0.226 0.008 0.260 0.019 0.111 0.012 
   Rural Western Terai 0.142 0.007 0.127 0.015 0.148 0.014 
   Rural Eastern Terai 0.278 0.009 0.281 0.020 0.280 0.018 
Log Distance to market center 2.095 0.028 2.024 0.057 2.220 0.048 
Per capita pension transfers  0.389 0.050 0.345 0.094 0.655 0.116 
Ward level variables 
    
   % illiterate, among age 15+ 0.560 0.004 0.542 0.009 0.569 0.009 
   % literate or 1-4 years of education  0.180 0.002 0.191 0.005 0.187 0.005 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.108 0.001 0.114 0.003 0.114 0.003 
   % employed in wage job 0.145 0.003 0.127 0.005 0.141 0.005 
   % self employed 0.462 0.005 0.492 0.010 0.482 0.009 
   Average log expenditure  8.896 0.007 8.897 0.014 8.826 0.013 
   Gini coefficient  0.312 0.001 0.312 0.003 0.304 0.003 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.565 0.014 0.522 0.023 0.611 0.027 
Number of Observations 2,464 523 633 
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Table 3: FIML estimation of the migration choice part of the system (1-3) 
Base category: No Migration Domestic Migration International Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 1.059*** 0.343 -0.418 0.423 
   Share of international migrants in a ward,  2001 0.165 0.250 1.267*** 0.268 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.158*** 0.017 0.127*** 0.017 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children 4-7 -0.192 0.364 0.162 0.318 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.058 0.276 -0.416 0.260 
   Share of men 16-64 1.156*** 0.352 0.236 0.347 
   Share of women 16-64 1.996*** 0.299 1.312*** 0.306 
   Share of elderly  2.952*** 0.355 0.932** 0.368 
   Number of married couples -0.379*** 0.056 -0.089* 0.049 
Maximum education of women in the household 0.005 0.027 0.024 0.027 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.268** 0.120 0.021 0.114 
   Newar -0.244* 0.133 -0.452*** 0.141 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.161** 0.072 -0.107 0.087 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.281*** 0.098 -0.103 0.095 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.061 0.076 0.037 0.079 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.247** 0.103 -0.100 0.098 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.144 0.113 -0.029 0.111 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.156 0.137 -0.192 0.143 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
-0.072 
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.057 0.069 -0.135** 0.068 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.056 0.073 -0.141* 0.076 
   Asset rich   (66th – 100th percentile) -0.324*** 0.097 -0.139 0.091 
Total pensions per capita -0.015 0.013 0.016** 0.008 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.702*** 0.167 0.565*** 0.165 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.563** 0.229 1.042*** 0.239 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.574*** 0.198 0.479** 0.210 
   Rural western Terai 0.655*** 0.225 0.739*** 0.229 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.807*** 0.196 0.838*** 0.201 
 Log of distance to market center -0.041 0.031 -0.015 0.029 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.544 0.396 0.029 0.422 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.556 0.594 0.416 0.536 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.197 0.610 0.405 0.577 
   % employed in wage job -0.053 0.391 0.481 0.451 
   % self employed 0.549** 0.250 -0.031 0.332 
   Log of average household expenditure, 1995 0.063 0.135 0.131 0.139 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.022 0.584 -0.914 0.622 
 Casualties from conflict, district level -0.024 0.060 -0.036 0.056 
 Constant -3.170** 1.325 -3.553*** 1.345 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,264.00 
 
 Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level.  
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Table 4: FIML estimation of expenditure equations of the system (1-3) 
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.120*** 0.015 -0.101*** 0.028 -0.074*** 0.008 
   Share of children  0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children  4-7 0.319* 0.189 0.137 0.147 0.175 0.109 
   Share of children 8-15 0.278* 0.144 0.613*** 0.133 0.359*** 0.072 
   Share of men 16-64 0.161 0.182 0.386 0.256 0.228** 0.103 
   Share of women 16-64 0.272* 0.154 0.493 0.344 0.747*** 0.105 
   Share of elderly  -0.180 0.184 0.222 0.377 0.260* 0.148 
   Number of married couples 0.150*** 0.044 0.081* 0.046 0.067*** 0.018 
Maximum education of women 0.034** 0.017 0.081*** 0.015 0.086*** 0.007 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.151* 0.086 -0.233*** 0.065 -0.170*** 0.038 
   Newar 0.049 0.070 0.074 0.120 -0.002 0.029 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.075 0.054 -0.125*** 0.047 -0.217*** 0.026 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities 0.024 0.068 -0.151** 0.064 -0.132*** 0.031 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.003 0.053 0.007 0.053 0.062** 0.024 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.215*** 0.065 0.055 0.065 0.143*** 0.030 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.181*** 0.069 0.120* 0.067 0.206*** 0.031 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.266*** 0.086 0.320*** 0.070 0.330*** 0.041 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.053 0.049 0.070 0.055 0.004 0.020 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.175*** 0.051 0.185*** 0.054 0.167*** 0.022 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) 0.558*** 0.064 0.518*** 0.079 0.491*** 0.028 
Total pensions per capita 0.019** 0.007 0.022*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.003 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas -0.103 0.104 -0.044 0.193 0.195*** 0.047 
   Rural west  mount/hills 
-0.063 0.134 -0.284 0.270 0.241*** 0.075 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 
-0.102 0.126 -0.225 0.175 0.114** 0.054 
   Rural western Terai 0.039 0.134 -0.199 0.212 0.218*** 0.060 
   Rural eastern Terai 
-0.071 0.133 0.003 0.218 0.299*** 0.059 
 Log of distance to market center 
-0.024 0.022 -0.017 0.017 -0.023** 0.010 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.250 0.225 -0.239 0.220 -0.369*** 0.116 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education 0.029 0.314 -0.354 0.448 -0.115 0.182 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.516 0.392 -0.329 0.380 -0.603*** 0.200 
   % employed in wage job 0.099 0.330 -0.080 0.213 -0.117 0.147 
   % self employed -0.333** 0.154 -0.144 0.143 -0.223** 0.093 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.148* 0.076 0.261*** 0.077 0.320*** 0.041 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.340 0.287 0.212 0.345 0.052 0.212 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.081** 0.039 0.027 0.034 -0.010 0.021 
 Constant -0.504 0.743 -1.757 1.181 -2.782*** 0.390 
Number of observations 3,620 
Log-Likelihood -4,264.00 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level.  
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Table 5: Simulated levels of expenditure, poverty and inequality rates for different 
migration scenarios.  
Migration scenarios Actual No  
migration 
Level of  
migration 
as of 1995/96 
+10% point  
increase 
 in  domestic 
migration 
+10% point  
increase 
in 
international 
migration 
Household types Poverty rate (%) 
 
All Households 
 
30.0 33.6* 31.8* 27.6** 29.5 
Households with no 
migrants 30.6 30.6 30.6 27.6
**
 29.3 
Households with 
migrants within Nepal 22.9 46.3
**
 30.0** 22.9 25.5 
Households with 
migrants abroad 32.8 34.9 37.2 30.7 32.8 
 Average expenditure, NRP 10,000’s 
 
All Households 
 
1.493 1.405* 1.446* 1.561* 1.515 
Households with no 
migrants 1.493 1.493 1.493 1.585
*
 1.536 
Households with 
migrants within Nepal 1.576 1.087
**
 1.401** 1.576 1.527 
Households with 
migrants abroad 1.441 1.341 1.328 1.478 1.441 
 Inequality rate (Gini) 
 
All  Households 
 
0.409 0.405 0.407 0.412 0.412 
Note: Shaded cells indicate that the poverty rates and average expenditure of these households are not 
affected by the simulated policy changes. 
* indicates that the difference between the actual and simulated values is statistically significant at least 5 
percent level. The significance tests are calculated taking into account clustering at a ward level.  
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Table 6: Simulated changes in predicted per capita consumption for different 
counterfactual scenarios by household characteristics (NPR 10,000) 
 Expected consumption 
Conditional on: 
Actual No  
migration 
Level of   
migration 
as of  
1995/96 
+10% point   
increase in  
domestic  
migration 
+10% point   
increase in 
international 
migration 
Ethnicity      
   Brahman/Chhetri 1.850 1.752 1.796 1.934 1.872 
   Dalit 1.052 1.033 1.030 1.088 1.059 
   Newar 2.670 2.557 2.611 2.770 2.696 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  1.174 1.068 1.123 1.232 1.205 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities 1.254 1.182 1.213 1.316 1.269 
Land holdings a year ago       
   Landless households 1.862 1.737 1.804 1.937 1.891 
   Farm plot < 1 ha 1.296 1.224 1.255 1.362 1.314 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 1.549 1.465 1.501 1.619 1.571 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  1.876 1.762 1.810 1.943 1.912 
Lagged durable asset index      
No Assets 1.021 0.963 0.989 1.068 1.035 
Asset poor  (1 - 33th percentile) 1.076 0.988 1.035 1.142 1.093 
               (33th  - 66th percentile) 1.471 1.380 1.422 1.550 1.491 
Asset rich   (66th - 100th ) 3.104 2.949 3.015 3.210 3.157 
Geography dummies      
   Katmandu  3.495 3.334 3.418 3.591 3.541 
   Other urban areas 2.476 2.291 2.391 2.572 2.527 
   Rural western mount/hills 1.187 1.154 1.157 1.241 1.203 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 1.137 1.064 1.105 1.196 1.150 
   Rural western Terai 1.269 1.177 1.223 1.368 1.280 
   Rural eastern Terai  1.388 1.300 1.336 1.443 1.414 
      
Total 1.493 1.405 1.446 1.561 1.515 
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Table 7: Simulated changes in poverty rates in four migration scenarios estimated under 
the different assumption. 
Migration scenarios Actual 
No  
Migratio
n 
Level of  
migration 
as in 1995-
96 
+10% point  
increase in  
domestic 
migration 
+10% point  
increase in  
international 
migration 
 Poverty rate (%) 
Preferred specification 
(from Table 5) 30.0 33.6 31.9 27.3 29.5 
Alternative specifications      
 
Assuming independence of  
error terms in (1-3)  
[Tables A3.1 and A4.1] 
30.1 31.1 30.8 29.9 30.1 
 
Including amounts of 
remittances (not instrumented)  
[Tables A3.2 and A4.2] 
29.0 33.5 30.4 26.9 29.4 
Including amounts of 
remittances instrumented by 
age of a sender 
[Tables A3.3 and A4.3] 
29.5 33.6 30.5 27.2 29.0 
 
Unrestricted Sample  
(3,874 households) 
[Tables A3.4 and A4.4] 
30.0 34.3 32.0 28.0 29.2 
 
Treating India as domestic 
destination 
[Table A3.5 and A4.5] 
29.9 32.7 31.7 28.4 27.2 
Assuming equal returns in 3 
states of migration in 
consumption equations 
[Table A3.6 and A4.6] 
30.1 35.8 31.6 28.3 30.8 
Note: that the “actual” poverty rates are simulations based on the model with the initial values of 
instrumental variables. So, the alternative specifications produce different poverty rates for the 
simulated “actual” scenario. 
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Figure 1: Incidence of migration and amount of remittances by the household size. 
Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals for the means. Histogram of the household 
size on the background of the lower two panels. NLSS 1995 and 2004 
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Figure 2: Non-parametric regression of the incidence of migration and amount of 
remittances by lagged asset index, NLSS 2004 
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Figure 3: Simulated distributions of per capita household expenditure in 
the scenarios of the actual and of no migration by household migration 
status. 
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Appendix
The Likelihood function The condition (2.3) could be expressed in terms of value func-
tions representing the pair-wise differences of utility functions (2.2). Define:
Vi1 = Ui1 − Ui3 = Zi(γ1 − γ3) + (η1 − η3) = Ziφ1 + i1 (2.5)
Vi2 = Ui2 − Ui3 = Zi(γ2 − γ3) + (η2 − η3) = Ziφ2 + i2 (2.6)
where φ1,2 are the unknown parameters and i1,2 are i.i.d. error terms. Migration choices and
corresponding consumption outcome are observed if:
State=1 if Vi1 > Vi2, Vi1 > 0 ⇒ Ci1 = Xiβ1 + µi1 (2.7)
State=2 if Vi2 > Vi1, Vi2 > 0 ⇒ Ci2 = Xiβ2 + µi2 (2.8)
State=3 if Vi1 < 0, Vi2 < 0 ⇒ Ci2 = Xiβ3 + µi3 (2.9)
Assume that all the random variables in the model are distributed as five-variate normal,
with the following variance-covariance matrix.
f(1, 2, µ1, µ2, µ3) = N(0,Ω); Ω =

1 α σ11 σ12 σ13
1 σ21 σ22 σ23
s11 s12 s13
s22 s23
s33
 (2.10)
where α is a covariance between 1 and 1; σ’s are covariances between 1, 2 and con-
sumption error terms µ1, µ2, µ3; and s’s are covariances between µ1, µ2, µ3. For identification,
both variances of the errors in (2.1) are normalized to 1. The covariances s12, s13, and s23 are
not estimated as we never observe a household’s consumption simultaneously in two distinct
migration states.
The probability of observing a particular consumption outcome at a certain migration state
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can be decomposed into the product of conditional and unconditional probabilities:
Lki = P (State = k, Cik = Xβk + µik = P (State = k|µik)P (µik) (2.11)
The unconditional part of (2.11) is the univariate normal density. After rescaling:
P (µik = Cik −Xβik) = φ(Cik −Xiβk
skk
) (2.12)
where φ is standard normal density function. The conditional part of (2.11), for example for a
household choosing state 1, can be expressed as:
P (State = 1|µi1) = P (Vi1 − Vi2 > 0, Vi2 > 0|µi1) =
|Substituting: η1i1 = 2 − 1, η1i2 = −i1| = P (η1i1 < Ziφ1 − Ziφ2, η1i2 < Zφi1|µ1)
(2.13)
where η1i1 and η
1
i2 are distributed as:
f(η1, η2|µ1) = N
((
(σ21−σ11)µ1
s11−σ11µ1
s11
)
,
(
2− 2α− (σ21−σ11)2
s11
1− α + σ11(σ21−σ11)
s11
1− σ211
s11
))
(2.14)
After normalization
η˜1i1 =
η1i1 − E(η1i1)√
V (η1i1)
, η˜1i2 =
η1i2 − E(η1i2)√
V (η1i2)
, ρ1 = Cov(η˜
1
i1, η˜
1
i2) (2.15)
(2.14) can be expressed as a standard bivariate normal:
P (State = 1|µi1) = Φ(η˜1i1, η˜1i2, ρ1) (2.16)
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Then, a contribution to the likelihood function of the observation i in State k is:
Lki = Φ(η˜
k
i1, η˜
k
i2, ρk)φ(
µik
skk
), k = 1, 2, 3 (2.17)
However, (2.16) and (2.17) are different in every state. Log likelihood is formed as the
sum of individual log-likelihoods (2.17) over all observations and all states:
L =
∑
i
∑
k
lnLki I(State = k), i = 1, 2, . . . , N, k = 1, 2, 3 (2.18)
where I is an indicator function for a migration state. To improve the fit of our estima-
tion we use the Box-Cox transformation of the continuous dependent variables in our model
(Heckman and Sedlacek 1990). The "Box-Cox parameter" λ=-0.4 provides best fit in terms
of minimization of the sum of square residuals of the continuous part of the model. The
log-likelihood function (2.18) is maximized using a standard Newton-Raphson algorithm of
Maximum Likelihood procedure in Stata. The maximization routine relies on analytical gradi-
ent and analytical Hessian that we programmed to improve convergence properties and speed
of the estimation. The performance of maximization algorithm is crucial for the jackknife
simulations we conduct in the paper.
Simulation techniques In the simulations, we keep the characteristics of the household at
2004 level, while changing the level of migration to match a particular scenario. For example,
when predicting the poverty rates at the level of migration in 1995 we, given the estimated pa-
rameters in 2004, change the constant of the regression of migration to match the probability
of migration domestically and the probability of migration internationally in 1995. Then we
draw randomly the errors from the 5-error distribution estimated in 2004, to estimate the mi-
gration decision and the consumption. We use this approach to simulating the counterfactual
scenarios because we are interested in the question of what would happen to households in
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2004 if the migration levels were different.
We treat household expenditure as a random variable that comes from some distribution
the parameters of which we estimate. This random variable is a sum of observed and unob-
served components. The observed component is a product of household characteristics and
the returns on these characteristics in a particular migration state. The unobserved component
is determined by the choice of the migration state according to rules (A.1) and (A.2). We
cannot recover the exact value of the unobserved component but can only estimate the param-
eters of the distribution of that component in each counterfactual state. We need to simulate
the distribution of counterfactual expenditures in order to calculate the poverty and inequality
measures in various counterfactual scenarios.
To simulate the expenditure distribution for each household in different states of migration
we draw error terms 1, 2, µ1, µ2, µ3 from unconditional 5-variate normal distribution with
the estimated variance-covariance matrix (2.10). In every draw m household i is assigned to
a particular migration state s, according to rule (2.5) and (2.7):
Uis − Uij = φˆsjZi + mi(sj) > 0; Uis − Uik = φˆskZi + mi(sk) > 0 (2.19)
where φsj,sk are the estimated parameters as in (2.5) andmi(sj),(sk) are the values of the error
terms in draw m. The expenditure of household i in draw m is:
Cmis = βˆsXi + µ
m
is (2.20)
So, in every draw only migration choice is realized and the counterfactual expenditure de-
rived for that choice. By repeating this process M times for all households in our sample
we generate the simulated expenditure distribution in all migrations states. Any distributional
statistics could be calculated using this distribution. For example, the simulated poverty rate
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for households with migrants working outside Nepal in case of no abroad migration is:
pAM =
∑M
m=1
∑N
i=1 I(Xiβˆ1 + µ
m
i1 < PL, s
m
i = 3)∑M
m=1
∑N
i=1 I(s
m
i = 3)
(2.21)
where N is a total number of households in the sample, PL is the poverty line, and I is an
indicator function. The expressions for other measures of poverty and inequality could be
derived in a similar way.
The actual calculation of these statistics is more involved as we use a Box-Cox transfor-
mation for the household expenditures in our estimation. We apply inverse of a Box-Cox
transformation on the last stage of simulation to obtain poverty and inequality measures of
a non-transform distribution. The later step is crucial for calculation of the measures of in-
equality and inequality sensitive poverty measures. The counterfactual poverty rates could be
calculated on the transformed distribution as the Box-Cox transformation preserve the expen-
diture ranking. The confidence intervals for poverty and inequality measures are estimated by
the method of jackknife (e.g. Efron 1981). The jackknife estimate of the parameter θ is given
by:
θˆJ =
∑ ˆθ(i)
n
(2.22)
The jackknife estimate of the standard error of θˆj is
σˆθˆj = [
n
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(θˆ(i) − θˆJ)2]1/2 (2.23)
where n is the sample size, and ˆθ(1), ˆθ(2), . . . , ˆθ(n) are the estimates of θ on n subsamples
each of size n-1. We draw the jackknife sample from the simulated distribution that accounts
for clustered structure of our data.
We repeat the simulation process based on 1000 draws for each jackknife iteration. We
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were not able to use a bootstrap to calculate the standard errors for our simulations because
of the large number of non-convergences of our estimator on the bootstrapped samples. Efron
(1981) demonstrates that the jackknife estimates of the standard errors are typically larger
than the bootstrap estimates.
Figure A1 demonstrates how well our simulations fit the actual distribution of per capita
consumption in the total population and in the subgroups of households with different mi-
gration status. Each graph on Figure A1 shows three cumulative distributions. The solid
line presents the cumulative distribution of the actual per capita expenditures generated from
our sample of 3,620 observations. The consumption distribution that is simulated using the
estimated parameters of the system (2.1)-(2.3) and the estimated variance-covariance matrix
((2.10) is shown as a dash line. The counterfactual distribution simulated under scenario of
no migration is shown as a dotted line.
Comparing the actual (solid line) and predicted (dash line) distributions for the total popu-
lation demonstrates a reasonably good fit achieved by our simulations. The number of house-
holds with simulated expenditures below the poverty line is almost identical to the actual
number of the poor households in our sample. The distribution simulated under scenario of
no migration exhibits the first order dominance over the actual distributions. This indicates
that relative to the actual consumption distribution the no-migration scenario would result in
higher poverty rates regardless of the choice of the poverty line. Similar to results in Table
5, the no migration scenario has a largest negative impact for the consumption of households
with domestic migrants.
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Figure A1: Actual, simulated actual and counterfactual expenditure distribution under 
scenario of no migration for households with domestic migrants, international migrants, 
no migrants, and the total population. 
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 Table A3.1: Multinomial probit estimation of the migration choice in the system (2-4) 
Base category: No Migration Domestic Migration International Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 0.856* 0.459 -0.747 0.582 
   Share of international migrants in a ward, 2001 0.191 0.319 1.762*** 0.357 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.221*** 0.024 0.179*** 0.023 
   Share of children  0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children  4-7 -0.288 0.509 0.224 0.449 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.022 0.371 -0.599 0.364 
   Share of men 16-64 1.501*** 0.461 0.272 0.485 
   Share of women 16-64 2.876*** 0.413 1.888*** 0.434 
   Share of elderly  4.334*** 0.473 1.428*** 0.515 
   Number of married couples -0.536*** 0.082 -0.127* 0.070 
Maximum education in the household 0.019 0.038 0.033 0.038 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.395** 0.172 0.004 0.157 
   Newar -0.321* 0.187 -0.634*** 0.198 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.223** 0.101 -0.160 0.118 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.364*** 0.132 -0.154 0.128 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.082 0.107 0.046 0.112 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.375*** 0.144 -0.144 0.137 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.236 0.157 -0.042 0.155 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.251 0.191 -0.264 0.195 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
-0.072 
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.085 0.097 -0.185* 0.096 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.062 0.104 -0.185* 0.105 
   Asset rich   (66th – 100th percentile) -0.471*** 0.140 -0.189 0.125 
Total pensions per capita -0.022 0.019 0.023** 0.011 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.975*** 0.233 0.805*** 0.234 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.774** 0.317 1.476*** 0.341 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.778*** 0.282 0.676** 0.302 
   Rural western Terai 0.898*** 0.317 1.050*** 0.328 
   Rural eastern Terai 1.147*** 0.276 1.196*** 0.287 
 Log of distance to market center -0.062 0.044 -0.023 0.042 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.639 0.571 0.102 0.600 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.509 0.839 0.700 0.772 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.293 0.863 0.637 0.815 
   % employed in wage job -0.221 0.556 0.669 0.632 
   % self employed 0.783** 0.364 -0.045 0.472 
   Log of average household expenditure, 1995 0.102 0.198 0.194 0.197 
   Gini coefficient , 1995 -0.191 0.841 -1.302 0.886 
Casualties from conflict, district level -0.034 0.084 -0.041 0.074 
Constant -4.512** 1.944 -5.135*** 1.908 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -2,705.20 
 Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level.  
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 Table A4.1: OLS estimation of expenditure equations of the system (2-4) 
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.087*** 0.014 -0.084*** 0.011 -0.067*** 0.006 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children 4-7 0.255 0.186 0.153 0.145 0.168 0.108 
   Share of children 8-15 0.253* 0.139 0.606*** 0.126 0.359*** 0.072 
   Share of men 16-64 0.433*** 0.166 0.520*** 0.172 0.283*** 0.099 
   Share of women 16-64 0.629*** 0.133 0.702*** 0.140 0.843*** 0.081 
   Share of elderly  0.330** 0.148 0.460*** 0.170 0.424*** 0.122 
   Number of married couples 0.067* 0.037 0.052* 0.031 0.048*** 0.016 
Maximum education of women 0.034** 0.016 0.080*** 0.015 0.087*** 0.007 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.226*** 0.078 -0.247*** 0.062 -0.183*** 0.036 
   Newar -0.019 0.062 0.023 0.071 -0.009 0.027 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.127** 0.050 -0.142*** 0.044 -0.224*** 0.026 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.039 0.060 -0.178*** 0.050 -0.143*** 0.030 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.015 0.051 0.006 0.053 0.059** 0.024 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.166*** 0.059 0.028 0.056 0.132*** 0.030 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.156** 0.067 0.110* 0.066 0.198*** 0.030 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.239*** 0.078 0.300*** 0.066 0.323*** 0.040 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.074 0.048 0.061 0.046 0.008 0.020 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.175*** 0.051 0.173*** 0.049 0.165*** 0.022 
   Asset rich   (66th – 100th percentile) 0.490*** 0.057 0.484*** 0.063 0.476*** 0.027 
Total pensions per capita 0.017** 0.007 0.022*** 0.005 0.014*** 0.003 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.058 0.093 0.052 0.129 0.222*** 0.043 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.048 0.123 -0.158 0.150 0.258*** 0.064 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.012 0.116 -0.158 0.149 0.136** 0.055 
   Rural western Terai 0.168 0.133 -0.103 0.158 0.241*** 0.058 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.105 0.118 0.113 0.144 0.331*** 0.055 
 Log of distance to market center 
-0.035 0.022 -0.020 0.017 -0.025*** 0.010 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.307 0.233 -0.251 0.237 -0.389*** 0.116 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education 0.024 0.346 -0.312 0.440 -0.135 0.180 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.465 0.400 -0.279 0.355 -0.616*** 0.203 
   % employed in wage job 0.011 0.324 -0.071 0.211 -0.127 0.149 
   % self employed -0.235 0.154 -0.103 0.144 -0.197** 0.093 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.183** 0.084 0.277*** 0.066 0.323*** 0.041 
   Gini coefficient, 1995 0.289 0.322 0.111 0.282 0.050 0.212 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.066* 0.039 0.015 0.027 -0.010 0.022 
Constant -1.515* 0.823 -2.227*** 0.640 -2.827*** 0.380 
Number of observations 523 633 2,464 
Log-Likelihood -236.85 -291.45 -1,037.61 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level.  
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 Table A3.2: FIML estimation of the migration choice part of the system (2-4) with 
amounts of remittances. 
Base category: No Migration Domestic Migration International Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 0.978*** 0.364 -0.463 0.443 
   Share of international migrants in a ward, 2001 0.192 0.245 1.261*** 0.261 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.159*** 0.017 0.127*** 0.017 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children 4-7 -0.174 0.364 0.172 0.317 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.020 0.274 -0.415 0.256 
   Share of men 16-64 1.222*** 0.350 0.259 0.350 
   Share of women 16-64 1.990*** 0.300 1.316*** 0.309 
   Share of elderly  3.044*** 0.337 1.004*** 0.368 
   Number of married couples -0.383*** 0.056 -0.093* 0.049 
Maximum education in the household 0.001 0.027 0.020 0.027 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.275** 0.121 0.002 0.111 
   Newar -0.247* 0.134 -0.451*** 0.140 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.159** 0.072 -0.112 0.085 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.271*** 0.097 -0.108 0.091 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.061 0.076 0.034 0.079 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.255** 0.102 -0.102 0.097 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.147 0.114 -0.025 0.109 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.167 0.135 -0.186 0.138 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
-0.072 
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.057 0.069 -0.132* 0.068 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.052 0.073 -0.133* 0.074 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) -0.321*** 0.098 -0.133 0.089 
Total pensions per capita -0.015 0.013 0.016** 0.008 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.690*** 0.165 0.565*** 0.165 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.534** 0.220 1.033*** 0.241 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.555*** 0.196 0.473** 0.213 
   Rural western Terai 0.631*** 0.221 0.735*** 0.231 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.791*** 0.192 0.834*** 0.203 
 Log of distance to market center -0.041 0.031 -0.015 0.029 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.528 0.396 0.054 0.425 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.488 0.589 0.471 0.550 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.206 0.608 0.453 0.575 
   % employed in wage job -0.066 0.393 0.486 0.446 
   % self employed 0.555** 0.251 -0.025 0.333 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.065 0.135 0.135 0.138 
   Gini coefficient, 1995 -0.033 0.580 -0.924 0.621 
Casualties from conflict, district level -0.024 0.061 -0.031 0.053 
Constant -3.188** 1.327 -3.615*** 1.344 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,202.46 
 Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
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 Table A4.2: FIML estimation of expenditure equations of the system (2-4) with amounts. 
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Log  amount of  remittances  0.061*** 0.011 0.118*** 0.013   
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.102*** 0.017 -0.053*** 0.018 -0.073*** 0.008 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children 4-7 0.244 0.174 0.102 0.135 0.174 0.109 
   Share of children 8-15 0.249* 0.139 0.536*** 0.125 0.357*** 0.072 
   Share of men 16-64 0.121 0.182 0.528** 0.206 0.228** 0.104 
   Share of women 16-64 0.307* 0.161 0.771*** 0.210 0.753*** 0.106 
   Share of elderly  -0.178 0.209 0.455* 0.259 0.264* 0.153 
   Number of married couples 0.121*** 0.047 0.030 0.039 0.067*** 0.018 
Maximum education of women 0.025 0.016 0.071*** 0.013 0.086*** 0.007 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.142* 0.084 -0.200*** 0.063 -0.170*** 0.038 
   Newar 0.065 0.068 0.007 0.091 -0.002 0.029 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.075 0.054 -0.164*** 0.043 -0.218*** 0.026 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities 0.030 0.067 -0.141*** 0.052 -0.133*** 0.031 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.016 0.051 -0.036 0.049 0.062** 0.024 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.187*** 0.064 -0.026 0.055 0.143*** 0.030 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.167** 0.067 0.053 0.065 0.206*** 0.031 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.248*** 0.081 0.220*** 0.065 0.330*** 0.041 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.054 0.048 0.041 0.053 0.004 0.020 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.161*** 0.050 0.121*** 0.046 0.166*** 0.022 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) 0.518*** 0.064 0.392*** 0.061 0.490*** 0.028 
Total pensions per capita 0.020*** 0.007 0.022*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.003 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas -0.098 0.106 0.109 0.133 0.197*** 0.047 
   Rural west  mount/hills -0.064 0.132 -0.008 0.197 0.243*** 0.074 
   Rural eastern mount/hills -0.063 0.125 -0.084 0.134 0.115** 0.054 
   Rural western Terai 0.037 0.132 -0.027 0.155 0.220*** 0.060 
   Rural eastern Terai -0.066 0.135 0.149 0.149 0.301*** 0.059 
 Log of distance to market center -0.025 0.021 -0.024* 0.014 -0.023** 0.010 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.154 0.214 -0.158 0.206 -0.370*** 0.116 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education 0.099 0.298 -0.150 0.385 -0.118 0.182 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.568 0.369 -0.167 0.305 -0.603*** 0.200 
   % employed in wage job 0.077 0.308 0.027 0.183 -0.117 0.147 
   % self employed -0.364** 0.153 -0.062 0.133 -0.222** 0.093 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.136* 0.072 0.176*** 0.061 0.320*** 0.041 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.267 0.267 0.160 0.251 0.054 0.213 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.091** 0.038 0.016 0.031 -0.009 0.021 
Constant -0.535 0.725 -1.914** 0.771 -2.783*** 0.391 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,202.46 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of  
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
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 Table A3.3: FIML estimation of the migration choice part of the system (2-4) with 
amounts of remittances instrumented by age of the migrant. 
Base category: No Migration Domestic Migration International Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 1.051*** 0.345 -0.421 0.425 
   Share of international migrants in a ward,  2001 0.174 0.247 1.273*** 0.264 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.158*** 0.017 0.127*** 0.017 
   Share of children  0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children  4-7 -0.192 0.365 0.164 0.318 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.056 0.277 -0.416 0.259 
   Share of men 16-64 1.170*** 0.350 0.243 0.348 
   Share of women 16-64 1.988*** 0.302 1.310*** 0.307 
   Share of elderly  2.969*** 0.353 0.946*** 0.367 
   Number of married couples -0.379*** 0.056 -0.089* 0.049 
Maximum education in the household 0.004 0.027 0.023 0.027 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.269** 0.120 0.018 0.115 
   Newar -0.245* 0.133 -0.452*** 0.140 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.161** 0.072 -0.108 0.087 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.280*** 0.098 -0.105 0.094 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.061 0.076 0.036 0.079 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.248** 0.103 -0.099 0.098 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.144 0.113 -0.028 0.111 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.157 0.137 -0.190 0.142 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
-0.072 
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.057 0.069 -0.134** 0.068 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.056 0.073 -0.140* 0.076 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) -0.324*** 0.097 -0.138 0.091 
Total pensions per capita -0.015 0.013 0.016** 0.008 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.700*** 0.167 0.566*** 0.164 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.557** 0.228 1.040*** 0.240 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.570*** 0.198 0.479** 0.211 
   Rural western Terai 0.651*** 0.225 0.739*** 0.229 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.804*** 0.195 0.839*** 0.201 
 Log of distance to market center -0.041 0.032 -0.015 0.029 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.544 0.396 0.030 0.423 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.550 0.593 0.417 0.538 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.198 0.610 0.413 0.578 
   % employed in wage job -0.053 0.391 0.484 0.450 
   % self employed 0.550** 0.250 -0.031 0.332 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.063 0.135 0.131 0.139 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.014 0.583 -0.915 0.623 
Casualties from conflict, district level -0.024 0.060 -0.035 0.056 
Constant -3.165** 1.324 -3.561*** 1.344 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,263.32 
 Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
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 Table A4.3: FIML estimation of expenditure equations of the system (2-4) with amounts 
of remittances instrumented by age of the migrant. 
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Log  amount of  remittances  0.014 0.037 0.059 0.057   
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.117*** 0.018 -0.085** 0.035 -0.074*** 0.008 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children 4-7 0.310 0.191 0.102 0.143 0.175 0.109 
   Share of children 8-15 0.276* 0.145 0.581*** 0.134 0.358*** 0.072 
   Share of men 16-64 0.150 0.184 0.399 0.259 0.228** 0.103 
   Share of women 16-64 0.278* 0.154 0.533 0.355 0.749*** 0.104 
   Share of elderly  -0.189 0.187 0.243 0.384 0.261* 0.149 
   Number of married couples 0.147*** 0.045 0.063 0.052 0.067*** 0.018 
Maximum education of women 0.032* 0.018 0.076*** 0.015 0.086*** 0.007 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.147* 0.087 -0.216*** 0.068 -0.170*** 0.038 
   Newar 0.053 0.071 0.073 0.121 -0.002 0.029 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.074 0.055 -0.136*** 0.051 -0.218*** 0.026 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities 0.026 0.069 -0.132** 0.063 -0.132*** 0.031 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.005 0.053 -0.016 0.055 0.062** 0.024 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.209*** 0.066 0.025 0.073 0.143*** 0.030 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.178*** 0.068 0.089 0.071 0.206*** 0.031 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.260*** 0.086 0.281*** 0.084 0.330*** 0.041 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.052 0.049 0.065 0.057 0.004 0.020 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.172*** 0.053 0.160** 0.063 0.167*** 0.022 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) 0.550*** 0.068 0.467*** 0.101 0.491*** 0.028 
Total pensions per capita 0.020*** 0.008 0.021*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.003 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas -0.106 0.105 -0.026 0.197 0.195*** 0.047 
   Rural west  mount/hills -0.063 0.135 -0.239 0.291 0.241*** 0.075 
   Rural eastern mount/hills -0.094 0.124 -0.198 0.182 0.114** 0.054 
   Rural western Terai 0.037 0.136 -0.177 0.221 0.218*** 0.060 
   Rural eastern Terai -0.072 0.135 0.008 0.222 0.300*** 0.059 
 Log of distance to market center -0.024 0.022 -0.020 0.016 -0.023** 0.010 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.223 0.241 -0.210 0.225 -0.370*** 0.116 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education 0.053 0.325 -0.302 0.457 -0.116 0.182 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.524 0.394 -0.279 0.377 -0.603*** 0.200 
   % employed in wage job 0.097 0.331 -0.039 0.212 -0.117 0.147 
   % self employed -0.342** 0.157 -0.113 0.145 -0.223** 0.093 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.145* 0.077 0.208** 0.086 0.320*** 0.041 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.325 0.293 0.246 0.328 0.052 0.212 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.084** 0.039 0.030 0.034 -0.010 0.021 
Constant -0.502 0.743 -1.510 1.148 -2.783*** 0.390 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,263.32 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
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 Table A3.4: Full sample FIML estimation of the migration choice in the system (2-4).  
Base category: No Migration Domestic Migration International Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 1.015*** 0.321 -0.404 0.412 
   Share of international migrants in a ward,  2001 0.052 0.235 1.151*** 0.234 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.177*** 0.016 0.142*** 0.017 
   Share of children  0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children  4-7 -0.292 0.353 0.095 0.319 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.128 0.260 -0.380 0.250 
   Share of men 16-64 1.181*** 0.299 0.213 0.328 
   Share of women 16-64 1.953*** 0.285 1.397*** 0.302 
   Share of elderly  1.898*** 0.297 0.184 0.314 
   Number of married couples -0.398*** 0.055 -0.096** 0.047 
Maximum education in the household 0.001 0.026 0.031 0.026 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.325*** 0.114 0.003 0.104 
   Newar -0.208 0.129 -0.439*** 0.138 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.181*** 0.070 -0.091 0.080 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.290*** 0.091 -0.090 0.090 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.060 0.077 0.023 0.077 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.226** 0.102 -0.108 0.093 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.135 0.111 -0.042 0.106 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.103 0.131 -0.203 0.137 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
-0.072 
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.055 0.065 -0.125* 0.066 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.061 0.069 -0.157** 0.073 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) -0.309*** 0.093 -0.118 0.086 
Total pensions per capita -0.014 0.010 0.011* 0.006 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.708*** 0.163 0.546*** 0.161 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.601*** 0.215 1.010*** 0.228 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.569*** 0.195 0.447** 0.203 
   Rural western Terai 0.664*** 0.222 0.715*** 0.220 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.836*** 0.189 0.814*** 0.194 
 Log of distance to market center -0.030 0.030 -0.017 0.029 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.609 0.386 0.023 0.402 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.674 0.571 0.447 0.500 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.045 0.577 0.425 0.540 
   % employed in wage job -0.182 0.390 0.477 0.441 
   % self employed 0.423* 0.251 0.007 0.325 
   Log of average household expenditure, 1995 0.067 0.132 0.122 0.133 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  -0.070 0.571 -0.924 0.604 
Casualties from conflict, district level -0.014 0.057 -0.047 0.048 
Constant -3.105** 1.296 -3.547*** 1.283 
Number of observations 3874 
Log-Likelihood -4,548.20 
 Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
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 Table A4.4: Full Sample FIML estimation of expenditure equations of the system (2-4) 
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.124*** 0.015 -0.115*** 0.012 -0.080*** 0.008 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children 4-7 0.354* 0.185 0.127 0.154 0.164 0.101 
   Share of children 8-15 0.305** 0.142 0.613*** 0.135 0.374*** 0.069 
   Share of men 16-64 0.200 0.169 0.301 0.183 0.324*** 0.096 
   Share of women 16-64 0.295* 0.157 0.331** 0.152 0.745*** 0.102 
   Share of elderly  -0.000 0.168 0.227 0.192 0.419*** 0.098 
   Number of married couples 0.160*** 0.041 0.098*** 0.030 0.062*** 0.017 
Maximum education of women 0.034** 0.016 0.083*** 0.016 0.084*** 0.007 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.127 0.087 -0.220*** 0.067 -0.175*** 0.036 
   Newar 0.019 0.066 0.095 0.082 0.006 0.028 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.058 0.052 -0.117*** 0.045 -0.198*** 0.026 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities 0.027 0.065 -0.140*** 0.054 -0.122*** 0.029 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha 0.016 0.053 0.005 0.053 0.056** 0.024 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.231*** 0.065 0.073 0.057 0.131*** 0.029 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.199*** 0.067 0.119* 0.067 0.196*** 0.031 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.257*** 0.081 0.332*** 0.068 0.326*** 0.041 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.067 0.047 0.084* 0.048 0.025 0.020 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.195*** 0.049 0.201*** 0.049 0.182*** 0.022 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) 0.567*** 0.063 0.544*** 0.066 0.501*** 0.027 
Total pensions per capita 0.017** 0.007 0.022*** 0.005 0.014*** 0.002 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas -0.091 0.105 -0.119 0.125 0.210*** 0.048 
   Rural west  mount/hills 
-0.082 0.129 -0.368** 0.152 0.221*** 0.076 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 
-0.126 0.122 -0.274* 0.143 0.125** 0.057 
   Rural western Terai 0.032 0.132 -0.268* 0.150 0.223*** 0.062 
   Rural eastern Terai 
-0.081 0.132 -0.075 0.138 0.312*** 0.061 
 Log of distance to market center 
-0.028 0.021 -0.018 0.017 -0.019** 0.010 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.266 0.217 -0.215 0.217 -0.411*** 0.113 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.033 0.303 -0.383 0.407 -0.182 0.184 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.453 0.370 -0.362 0.344 -0.666*** 0.199 
   % employed in wage job 0.102 0.324 -0.080 0.218 -0.117 0.152 
   % self employed -0.281* 0.151 -0.173 0.143 -0.197** 0.091 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.162** 0.072 0.247*** 0.069 0.314*** 0.040 
   Gini coefficient , 1995 0.326 0.272 0.299 0.310 0.103 0.204 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.060 0.037 0.034 0.025 -0.004 0.021 
Constant -0.636 0.710 -1.390** 0.703 -2.730*** 0.388 
Number of observations 3874 
Log-Likelihood -4,548.20 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
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 Table A3.5: FIML estimation of the migration choice part of the system (2-4), where 
migration to India is treated as domestic migration. 
Base category: No Migration Nepal + India Migration Other abroad Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 0.620 0.379 -0.214 0.719 
   Share of international migrants in a ward, 2001 0.664*** 0.256 1.323*** 0.308 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.157*** 0.015 0.119*** 0.030 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children 4-7 -0.029 0.299 0.132 0.428 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.151 0.233 -0.668** 0.335 
   Share of men 16-64 0.919*** 0.316 -0.141 0.439 
   Share of women 16-64 1.852*** 0.275 1.276*** 0.367 
   Share of elderly  2.402*** 0.330 1.267*** 0.405 
   Number of married couples -0.265*** 0.050 -0.145** 0.058 
Maximum education in the household -0.011 0.025 0.105*** 0.032 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.152 0.105 0.157 0.131 
   Newar -0.307** 0.128 -0.268* 0.157 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.253*** 0.069 0.211** 0.096 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.202** 0.082 -0.126 0.124 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha 0.002 0.070 -0.022 0.108 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.203** 0.087 -0.045 0.130 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.131 0.100 0.082 0.141 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.239** 0.122 -0.010 0.159 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
-0.072 
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) -0.016 0.060 -0.201* 0.112 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.123* 0.067 0.005 0.096 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) -0.383*** 0.085 0.080 0.111 
Total pensions per capita -0.026** 0.012 0.022*** 0.008 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.621*** 0.156 0.721*** 0.185 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.890*** 0.214 0.808*** 0.281 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.495*** 0.191 0.794*** 0.255 
   Rural western Terai 0.732*** 0.214 0.632** 0.282 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.736*** 0.184 1.181*** 0.236 
 Log of distance to market center -0.039 0.029 0.018 0.036 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.124 0.383 -0.435 0.610 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education 0.009 0.555 0.441 0.669 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.099 0.553 0.267 0.765 
   % employed in wage job 0.205 0.376 0.274 0.738 
   % self employed 0.311 0.260 -0.179 0.542 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 -0.064 0.128 0.626*** 0.157 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.011 0.578 -2.035*** 0.763 
Casualties from conflict, district level -0.055 0.047 0.031 0.074 
Constant -1.988 1.263 -8.040*** 1.588 
Number of observations 3,620 
Log-Likelihood -4,061.94 
 Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
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 Table A4.5: FIML estimation of expenditure equations of the system (2-4), where India is 
treated as domestic destination 
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.109*** 0.015 -0.084*** 0.019 -0.071*** 0.012 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children 4-7 0.238* 0.137 0.059 0.221 0.167 0.108 
   Share of children 8-15 0.486*** 0.109 0.465** 0.211 0.370*** 0.077 
   Share of men 16-64 0.326** 0.163 0.469* 0.246 0.274*** 0.102 
   Share of women 16-64 0.511*** 0.158 0.506** 0.207 0.796*** 0.152 
   Share of elderly  0.146 0.187 0.401* 0.218 0.371** 0.186 
   Number of married couples 0.102*** 0.032 0.038 0.050 0.054** 0.021 
Maximum education of women 0.061*** 0.014 0.055** 0.024 0.085*** 0.010 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.239*** 0.060 -0.074 0.105 -0.183*** 0.037 
   Newar 0.081 0.071 -0.068 0.104 -0.001 0.034 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.047 0.052 -0.166** 0.075 -0.224*** 0.029 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.082 0.053 0.015 0.076 -0.137*** 0.032 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.014 0.044 -0.061 0.073 0.059** 0.024 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.135*** 0.050 -0.174* 0.089 0.135*** 0.030 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.147** 0.059 -0.003 0.103 0.198*** 0.032 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.289*** 0.068 0.118 0.098 0.326*** 0.040 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.076** 0.038 0.104 0.100 0.010 0.022 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.186*** 0.039 0.158** 0.076 0.166*** 0.022 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) 0.588*** 0.062 0.344*** 0.087 0.478*** 0.030 
Total pensions per capita 0.025*** 0.007 0.013*** 0.005 0.013*** 0.005 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.019 0.112 -0.016 0.141 0.205*** 0.067 
   Rural west  mount/hills -0.160 0.145 -0.177 0.176 0.230** 0.101 
   Rural eastern mount/hills -0.048 0.117 -0.234 0.161 0.120* 0.071 
   Rural western Terai -0.006 0.135 -0.104 0.177 0.224*** 0.072 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.075 0.132 -0.069 0.177 0.307*** 0.089 
 Log of distance to market center -0.021 0.016 -0.035 0.024 -0.025*** 0.010 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.358* 0.184 0.044 0.284 -0.384*** 0.116 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.287 0.295 -0.047 0.520 -0.143 0.184 
   % completed 5-7 years of education 0.156 0.328 -0.671 0.437 -0.629*** 0.204 
   % employed in wage job 0.014 0.209 -0.148 0.470 -0.129 0.147 
   % self employed -0.140 0.128 -0.177 0.196 -0.200** 0.093 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.237*** 0.060 0.189 0.136 0.314*** 0.053 
   Gini coefficient , 1995 -0.020 0.255 1.034** 0.487 0.082 0.248 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.045* 0.027 0.001 0.052 -0.008 0.022 
Constant -1.421** 0.640 -1.030 1.320 -2.739*** 0.515 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,061.94 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
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 Table A3.6: FIML estimation of the migration choice part of the system (2-4), assuming 
equal returns in earning equations.  
Base category: No Migration Domestic Migration International Migration 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
   Share of domestic migrants in district, 1995 0.919** 0.397 -0.453 0.444 
   Share of international migrants in a ward, 2001 0.056 0.238 1.118*** 0.248 
Household Demographics (before migration)     
   Household size 0.158*** 0.017 0.131*** 0.016 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable     
   Share of children 4-7 -0.217 0.363 0.149 0.311 
   Share of children 8-15 -0.063 0.270 -0.489* 0.254 
   Share of men 16-64 0.998*** 0.332 0.101 0.341 
   Share of women 16-64 2.055*** 0.293 1.303*** 0.306 
   Share of elderly  2.961*** 0.341 0.972*** 0.361 
   Number of married couples -0.380*** 0.056 -0.097** 0.048 
Maximum education in the household 0.009 0.029 0.022 0.026 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.289** 0.125 0.019 0.107 
   Newar -0.241* 0.135 -0.442*** 0.139 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.174** 0.073 -0.137* 0.080 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.281*** 0.098 -0.087 0.088 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha -0.059 0.077 0.047 0.077 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha -0.241** 0.103 -0.071 0.093 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha -0.136 0.113 -0.001 0.106 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  -0.142 0.137 -0.170 0.128 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
-0.072 
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.061 0.069 -0.143** 0.067 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) -0.047 0.073 -0.127* 0.075 
   Asset rich   (66th - 100th percentile) -0.319*** 0.097 -0.132 0.085 
Total pensions per capita -0.014 0.012 0.013* 0.007 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.709*** 0.169 0.578*** 0.158 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.587*** 0.226 1.117*** 0.231 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.573*** 0.199 0.526** 0.207 
   Rural western Terai 0.671*** 0.222 0.797*** 0.224 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.822*** 0.197 0.857*** 0.195 
 Log of distance to market center -0.044 0.032 -0.017 0.028 
Ward level variables     
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.489 0.400 -0.003 0.391 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.416 0.596 0.545 0.527 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.147 0.637 0.296 0.575 
   % employed in wage job -0.083 0.392 0.418 0.434 
   % self employed 0.542** 0.255 -0.041 0.310 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.075 0.142 0.150 0.136 
   Gini coefficient, 1995  0.030 0.593 -0.907 0.620 
Casualties from conflict, district level -0.022 0.061 -0.042 0.052 
Constant -3.289** 1.383 -3.688*** 1.301 
Number of observations 3,620 
Log-Likelihood -4,319.62 
 Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
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 Table A4.6: FIML estimation of expenditure equations of the system (2-4), assuming 
equal returns in earning equations.  
 Domestic Migration International Migration No Migration 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err 
Household Demographics (before migration) 
   Household size -0.081*** 0.007 -0.081*** 0.007 -0.081*** 0.007 
   Share of children 0-3: Omitted variable      
   Share of children 4-7 0.205** 0.081 0.205** 0.081 0.205** 0.081 
   Share of children 8-15 0.408*** 0.061 0.408*** 0.061 0.408*** 0.061 
   Share of men 16-64 0.349*** 0.084 0.349*** 0.084 0.349*** 0.084 
   Share of women 16-64 0.688*** 0.084 0.688*** 0.084 0.688*** 0.084 
   Share of elderly  0.335*** 0.107 0.335*** 0.107 0.335*** 0.107 
   Number of married couples 0.074*** 0.016 0.074*** 0.016 0.074*** 0.016 
Maximum education of women 0.077*** 0.006 0.077*** 0.006 0.077*** 0.006 
Ethnicity: Reference Category: Brahman \ Chhetri 
   Dalit -0.182*** 0.032 -0.182*** 0.032 -0.182*** 0.032 
   Newar 0.003 0.029 0.003 0.029 0.003 0.029 
   Terai-Hill Janajatis  -0.186*** 0.025 -0.186*** 0.025 -0.186*** 0.025 
   Muslim \ Other Minorities -0.124*** 0.028 -0.124*** 0.028 -0.124*** 0.028 
Land holdings a year ago: Reference Category: No farm plot  
   Farm plot < 0.5 ha 0.045** 0.022 0.045** 0.022 0.045** 0.022 
   Farm plot  0.5-1 ha 0.128*** 0.026 0.128*** 0.026 0.128*** 0.026 
   Farm plot: 1-2 ha 0.184*** 0.028 0.184*** 0.028 0.184*** 0.028 
   Farm plot > 2 ha  0.302*** 0.034 0.302*** 0.034 0.302*** 0.034 
Lagged durable asset index: Reference Category: No durables  
   Asset poor  (1 – 33th percentile) 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.017 
                       (33th  - 66th percentile) 0.168*** 0.019 0.168*** 0.019 0.168*** 0.019 
   Asset rich   (66th – 100th percentile) 0.503*** 0.025 0.503*** 0.025 0.503*** 0.025 
Total pensions per capita 0.017*** 0.003 0.017*** 0.003 0.017*** 0.003 
Geography dummies: Reference Category: Katmandu 
   Other urban areas 0.155*** 0.047 0.155*** 0.047 0.155*** 0.047 
   Rural west  mount/hills 0.151** 0.073 0.151** 0.073 0.151** 0.073 
   Rural eastern mount/hills 0.064 0.056 0.064 0.056 0.064 0.056 
   Rural western Terai 0.164*** 0.063 0.164*** 0.063 0.164*** 0.063 
   Rural eastern Terai 0.238*** 0.057 0.238*** 0.057 0.238*** 0.057 
 Log of distance to market center -0.024*** 0.009 -0.024*** 0.009 -0.024*** 0.009 
Ward level variables  
   % illiterate, among age 15+ -0.331*** 0.106 -0.331*** 0.106 -0.331*** 0.106 
   % literate or 1-4  years of education -0.145 0.180 -0.145 0.180 -0.145 0.180 
   % completed 5-7 years of education -0.409** 0.190 -0.409** 0.190 -0.409** 0.190 
   % employed in wage job -0.080 0.138 -0.080 0.138 -0.080 0.138 
   % self employed -0.214** 0.083 -0.214** 0.083 -0.214** 0.083 
   Log of average hh expenditure, 1995 0.291*** 0.036 0.291*** 0.036 0.291*** 0.036 
   Gini coefficient , 1995 0.090 0.174 0.090 0.174 0.090 0.174 
Casualties from conflict, district level 0.001 0.021 0.001 0.021 0.001 0.021 
Constant -2.311*** 0.382 -2.687*** 0.396 -2.555*** 0.348 
Number of observations 3620 
Log-Likelihood -4,319.62 
Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level; ♣ indicates joint significance of 
coefficients at 10% level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
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 Table A5: Simulated changes in expenditure, poverty and inequality rates for different 
migration scenarios (standard errors in parenthesis). 
 
 
 
Migration scenarios Actual No  
migration 
Level of  
migration 
as in 1995-96 
+10% point  
increase in  
domestic 
migration 
+10% point  
increase in  
international 
migration 
Household types Poverty rate (changes in percentage points) 
 
All Households 
 
30.0  
 
+3.6* 
(2.1) 
+1.8* 
(0.9) 
-2.4* 
(1.3) 
-0.5 
(1.1) 
Households with no 
migrants 
30.6 
 
0 0 -3
*
 
(1.4) 
-1.3 
(1.9) 
Households with 
migrants within Nepal 
22.9 
 
+23.4* 
(9.4) 
+7.1* 
(3.6) 0 
+2.6 
(2.8) 
Households with 
migrants abroad 
32.8 
 
+2.1 
(7.3) 
+4.4 
(4.2) 
-2.1 
(2.5) 0 
 Average expenditure, NRP 10,000’s 
 
All Households 
 
1.493 
 
-0.088* 
(0.046) 
-0.047* 
(0.022) 
+0.068* 
(0.041) 
+0.022 
(0.037) 
Households with no 
migrants 
1.493 
 
0 0 +0.092
*
 
(0.050) 
+0.043 
(0.061) 
Households with 
migrants within Nepal 
1.576 
 
-0.489* 
(0.188) 
-0.175* 
(0.079) 0 
-0.049 
(0.060) 
Households with 
migrants abroad 
1.441 
 
-0.1 
(0.177) 
-0.113 
(0.100) 
+0.037 
(0.080) 
0 
 
 Inequality rate (Gini) 
 
All  Households 
 
0.409 
 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
+0.003 
(0.005) 
+0.003 
(0.004) 
64
Bibliography
Acharya, L. (2001). Integration of Population in Poverty Alleviation Programmes in Nepal.
Population and Development in Nepal, 8:57–66.
Adams Jr, R. (1989). Worker Remittances and Inequality in Rural Egypt. Economic Develop-
ment and Cultural Change, 38(1):45–71.
Adams Jr, R. (1991). The Economic Uses and Impact of International Remittances in Rural
Egypt. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 39(4):695–722.
Adams Jr, R. (1998). Remittances, Investment, and Rural Asset Accumulation in Pakistan.
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 47(1):155–173.
Adams Jr, R. (2005). Remittances, Household Expenditure, and Investment in Guatemala.
Technical report, World Bank, Development Research Group, Trade Team.
Adams Jr, R. and Page, J. (2005). Do International Migration and Remittances Reduce Poverty
in Developing Countries? World Development, 33(10):1645–1669.
Agesa, R. and Kim, S. (2001). Rural to Urban Migration as a Household Decision: Evidence
from Kenya. Review of Development Economics, 5(1):60–75.
Alderman, H. (1996). Saving and Economic Shocks in Rural Pakistan. Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 51:343–366.
Aydemir, A. (2003). Are iMmigrants Positively or Negatively Selected? The Role of Immi-
grant Selection Criteria and Self-Selection. Labor and Demography, 306002.
Barham, B. and Boucher, S. (1998). Migration, Remittances, and Inequality: Estimating
the Net Effects of Migration on Income Distribution. Journal of Development Economics,
55(2):307–331.
Bhattacharyya, B. (1985). The Role of Family Decision in Internal Migration: The Case of
India. Journal of Development Economics, 18(1):51–66.
Bhattarai, P. (2005). "Migration of Nepalese Youth for Foreign Employment: Problems and
Prospects". Youth Action Nepal, Katmandu.
Bhattrai, R. (2007). Open Borders, Closed Citizenship: Nepali Labor Migrants in Delhi.
Technical report.
Borjas, G. (1987). Self-selection and the Earnings of Immigrants. The American Economic
Review, 77(4):531–553.
65
Borjas, G. (1990). Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants. Reply. American Economic
Review, 80(1).
Borjas, G. (1991). Immigration and Self-Selection. In Immigration, Trade, and the Labor
Market, page 29. University Of Chicago Press.
Carrington, W., Detragiache, E., and Vishwanath, T. (1996). Migration with Endogenous
Moving Costs. The American Economic Review, 86:909–930.
Central Bureau of Statistics (2003). "Population Census 2001: National Report. Government
of Nepal.
Chhetry, D. (1999). Caste/Ethnic Groups as Primary Units of Concern of Poverty. Nepal
Population Journal, 8(7):43–48.
Chhetry, D. (2002). Population, Development and Poverty in Nepal: An Integrated Approach
of Analysis. Population and Development in Nepal, 10:72–83.
Chiswick, B. (1978). The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-born Men.
The Journal of Political Economy, 86(5):897–921.
Do, Q. and Iyer, L. (2007). Poverty, Social Divisions, and Conflict in Nepal.
Docquier, F. and Rapoport, H. (1998). Are Migrant Minorities Strategically Self-Selected?
Journal of Population Economics, 11(4):579–588.
Du, Y., Park, A., and Wang, S. (2005). Migration and Rural Poverty in China. Journal of
Comparative Economics, 33(4):688–709.
Dustmann, C. and Kirchkamp, O. (2002). The Optimal Migration Duration and Activity
Choice after Re-Migration. Journal of Development Economics, 67:351–372.
Efron, B. (1981). Nonparametric Estimates of Standard Error: the Jackknife, the Bootstrap
and Other Methods. Biometrika, 68(3):589–599.
Esquivel, G. and Huerta-Pineda, A. (2006). Remittances and Poverty in Mexico: a Propensity
Score Matching Approach. Technical report, mimeo.
Fafchamps, M. and Shilpi, F. (2003). The Spatial Division of Labour in Nepal. Journal of
Development Studies, 39(6):23–66.
Funkhouser, E. (1992). Mass Emigration, Remittances, and Economic Adjustment: the Case
Of El Salvador in the 1980s. Immigration and the Work Force: Economic Consequences
for the United States and Source Areas, pages 135–75.
Gustafsson, B. and Makonnen, N. (1993). Poverty and Remittances in Lesotho. Journal of
African Economies, 2(1):49–73.
66
Hausman, J. (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society, 46:1251–1271.
Heckman, J. and Sedlacek, G. (1990). Self-selection and the Distribution of Hourly Wages.
Journal of Labor Economics, 43:329–363.
Hildebrandt, N. and McKenzie (2004). The Effects of Migration on Child Health in Mexico.
Economia, pages 257–289.
Hoddinott, J. (1994). A model of Migration and Remittances Applied to Western Kenya.
Oxford Economic Papers, 46(3):459–476.
Jha, H. (1999). Status of Informal Sector Workers: the Other Side of Economy in Nepal.
Centre for Economic and Technical Studies in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Kanbur, R. and Rapoport, H. (2005). Migration Selectivity and the Evolution of Spatial in-
equality. Journal of Economic Geography, 5:43–57.
Kollmair, M., Manandhar, S., Subedi, B., and Thieme, S. (2006). New Figures for Old Sto-
ries: Migration and Remittance in Nepal. An International Journal of Migration Studies,
3(2):151–160.
Kumar, B. (2003). Migration, Poverty And Development In Nepal. In Ad Hoc Expert Group
Meeting on Migration and Development: Opportunities and Challenges for Poverty Reduc-
tion in the ESCAP region (UNESCAP).
Low, A. (1986). Agricultural Development in Southern Africa: Farm Household Theory and
the Food Crisis. James Currey, London, UK.
McKenzie, D., Gibson, J., and Stillman, S. (2007). Moving to Opportunity, Leaving Behind
What? Evaluating the Initial Effects of a Migration Policy on Incomes and Poverty in
Source Areas. New Zealand Economic Papers, 41(2):197–224.
McKenzie, D., Gibson, J., Stillman, S., Zealand, H., Bay, I., and Zealand, W. (2006). How
important is selection? Experimental vs. Non-experimental Measures of the Income Gains
from Migration.
McKenzie, D. and Rapoport, H. (2005). Migrant Networks, Migration Incentives and Educa-
tion Inequality in Rural Mexico. Inter-American Development Bank.
Mesnard, A. (2004). Temporary Migration and Capital Market Imperfections. Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers, 56(2):242–262.
Mroz, T. (1999). Discrete Factor Approximations in Simultaneous Equation Models: Esti-
mating the Impact of a Dummy Endogenous Variable on a Continuous Outcome. Journal
of Econometrics, 92(2):233–274.
67
Munshi, K. (2003). Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the US Labor
Market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2):549–599.
Nandini, A. (1999). Engendered Mobilization—-The Key to Livelihood Security: IFAD’s
Experience in South Asia. Technical report.
Sheddon, D. (2005). Nepal’s Dependence on Exporting Labor. Migration Policy Institute.
Sheddon, D., Adhikari, J., and Gurung, G. (2000). Foreign Labor Migration and the Remit-
tance Economy of Nepal: A Report to DFID, Kathmandu.
Stark, O. (1978). Economic-Demographic Interaction in the Course of Agricultural Develop-
ment: The Case of Rural-to-Urban Migration. Technical report.
Stark, O. (1991). The Migration of Labor. Basil Blackwell Oxford.
Stark, O. and Levhari, D. (1982). On Migration and Risk in LDCs. Economic Development
and Cultural Change, 31:191–196.
Stock, J. H. and Yogo, M. (2002). Testing for weak instruments in linear iv regression. Work-
ing Paper 284, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Taylor, J. and Mora, J. (2006). Does Migration Reshape Expenditures in Rural Households?:
Evidence from Mexico. World Bank, Development Research Group, Trade Team.
Taylor, J. and Wyatt, T. (1996). The Shadow Value of Migrant Remittances, Income and
Inequality in a Household-Farm Economy. Journal of Development Studies, 32(6):899–
912.
Thapliyal, S. (1999). Movement of Population between India and Nepal: Emerging Chal-
lenges. Strategic Analysis, 23(5):777–789.
The World Bank (2004). Nepal Development Policy Review: Restarting Growth and Poverty
Reduction. Report 29382-NP, SAPREM-SA.
Thieme, S. (2003). Savings and Credit Associations and Remittances: The Case of Far West
Nepalese Labour Migrants in Delhi, India. Technical report.
Thieme, S., Bhattrai, R., Gurung, G., Kollmair, M., Manandhar, S., and Müller-Böker, U.
(2005). Addressing the Needs of Nepalese Migrant Workers in Nepal and in Delhi, India.
Mountain Research and Development, 25(2):109–114.
Woodruff, C. and Zenteno, R. (2007). Migration Networks and Microenterprises in Mexico.
Journal of Development Economics, 82(2):509–528.
Yamanaka, K. (2000). Nepalese Labour Migration to Japan: from Global Warriors to Global
Workers. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(1):62–93.
68
Chapter 3
Work-related migration and its effect on
educational attainment in Nepal
3.1 Introduction
In Nepal in 2004, about 1 million children (or 20% of all children aged 6 to 15) had fathers
residing and working away from home, and often in foreign countries. What effect does this
condition have on the well-being of these children and, in particular, on their educational
attainment?
On the one hand, absence of a father can have a detrimental effect on the educational
attainment of a child. For example, it has been consistently shown that children living with-
out a father due to death or divorce in the family have lower progress in school (Antman,
2008). When the father is absent, children may have to spend more time helping with house-
hold chores and have less time to devote to school. A father present at home also serves as a
role model to encourage schooling. On the other hand, the father’s absence can be compen-
sated by increased household income coming from remittances that the father sends home.
In particular, my second essay showed that Nepali households with migrants have higher per
capita consumption than they would have without migration (Bontch-Osmolovski and Lok-
shin, 2007). However, the findings of that essay are not directly applicable here, because
spending on a child’s education is more of an investment-type expenditure and is therefore
not included in the calculation of household consumption aggregate.
Migration and remittances recently became a hot topic in literature on development and are
actively promoted by international institutions as a cure for poverty.1 However, if the short-
term boost to household consumption has the long-term consequence of lower human capital
of children, then the role of remittances in poverty reduction may need to be reconsidered.
Overall, there is no clear theoretical solution to the question formulated above and still no
empirical answer. There have been very few attempts to estimate the effect of migration on
education, and none so far in application to Nepal.
The main goal of this paper is to find out how the educational attainment of children
responds to the migration of their parents or other relatives in the household. This essay uses
the methodology and many of the results developed in my second essay, which studied the
relationship between household migration and poverty.
3.2 Review of economic literature on educational attainment
and its determinants
The economic research on the determinants of children’s educational attainment (EA) is vast.
However, there are few published papers that study the relationship between EA and migration
of parents. I will start with an overview of the development of EA literature to summarize the
1e.g. "With the number of migrants worldwide now reaching almost 200 million, their productivity
and earnings are a powerful force for poverty reduction. S¸Remittances, in particular, are an important
way out of extreme poverty for a large number of people. The challenge facing policymakers is to fully
achieve the potential economic benefits of migration, while managing the associated social and political
implications"
Francois Bourguignon, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, The World Bank
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main findings for determinants of EA. I will pay special attention to the literature concerned
with the impact of migration on EA.
Development of education attainment literature
This review relies largely on several extensive reviews of the literature available within the
economics of education. A review of the literature up to 1995 can be found in a JEL article by
Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and some later developments are discussed in the 2000 textbook
by Belfield (2000). A discussion of the frontiers of the economics of education in developing
countries is presented in a chapter of the Handbook of the Economics of Education, Glewwe
and Kremer (2005). An early review of the human capital theory was given by Blaug (1976).
Before the arrival of the human capital theory developed by Becker (1964), economists
were accustomed to view education primarily as a consumption item. Analysis of the
determinants of EA based on this view would typically control for household income, family
tastes and price of the education. A classic example of this consumption-based approach can
be seen in a 1967 paper by Campbell and Siegel (1967).
In contrast to the consumption-based approach, the human capital theory is based on a
view of education as an act of investment. When education is viewed as an investment, de-
mand for it must be determined by such factors as returns to education, borrowing constraints,
opportunity costs of investment, risk aversion, and other typical investment model factors.
The empirical literature that tried to estimate the role of these factors closely followed the
development of theoretical models of human capital.
To begin with, a series of papers in the 1970s estimated the elasticity of demand for educa-
tion in response to changes in salary for different occupations. In other words, they estimated
a response of invested amount to future returns on that investment (see the review in Free-
man, 1986). Further evidence for investment theory came with the estimation of the role of
opportunity costs of education. In an important paper, Manski and Wise (1983) used local
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wage rates as a measure of foregone earnings and found that higher wage rates tend to dimin-
ish local enrollments in college. This provided further support for investment-type models of
education.
Subsequently, in their seminal paper Becker and Tomes (1986) introduced the role of
family background and family decision-making into the model. This model distinguished
between genetic and acquired endowments of a child, modeled the role of parents in the
decision-making process, and introduced endogenous fertility together with the educational
choices. The goal of Becker and Tomes was to estimate mobility of earnings, wealth and
ability between generations, so-called "intergenerational mobility".
Quite soon, the development of the theory and growing complexity of the models outpaced
the development of the econometric methods used in the empirical work. In the late 1980s,
quite a few papers were focused on particular determinants of EA, but downplayed the role
of all the other potential aspects. Haveman and Wolfe (1995) present a meta-analysis of such
groups of papers: papers on the effect of borrowing constraints, on the role of education and
occupation of the parents, on the role of community level characteristics, etc.
One of the persistent econometric difficulties in the analysis of determinants of child
EA was the presence of unobserved family background variables that are likely to be cor-
related with many other observed family covariates. Two solutions to this problem gradually
emerged: the research on sibling data and use of longitudinal panel datasets.
In the sibling analysis, researchers would use between-sibling variation in outcome and
covariates. For example, to estimate the effect of divorce in the family on child EA, one
would interact the event of divorce with the age of the child and hold other family fixed
effects constant. Of course, one would identify the effect only for the subsample of families
with two or more children.
The longitudinal analysis makes it possible to control for family fixed effect by analyzing
the variation in the timing of events during childhood. Furthermore, longitudinal data allow
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researchers to estimate life cycle models of human capital investment, taking into account
self-selection of the agents into different occupations. An example of the frontiers in this type
of analysis can be found in two papers by Keane and Wolpin (1997, 2001), which use 11 years
of the NLSY data.
The human capital theory of education proved to be an excellent tool both in theoretical
and empirical applications. Yet, it is not the only way that economists look at education, and
I will briefly mention here the other alternatives.
First of all, the human capital investment theory of education was accompanied all along
by a competing theory, which viewed education as a signaling or screening process. Accord-
ing to this theory, the primary goal of education is not to accumulate human capital, but to
reveal the individual’s inherent ability and skills to the prospective employer. While very dif-
ferent in theory, in practice it turned out to be difficult to distinguish empirically. Both predict
a positive effect of education on earnings and self-selection of the individuals by enrollment
decisions. Yet, the two models have quite different implications for the determinants of EA.
In particular, if education is primarily a signaling tool and does not raise individual human
capital, then persons with better prospects of self-employment would end up getting less ed-
ucation than those engaged in wage employment. Wolpin (1977) empirically confirmed the
presence of such a phenomenon in his 1977 paper.
Another view of education recognizes it as an instrument to create social networks and
produce so-called social capital. For example, one may consider the important role that fra-
ternities and socializing play on college campuses in the US. The theory of social capital is a
rather recent one and has not yet achieved full recognition by mainstream economic literature.
A recent paper by Laibson et al. (2002) tries to build a framework for the accumulation of
social capital and to distinguish it from human capital. Unlike human capital, social capital
is not calculated on the individual level, but is defined for a network of people. In this regard
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the social capital theory of education would provide additional determinants of school enroll-
ment. On the other hand, higher social capital of the neighborhood was shown to facilitate the
supply of schooling by increasing the motivation for intergenerational loans from the older
generation to the younger generation (Goldin and Katz, 1999).
Finally, education is sometimes modeled as a household-produced good, with one input
being the time that children and parents devote to education, and other inputs being other mar-
ket goods. This branch of the literature correlates closely with the literature on child quality.
The papers treating education as household production are discussed in Gang and Zimmer-
mann (2000). This literature is very important for the research on the effect of migration on
EA, because it directly models the impact of parental time inputs (which has to change with
migration of a parent) on the production of child EA. For example, a paper by Hanushek
(1992) estimates the effect of absence of a father on the EA of the child (holding income con-
stant). Surprisingly, Hanushek finds no significant effect, but some other studies do find such
an effect (see page 5 in Antman, 2008)
Findings of the child labor literature
So far we have been considering the literature concerned primarily with the educational at-
tainment of children. However, interesting results for EA may come from research on other
topics, such as child labor. Indeed, in developing countries, child labor is often a primary
substitute for education and the main opportunity cost of schooling is the foregone earnings
from work (that a child could perform at home or on the market). The decision regarding child
labor and education enrollment is probably made jointly and simultaneously in the household,
so something that affects child labor would affect educational attainment as well.
One simple example of such analysis is a paper by Bonsang and Faye (2005). The authors
estimate a multinomial logit model of a choice of child occupation among three options: work
in the market, work at home or schooling. An important assumption of this paper is that
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schooling and child labor are mutually exclusive.
A paper by Beegle et al. (2005) reviews several studies of the child labor - schooling trade-
off. The majority of these studies find a negative effect of child labor on child schooling. Some
studies, however, argue that a child can do both activities at the same time if school hours are
substantially short, in which case schooling and child labor are no longer mutually exclusive.
In fact, Ravallion and Wodon (2000) find evidence just for that in Bangladesh; the increase in
schooling was accompanied by a comparatively low reduction in child labor.
Another important question concerns the effect of household wealth on child labor. In an
influential study Baland and Robinson (2000) model the relationship between parental income
and child labor, and show that higher household income does not always lead to a decline in
child labor. In fact, under certain conditions, an increase in parental income may lead to a
decrease in expected transfers from the child back to his or her parents in the future; this
would in turn lead to an increase in parental demand for child labor in the present. This
interesting theoretical finding has been confirmed in the empirical literature (a meta-analysis
of the results of 17 different papers is provided in a recent paper by Dammert (2005)).
Some authors, e.g. Basu and Van (1998), argue that one of the the primary factors for
underinvestment in education is the fact that one can not have an enforceable contract with
one’s children, and that use of child labor is just a way for parents to get returns from their
children as economic assets .
The determinants of educational attainment
In this subsection I summarize the possible determinants of educational attainment as sug-
gested by the literature. Educational attainment viewed as investment would respond to the
following factors:
• returns to education. Future monetary returns to education come from the increase in
human capital productivity, signaling, and the acquisition of social networks. Returns
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to education are typically measured by future salaries or lifetime earnings. Studies
typically estimate elasticity of the demand for education to be between 1 and 2. A
meta-analysis of studies of elasticity of demand for education in returns to salaries is
given by Freeman (1986).
What causes variation in returns to education? First of all, even though local returns
to education are taken by households as given and can be considered exogenous, re-
turns may vary between the local labor markets and especially between future migra-
tion destinations. Therefore, a new possibility of domestic or international migration
may drastically change a household’s perception of returns to education (McKenzie and
Rapoport, 2003; de Brauw and Giles, 2005).
Returns to each additional year of education will vary by the level of education already
achieved. While typical models of human capital formation involve negative second
derivatives, there is also evidence of increasing returns to highly skilled human capital
in developed countries, which partly explains the rise in inequality (Juhn et al., 1993).
On the individual level, returns to education are determined by child-specific abilities,
which are usually unobserved by researchers. These abilities may be correlated with the
abilities of parents and siblings. Depending on the model, we see two types of parental
behavior with respect to child abilities: there is compensating behavior (if parents in-
vest more in children with low abilities to equalize returns) or behavior which reinforces
the differences (if parents invest more in children with high abilities and give monetary
transfers to less able children) (Behrman, 1997). Returns to education may also vary by
gender, and in most developing countries women in the same occupation with the same
level of education earn considerably less than men (Lokshin and Mroz, 2003).
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Finally, returns to education may be perceived differently by a child and his parents,
depending on the contractual arrangement between the child and parents, and of parents’
assessment of the value of the child’s future utility. In non-altruistic models of parental
behavior, parents may invest in a child’s education primarily in the interest of future
compensation (after they have retired) (Basu and Van, 1998). In such a case, it may
matter for the parents whether the child is expected to stay nearby and support them
in the future. In particular, since daughters are much more likely than sons to leave the
household, perceived returns to parents from investment in daughters may be lower than
for sons (Das Gupta et al., 2003). The possibility of outmigration of children may lower
the link between parents and child as well.
• opportunity costs of education. First, there is an opportunity cost of time that a child
spends on education, time which alternatively could be spent on work at home, work in
the market or leisure. The opportunity cost for not-working at home is determined by a
household home production function, and can be affected by such factors as household
demographic composition, household productive assets (i.e. amount of agricultural land
to harvest), and temporary income shocks. The opportunity cost for not-working on the
wage market depends on the returns from the wage market (local or migrant), given the
current level of education of the child. The maximum of those two costs would be the
opportunity cost of studying.
Second, an opportunity cost of monetary investment in a child’s education lies in the
possible income from investing that amount in the money market or elsewhere. For
example, if returns on the money market are high, parents may choose to invest money in
a bank rather than in the human capital of children, and compensate them with transfers
later. A wealth model developed by Becker (reviewed in Behrman, 1997) predicts that
parents will keep investing in their children’s education until the returns from education
and from the money market are equal.
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• household wealth, credit and liquidity constraints. If a household faces high borrow-
ing interest rates or borrowing constraints, then parents may choose a level of human
capital investment below the optimal unconstrained level. In such cases, an increase in
wealth of the household will shift the constrained choice of education higher, towards
the unconstrained one. This can happen for two different reasons: wealthier house-
holds can borrow at lower interest rates than poorer, riskier households, or sometimes
wealthier households may not need to borrow at all. When a household has reached the
wealth threshold such that the borrowing constraint is no longer binding, the effect of
an increase in wealth of the household on investment in education is expected to drop
in magnitude (i.e. exhibit non-linear behavior) (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2003).
While the theoretical effect of wealth and income on education is largely acknowledged,
its identification remains a difficult task. In a 1999 article, Behrman and Knowles (1999)
present an overview of the results of 21 papers which attempt to estimate the elasticity
of various measures of educational attainment with respect to household long-term con-
sumption. Many of the papers deliver significant positive elasticities, but interpretation
of such estimates, including the ones derived in the Berhman paper, remains problem-
atic because of the issues of measurement error and endogeneity of income variables.
• other determinants of investment. When it is not posible to borrow, investing in
education involves a trade-off between current and future consumption. Such a trade-off
will depend on the household discount rate and on the marginal utility of substitution
between current and future household consumption. The lower the current level of
consumption, the higher it is valued by the household relative to future consumption,
and the less is invested in child education.
When education is treated as consumption, the quantity demanded depends on its price
(i.e. tuition) relative to other goods, total household income (education is often claimed to be
a normal good) and parents’ taste. Parents’ taste for education is likely to be affected by their
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own level of education and that of their parents and friends. Parents’ marginal utility from
the consumption of education can depend on such child characteristics as gender (particularly
important in South Asian countries) and birth order (Das Gupta et al., 2003).
If education is viewed as screening or signaling, then it should create less incentive to
acquire education for prospective self-employed individuals (Wolpin, 1977).
Finally, when education is modeled as a produced good, several groups of factors may
influence the production process:
• social factors determine the available supply, cost and quality of education. This in-
cludes availability and proximity of schools, cost of tuition, teacher to pupil ratio, qual-
ity of teachers and educational institutions in general. A detailed review of the school
quality literature and its effect on EA is provided in the Glewwe and Kremer (2005).
• household factors On the household level, the process of educating a child is consid-
ered to depend on the composition and number of adults in the household. Parents
and other adults can serve as role models and help children to learn how to read and
do homework. This effect depends, of course, on the educational level of adults. The
number of other children in the household that share and split available resources and
responsibilities can either lower or raise the educational attainment of a child.
Findings of the literature on migration and educational attainment.
Several effects of migration on educational attainment are identified in the literature. First,
there can be a direct income effect from migration and remittances. The income effect can
enter through an investment channel or consumption channel and is expected to be positive.
On the other hand, if higher parental income is accompanied by an increase in child labor, as
in Rogers and Swinnerton (2004), EA can actually be reduced. In addition, a household may
suffer a period of economic setback immediately following the migrants’ departure, before
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the remittances begin to arrive. During this time, the child may be forced to forgo schooling
temporarily or even permanently.
Second, the absence due to migration of a member of the household will have its own
effects on EA (Antman, 2008). The child’s performance in school may deteriorate because
of the absence of role models and decreased parental supervision. Another possibility is that
a child may be forced to forgo schooling if the absence of a household member raises the
child’s productivity at home. This effect is probably going to be more significant for boys
than for girls, as boys are better substitutes for an absent male. However, long-term effects of
remittances may encourage a household to start up a new enterprise; this could in turn increase
returns for the education of children working in that enterprise. 2
Finally, the experience of migration in the household (and to some extent in the village)
may change the perception of returns from education for the household members (McKenzie
and Rapoport, 2003). If migrants’ native education is not valued abroad, this would give
a negative incentive for prospective migrants to study (even if they end up not migrating).
On the other hand, if skilled labor is valued abroad (for instance, countries like Canada and
Australia import only high-skilled workers), then the opposite effect would be observed.
To sum up: three different channels of how migration can effect educational attainment are
established in the literature, while the total expected effect of migration on child EA remains
undetermined. This is why it may be interesting to estimate it from the policy perspective.
Theoretical models also predict potential variation of this effect between different age and
gender groups. It is hard to decompose the total effect of migration through the three channels
mentioned above, and most of the papers on migration and education either implicitly or
explicitly treat the total effect as a a black box, failing to identify the contribution of each
channel separately.
2On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, if education has a signaling effect only, then having an enterprise
in the family may reduce the incentive for children to acquire education.
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To further complicate matters, the research on migration and education is plagued by prob-
lems of endogeneity and selection. The same unobserved factors may affect both migration
of the parent and school enrollment of the child (for example, a severe negative income shock
may force both migration of a parent and withdrawal of a child from school to work in the
market (Antman, 2008).
Overall, the literature on the effect of migration on educational attainment remains rather
limited; as of December, 2008 it consists of one published paper and five working papers,
which I review in greater detail below. In the earliest of those papers, Edwards and Ureta
(2003) try to determine the effect of income from remittances on the educational attainment of
children in El Salvador. They estimate that the impact of income from remittances is positive,
i.e. that remittances significantly lower the hazard of dropping out of school, and that this
effect is 3 to 10 times larger than the impact of income from other sources.3
To get these results, Edwards and Ureta used the cross-section data on 14,000 children
aged 6 to 24 from the Annual Household Survey (EHPM) in 1997. The authors make the
dependent variable the event of leaving school, conditional on being enrolled in the previous
year. In other words, they apply the Cox proportional hazard model (CPH) to estimate the
effect of the covariates on child educational attainment. They argue that the benefit of the
CPH model in estimating total attainment is that it incorporates information on children cur-
rently enrolled in school (right censored). However, one shortcoming of this approach is that
unenrolled children are assumed to have dropped out of school for good, whereas in reality
some of them will return to school the next year. In the paper, such children are treated as if
they will not re-enroll, and the estimate of total attainment for El Salvador may consequently
be too low.
3In particular, receiving $100 in remittances is estimated to lower the hazard of leaving school by 25% in
rural areas and by 54% in urban areas.
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In the estimation, Edwards and Ureta control for gender of the child, access to basic ser-
vices like water and electricity, parental education and two sources of family income: income
from remittances and total income net of remittances. Two questions arise in this regard. First,
they do not control for the age of child which is, of course, an important determinant of en-
rollment (despite the fact that hazard function estimates are conditional on the obtained grade
by construction, obtained grade and age of child can be different in Nepal as I show in section
3.3). Second, there are problems with putting income variables on the right hand side. One
problem, as the authors mention in the paper, is that current household income is used as a
proxy for the permanent household income, and therefore it is measured with error by defini-
tion. In addition, both income from remittances and income net of remittances are potentially
endogenous in respect to enrollment of the child. Edwards and Ereta argue that, since most of
the migration in El Salvador occurred for political reasons in the 1980s, remittances income
can be seen as exogenous.
Even if the migration decision was exogenous, however, the fact of sending remittances
might not be; This would make income from remittances endogenous. Endogeneity of income
net of remittances can stem from two sources. First, it can be affected by same unobservable
factors that affect education of the child. Second, it can can be directly affected by child
enrollment decision, since the child can work in the wage market instead of going to school.
Overall, recent economic literature stresses the importance of using the household wealth
rather than transitory income, and the need to control for endogeneity of the migration decision
and remittances amounts (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995).
In the other working papers on education and migration, the problem of endogeneity is
addressed in various ways. One of the commonly used instruments to account for the non-
random selection of migrant households is the historical regional migration rates.
In a working paper written by Acosta (2006), the conclusions derived by EU are reex-
amined. Acosta uses the next round of EHPM data, the IV probit estimation rather than the
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CPH estimation model used by Edwards and Ureta, and controls for the selection of migrants
using village level networks as an instrument. Village level networks are measured by the
proportion of the migrant families in the village. Acosta confirms the positive effect found by
Edwards and Ureta, noting that it does not seem to apply to older boys (15-17 years old).
However, the instrument used by Acosta is subject to criticism for being influenced by cur-
rent economic conditions in the village, and thus being correlated with the outcome of interest.
In the papers described below, the authors use the historic level of migrant networks, which
is a more refined version of the same instrument. Historic level networks with sufficient lag
are argued to determine migration in the present but to be uncorrelated with current economic
shocks.
In two very similar papers, Hanson and Woodruff (2003) and McKenzie and Rapoport
(2003) study the effect of having a U.S migrant in the family on the educational attainment
of children left at home in Mexico. Hanson and Woodruff use a 10% subsample of 10-15
year old children from the 2000 Mexico Census of Population and Housing, and McKenzie-
Rapaport use the data from the 1997 ENADID survey, focusing on children 12 to 18 years
old. Both of the papers use historic lagged state-level migration rates interacted with the
household level variables to have a variation of instrument on the household level. It is argued
that this instrument has an effect on the probability of migration, but does not affect education
outcomes of the children. In regards to the estimation technique, both papers use the grade
achieved at school as the dependent variable. Hanson and Woodruff use instrumental variable
linear regression, but McKenzie and Rapaport go beyond the linear probability model, using
iv-ordered probit and iv-censored ordered probit. Hanson and Woodruff find the positive effect
of having a migrant in the household on grade achievement of girls of poorly-educated mothers
(0-8 years) and an insignificant effect on boys. McKenzie and Rapaport actually report a
negative effect of living in a migrant household (20 % lower chance of completing high school
for boys and 14% for girls). Their explanation for this phenomenon is that children in migrant
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households are more likely to migrate themselves and, therefore, have lower expected returns
to education.
However, as Antman (2008) points out in her paper, if networks reduce the cost of migra-
tion, then the presence of networks can affect the child’s prospects of future migration and
thus change the expected returns of education and the optimal level of educational attainment.
This case would make the use of the instrument problematic.4
To take care of family-level fixed effects that may cause both migration and education,
Antman follows an approach from the sibling research literature (see Haveman and Wolfe,
1995). The effect of migration on education is identified through the variation of its magnitude
on children within the family, conditional on the age of the child when migration occurred.
Antman uses a sample of siblings at least 25 years old from the Mexican Migration Project
data (MMP107), and uses retrospective migration history to figure out the age of the child
when the first migration happened. She concludes that migration of a father has a positive
impact on education of the girls (about one additional year) and no impact on the boys. It
turns out that the results of her analysis are the opposite of those found in McKenzie and
Rapaport and Haveman and Wolfe studies. Of course, since the sibling method only estimates
the effect on the sample of two-child households that have a migrant, additional assumptions
are needed to generalize the results for the whole population.
A working paper by Mansuri (2006) tries to use both of the above-mentioned approaches
separately. Her interest lies in the effect of migration on educational attainment and child
labor in Pakistan. Mansuri takes the data from the Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS)
2001-02 and examines the educational and labor outcomes of children aged 5-17. For the
instrument, Mansuri uses the current proportion of households with a migrant in the village,
interacted with the number of adult males in the household. At the same time, village-level
4de Brauw and Giles (2005) estimated that the village-level reduction in cost of migration in China resulted
in a substantial drop in high-school enrollment, since the opportunity costs of education increased
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fixed effects are used to take care of village-level unobservables that may determine both the
migrant networks and educational attainment outcomes. Therefore, by interacting the village-
level instrument with the household-level variable, Mansuri attempts to simultaneously use
village-level instrument and control for village-level fixed effects. However, her assumption
that the number of adult males in the household does not affect children’s educational out-
comes (conditional on other household level variables) remains questionable, especially given
the extensive literature on the role of adults as role models for a child’s educational perfor-
mance (see Haveman and Wolfe, 1995).
In a separate exercise, Mansuri examines within-family variation of the age of a child at
the time of migration and its effect on the educational outcomes. To take care of the endogene-
ity in the present level of village networks, Mansuri uses the interaction of village networks
with the number of adult males in the household, and focuses on within-family variation of
educational attainment between siblings. Mansuri finds a positive effect of migration of a
household member on the educational outcomes of children using both ways of the estimation
with a much larger effect for girls (50-65% increase in enrollment rates) than for boys (7-15%
increase). However, enrollment rates of boys were already much larger to begin with.
Numerous other papers on the various effects of migration have used historical migration
rates as the instruments for migration decision (See the discussion in Rapoport and Docquier,
2006, page 1186). Historical migrant networks are also occasionally used as instruments in
the literature on the impact of immigration on the local labor markets (for example Card,
2001).
Some researchers used measures of regional variation in cost of migration as an instru-
ment. Of course, one needs to show that such variation is uncorrelated with the determinants
of the outcome of interest. An example of this is a working paper by de Brauw and Giles
(2005) on the effect of an increase in migrant opportunities on enrollment in school. To mi-
grate internally in China, one needs a national passport. In 1998, passports were not yet
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available to most rural residents; since then various rural locations started to issue passports to
their residents at different times. deBrauw and Giles prove that this variation is exogenous and
uncorrelated with local economic conditions. Using this instrument to control for the emer-
gence of migrant networks, they find that enrollment in high school falls significantly with the
rise of the opportunity to migrate.
Among the other approaches, a series of papers by Yang (2004) are notable for the use
of exogenous fluctuations in the exchange rates as an instrument for the amount of migrant’s
earnings and the amount of remittances sent from abroad. Using the variation in migrants’
destinations during the 1997-98 Asian exchange rate crisis, Yang is able to identify the effect
of remittances on entrepreneurship and household consumption in Phillipines.
Table 3.1 summarizes the contributions and findings of existing migration literature.
Table 3.1: Summary of the literature on the effect of migration on education
effect on
country age
groups
method control for endo-
geneity
boys girls
Cox-Edwar. El Salvador 6-24 (CPH) no  0 assumed similar
Acosta El Salvador 11-17 IV probit present networks  0  0 , stronger for
girls
Hanson Mexico 10-15 IV reg. lagged networks 0  0, if low edu-
cated mothers
McKenzie Mexico 12-18 Censored ordered IV
probit
lagged networks ≺ 0 ≺ 0, weaker for
girls
Antman Mexico 0-25 Sibling reg. age of child at the
migration
0  0
Mansuri Pakistan 5-17 IV reg. and sibling.
reg
current networks +
age of child
 0  0, stronger for
girls
DeBrauw China high
school
IV regression issuance of na-
tional id
≺ 0 ≺ 0, same
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3.3 Data, descriptive analysis and introduction to the Nepalese
Educational System
3.3.1 Data
This paper’s analysis is based on the data from two rounds of the Nepal Living Standards
Survey (NLSS) and data from the national census of households, 2001. The NLSS, a na-
tionally representative survey of households and communities, was conducted between June
1995 and June 1996 (NLSS-I) and April 2003 and April 2004 (NLSS-II) by the Nepal Central
Bureau of Statistics, with the assistance of the World Bank.5 NLSS I and II data are com-
parable in terms of survey methodology, interviewing procedures, and questionnaire content.
NLSS modules contain detailed information on household composition, individual activities
of household members, their educational background and current or past school attendance. A
special part of the questionnaire is devoted to the receipt of household remittances, providing
information on the age and sex of sender, the relationship of sender to recipient, the amount
of remittances and the location from which they were sent.
The NLSS-II sample includes both cross-sectional and panel components. The cross-
sectional sample was constructed using a two-stage design based on the 2001 Nepal Census
sample. The primary sampling units (PSUs) were identified using probability proportional
to size sampling. Within each PSU, 12 households were selected using systematic sampling.
Panel PSUs in NLSS-II were randomly selected with equal probability within each of the six
strata as defined in NLSS-I (mountains, urban Kathmandu, urban hills, rural hills, urban Terai,
and rural Terai). The survey’s sample covers 73 districts of Nepal (excluding the Rasuwa and
Mustang districts). The NLSS-II sample includes information on 326 cross-sectional and 95
panel PSUs enumerating 3,912 and 1,160 households respectively. To create a larger sample,
5NLSS questionnaires can be downloaded from http:\www.worldbank.org/lsms
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I combine the cross-sectional and panel samples of NLSS II into one dataset 6. The combined
dataset includes 5,051 households with 7,182 children of school age (6-16) and 7,414 adult
males (17-60).
3.3.2 Internal and international migration in Nepal
In this section I describe characteristics of internal and international migration in Nepal using
information from Census 2001 data and NLSS surveys. According to (Central Bureau of
Statistics, 2003) internal migration within Nepal steadily increased following the eradication
of malaria in the Terai plains in the 1950s. In 2001, 22% of the population was living outside
their district of birth and 3% of the population had changed district of residence in the last
five years. The major stream of migrants (69% of all the migrants) moved from rural to rural
areas. Rural to urban migrants constituted 26% and urban to urban just 3%. Geographically,
the main direction of migration was and remains from the mountains and hills of the north to
the Terai plains in the south.
International migration has two distinct destinations. First of all, India, bordering Nepal
to the south, continues to attract a great deal of migrants from Nepal. Historically, citizens
of Nepal did not need visa to enter or work in India. In this respect, migration to India can
be seen as a natural extension of internal migration. According to NLSS, migration to India
constituted 85% of all abroad destinations in 1993-94. However, migration to other foreign
countries grew in importance after the 2001 reform simplified the procedure to get a travel
passport. In 2003-04 18% of migrants went to Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar
and UAE, and the share of migrants to India dropped to 65%.
Overall, according to NLSS 2004, 14% of households reported receiving remittances from
6In order to calculate country-level averages, population weights in the combined sample had to be adjusted
accordingly.
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Nepal and 18% from abroad. If receving remittances is used as an indicator of having a work-
related migrant, this gives a total figure of 32% of households with work-related migrants.
Accoridng to an alternate definition, a migration event in the household occurs when an adult
male member of the household is absent from the household for more than six months. This
definition gives an estimate of 29% of households with a working migrant.
Table 3.2 presents information on remittances in families with children grouped by the
relation of sender to child.7
Table 3.2: Remittances patterns among children age 5 to 15
Remittances sent from
Relation of sender to child (%) Nepal Abroad Total
Father 31 53 44
Brother 27 30 29
Uncle, father’s side 13 11 12
Sister, aunt, mother 10 1 5
Other relative 19 4 10
Total 100 100 100
% of children, receiving remittances 13 18 30
% of children, receiving remittances from father 4 10 13
% of children, with father residing elsewhere 18
Table 3.2 reveals several important facts. First, the overall share of children receiving re-
mittances is just about the same as the share of households receiving remittances in Table 1 of
Bontch-Osmolovski and Lokshin (2007). Therefore, household with migrants have about the
same number of children as no-migrant households. Second, 85% of all remittances are sent
by either the father, brother or an uncle of the child (note that within one household a sender
can simultaneously be the father of one child and an uncle of another). Third, a significant
share of remittances sent from Nepal is sent by relatives outside the primary family,8 who
7NLSS only considers the question of the relation of sender to the household head. I calculated the relation
of sender to the child in the family by identifying relatives through information on their names, names of parents
of their parents, relationship to household head and maternity history.
8A Nepalese household may consist of a household head, his parents, his wife, his sons and his daughters
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usually reside in different households (for instance, relatives of the child’s mother). These are
in fact not remittances, but transfers between separate families. The share of fathers relative
to brothers and uncles is lower among domestic senders than international senders. Finally, 5
% of children have fathers residing elsewhere but do not report that they receive remittances.
Divorces are still extremely rare in Nepal; most likely in these cases, the father brings earnings
from working elsewhere in person (or remittances were not reported for other reasons).
3.3.3 The Nepalese Educational System
Education in Nepal is structured between grade-school and higher education (college and
above). Grade-school education includes a primary level of grades 1-5 (ages 6-10), lower
secondary and secondary levels of grades 6-8 (ages 11-14) and 9-10 (ages 14-15). Pre-primary
education is also available in certain areas. Secondary levels of education are usually taught
in different locations than primary schools; these often require longer travel time or may not
be available at all in the area.
At grades 5, 8 and 10, students are required to pass a set of exams to complete the cor-
responding level of education and advance to the next one. To advance to higher education
(college) a student has to pass a national exam after grade 10 and obtain a School Leaving
Certificate (SLC examination). It usually takes an additional year to prepare for the SLC
examination.
Education in primary school is compulsory by law, and six years of age is the prescribed
age for admission into grade one. However, almost 50% of children enroll in first grade
as young as the age of five. This results in some confusion regarding the official age of
enrollment. Various authors use either five or six as the starting age of enrollment. Even the
documents from the Nepali Ministry of Education and Sports are not consistent in this regard.
(if they are young), his brothers and sisters (if they are young) and his grandchildren. When women marry they
usually leave the household. Consequently, relatives of the household head’s wife do not typically reside in the
household.
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Figure 3.1 shows the official age-to-grade correspondence matrix, which begins at the age
of five. However, other documents use a starting age of six (at this age enrollment becomes
compulsory). In this analysis, I will use six as the prescribed age of enrollment into primary
school, as many of the five-year-olds are either postponing their enrollment or repeating the
1st grade. The prescribed ages for low secondary and secondary schools are defined to be
from 11 to 13 and from 14 to 15, respectively.
Figure 3.1: Age to grade official matrix, 2001
Source: Ministry of Education. www.moe.gov.np
Table 3.3 presents a snapshot of official educational statistics for 2001. This table shows
several important characteristics of the Nepalese educational system. The enrollment rate in
primary school is fairly high, but in low secondary and secondary schools we can observe
a gender gap in enrollment and, consequentially, a sharp drop. One factor that explains this
drop in enrollment is the availability of schools. In 2002, there were only half as many low
secondary and secondary schools as there were primary schools.
Transition rates presented at the bottom of the table show that about 80% of children who
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Table 3.3: Country level statistics, 2001
Primary Low secondary Secondary Total
Schools 24,943 7,340 4,113 25,194
Enrollments Total 3,853,618 1,058,448 449,296 5,361,362
Girls 1,726,253 446,382 186,092 2,358,727
Girls % 44.8 42.2 41.4 44
Boys 2,127,365 612,066 263,204 3,002,635
Teachers 96,659 26,678 18,846 142,183
Student/School 154.5 144.2 109.2 212.8
Teacher/School 3.9 3.6 4.6 5.6
Student/Teacher 39.9 39.7 23.8 37.7
Age group population 6-10 11-13 14-15 6-15
Total 3,091,258 1,673,887 1,025,415 5,790,561
Female 1,504,414 826,176 517,623 2,848,213
Male 1,586,844 847,712 507,792 2,942,349
Gross enrollment rate
Total 124.7 63.2 43.8 92.6
Girls 114.7 54 36 82.8
Boys 134.1 72.2 51.8 102
Net enrollment rate
Total 81.1 39.4 25.5 59.2
Girls 75.1 33.7 20.9 53.2
Boys 86.9 45 30.2 65
Transition rate
(primary to low secondary) Total 82.1
Girls 81.8
Boys 82.3
Source: Ministry of Education. www.moe.gov.np
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complete primary school enroll in secondary school. How is it possible that the enrollment rate
in secondary school remains low, despite such a high transition rate? Several reasons explain
this paradox: high incidence of grade repetition, problems of late enrollment in primary school
and a low completion rate of 60%.
The incidence of grade repetition and late enrollment can be judged from the disparity
between net enrollment rates and gross enrollment rates for all the school levels. The net
enrollment rate is defined as the share of children of the relevant age that are enrolled in
school among all children of that age group. The gross enrollment rate is defined as the share
of children of all ages that are enrolled in school among all children of that age. The fact that
gross enrollment is so high shows a particular problem in Nepalese education: that many older
children are being enrolled in primary schools together with younger children, either because
of a late start or because of grade repetition.
Indeed, other government reports show evidence of very high rates of repetition (percent
of students that repeat a grade). Table 3.4 presents this data. Repetition rates are very high
Table 3.4: Internal efficiency of education, 2003
Promotion rate Repetition rate Dropout rate
Grade Total Girls Boys Total Girls Boys Total Girls Boys
1 50.8 50.8 50.8 34.0 33.7 34.2 15.3 15.5 15
2 74.9 74.8 74.9 19.4 19.8 19.1 5.8 5.5 6.0
3 77.7 77.8 77.6 15.3 15.6 15.1 7.0 6.6 7.3
4 76.9 77.1 76.7 15.7 15.8 15.5 7.5 7.1 7.7
5 73.0 72.6 73.3 13.5 13.8 13.3 13.5 13.6 13.4
6 78.7 78.7 78.7 15.4 16.2 14.8 5.9 5.1 6.5
7 81.5 81.6 81.4 12.4 12.8 12.2 6.0 5.6 6.4
8 74.5 74.0 74.8 18.6 19.4 17.9 7.0 6.6 7.3
9 76.9 76.8 76.9 16.0 17.0 15.2 7.2 6.2 7.9
10 - - 17.9 19.7 16.6 - - -
Source: Ministry of Education. www.moe.gov.np
especially for the first grade: one out of three students repeats the first grade. Likely, this high
rate is driven by the underage enrolled children that stay for an extra year to catch up with
the six-year-olds. Yet, even in the higher grades, repetition remains very high relative to other
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regions in South Asia. Drop out rates are also high in the first grade, but it is possible that
some of the drop-outs reenroll in school next year.
Grade repetition leads to increased class sizes, lower teacher-to-student ratio and a mix
of students of different ages in a class, making it harder for teachers to teach and students to
learn. To generalize, while Nepal has made considerable progress in overall primary school
enrollment and has seen drop-out rates plummet, the high repetition rate plagues the educa-
tional system and is a big problem for primary school students.
What are the reasons for the high repetition rates? Official reports from the Ministry of
Education cite inadequate teacher training, a high level of absenteeism and low level of student
commitment as primary factors. In other words, some children are enrolled formally, but have
to contribute a lot of their time to household work and are unable to advance to the next grade.
Another acknowledged problem of education in Nepal is connected to the disparities be-
tween outcomes in regard to ethnicity and gender of the child. A recent descriptive paper by
Stash and Hannum (2001) summarizes the role of caste and gender in long-term educational
trends as of 1991, using DHS data. In the next section, I present the evidence on educational
outcomes from the NLSSS data that I am using for this paper.
Evidence from the NLSS surveys of 1995-96 and 2003-04
It is evident that total enrollment rates calculated in NLSS for 2003-04 are lower than official
enrollment rates reported in table 3.3 for 2001. Since there was an overall increasing trend in
enrollment rates, this difference cannot be explained simply by difference between the years.
Table 3.10 on page 135 presents changes in net enrollment rate (NER) between 1996 and
2004.9
Table 3.10 shows that from 1995 to 2003 primary school NER increased by 10% points
9The net enrollment rate (NER) is the share of children of primary school age that are enrolled in primary
school.
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(from 67% to 78 %) for boys and by 20% points (from 46% to 67%) for girls. Nepal has
a compulsory education requirement only for the first 5 years of primary school, and not
surprisingly, NER for secondary school drops dramatically at teh age of 11. On the other
hand, secondary school enrollments also increased universally between the two periods for all
the social divisions presented in the table.
Table 3.10 shows evidence of high variation in enrollment rates with respect to regional,
ethnic and income groups. Enrollment rates are much higher in high-income groups, among
advantaged ethnicities, and in urban areas. Gender disparity is almost negligible in urban
areas and for high income groups, but has a very large presence in poor rural families and
among Muslims. Overall, the lower the enrollment rate for boys, the bigger the gender gap
between boys and girls.
Educational attainment by age
Figure 3.2: Proportion of children by education status
Source: author’s calculation from NLSS.
Figure 3.2 (page 95) plots the proportion of children of certain age, categorized by their
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education status. The share of children who never went to school declines steadily from 5
to 11 years of age. The share of children who dropped out of school increases gradually
from 11 to 18 years of age. Together this results in a U-shape function for the proportion of
children who are not enrolled in school. In this paper I focus on the effect of migration on
the probability of being enrolled in school only. Figure 3.2 shows that grade repetition is an
important issue for the children of all ages, and needs to be studied separately.
3.4 Theoretical and empirical model of migration and en-
rollment
In this section I construct a theoretical and empirical framework for analyzing the effect of
migration on enrollment. First, I start with a general discussion of how to define the effect
of migration on enrollment in terms of conditional demand functions. Second, I calculate
these effects in a simple theoretical model of household choice. Finally, I set up the empirical
framework to estimate the effect of migration using Nepal survey data.
Effect of variable X on Y is usually defined as the change of Y variable, given the exoge-
nous change in X , holding everything else constant. Since migration and schooling are both
products of household’s choice and endogenous in nature, the causality link between them is
not obvious and demands closer examination.
I start with the assumption that a given household makes a joint simultaneous decision
regarding an adult migration outcome M and a child enrollment outcome S. At this moment
it is not necessary for me to specify the budget constraints and household utility function and
solve explicitly for the optimal solutions (this is done in the later section). In general, as the
result of a joint simultaneous choice, both migration and schooling enrollment outcomes will
be some functions of exogenous parameters X.
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
S∗ = f ∗(X)
M∗ = g∗(X)
(3.1)
(Stars * over the functions indicate that these are the optimal values). Despite the fact that the
household simultaneously picks both M∗ and S∗, this system can be rewritten as if maximiza-
tion were a two step process. First, we solve for the optimal school enrollment choice, taking
the migration outcome as given. Second, we pick the migration outcome that maximizes the
utility function, given the optimal schooling choices. The optimal enrollment function then
becomes a switching function of two conditional enrollment functions, depending on the value
of optimal migration choice.
The system of equations, identical in solution to (3.1), becomes:

S∗0 = f0(X)
S∗1 = f1(X)
M∗ = g∗(X)
S∗ = S∗0I(M
∗ = 0) + S∗1I(M
∗ = 1)
(3.2)
The first two equations describe the optimal choice of schooling, conditional on migration,
i.e. conditional demand functions. The third equation is unchanged. The fourth equation
establishes identity with the system (3.1). Functions f1 and f0 are such that they are equal to
the values of f ∗(X) on the corresponding subsets of X . i.e.
f0(X) ≡ f ∗(X),where X is such that: g∗(X) = 0 (3.3)
f1(X) ≡ f ∗(X),where X is such that: g∗(X) = 1 (3.4)
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Under certain assumptions, conditional demand functions (if they are known or estimated)
can provide an answer to the hypothetical question: "what would have happened if the house-
hold had made a different migration choice, while everything else that determines enrollment
remained the same?" In this case, the difference between counterfactual outcomes S∗0 and S
∗
1
can be called the "effect" of the migration choice of the household on schooling enrollment.
Formally:
D = S∗1 − S∗0 = f1(X)− f0(X)
Whether it makes sense to ask such a question and invest the time in getting an answer
for it depends on the economic model adapted. There are several models which allow such a
switch:
First of all, there could be a set of factors Z that influence migration decision, but not
the enrollment decision. One example from the model solved later in the paper is the cost of
migration and the income from migration; both of these factors, when there are no borrowing
constraints, only influence the migration decision and not the enrollment decision. Then one
may ask what would the enrollment be if the cost of migration dropped, for example.
Another example of Z is a sudden change in the preference for migration that a household
may experience, e.g. a taste shift. If this change in taste is random we can say that the house-
hold changed its migration decision on a whim. If this change was influenced by some other
factors, for instance, discovery of new information or an actual change in migration condi-
tions, then we can say that household taste changed exogenously. In all of these examples,
household switches to a different optimal state of migration and the corresponding level of
enrollment will be set according to functions S∗0 and S
∗
1 .
One can also ask what would happen to a migrant household if the migration option was
not on the table, if for example migration were banned for good. With such a question one
must assume that such a policy has no general equilibrium effects, i.e. that other factors that
determine schooling effort remain the same.
98
Finally, some models may allow households to make mistakes. In a non-deterministic
world, governed by free will, we would ask what would happen if a household made a subop-
timal migration choice by mistake. In a deterministic world, we would ask what would happen
if there occurred an event that led the household to make a mistake regarding migration choice.
Each of these models results in the existence of counterfactual enrollment after the migra-
tion switch; we can call the difference in counterfactual enrollment the "effect" of migration.
However, the particular cause of the switch in migration choice can be either more or less
interesting. For example, free will and "whim choice" models are not so interesting, because
it models an improbable situation when all or a large share of households make a sub-optimal
choice. On the other hand, measuring "effect of change in migration on enrollment" is more
interesting when there are policies that can influence migration outcome without simultane-
ously affecting enrollment, i.e. information campaigns or the lowering of travel costs or of
sending remittances. In such cases, it may be preferable to avoid the "effect of migration"
term altogether and focus on the effect of certain migration-changing policies on enrollment.
Different migration stimulation policies will affect different households differently, and their
resulting effect on enrollment will also be different. The "no-migration" question is interest-
ing in its own way, because it quantifies the value of the option of migration itself, i.e. how
much do we gain or lose in enrollment from having migration as an option.
An altogether different type of question concerns the effect on enrollment of some event
that has a direct effect on both migration and enrollment decisions. For example, an increase
in wages in the region simultaneously raises the opportunity cost of education and reduces
incentive for migration. To study this effect it is not necessary to know the conditional demand
functions in the system 3.2 and only necessary to know the solutions to the system 3.1.
The next section shows how to calculate effects of migration in a particular specification of
a household model. My goal is to compare changes in the optimal schooling effort in the two
scenarios: first, by comparing conditional demand of schooling effort between counterfactual
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migration choices, and second, by looking at the change of schooling effort as a result of
change in migration, induced by increase in the returns from migration.
Theoretical model
The model is a standard two-period schooling investment model, modified to account for the
potential effect of migration on human capital production. The household is assumed to select
"schooling effort" of a child s (continuous) and migration dummy d in the first period, that
will maximize a two period utility function of total household consumption C.
max
d∈{0,1},s
U(C1) + δU(C2)
C1 = I1 − ps+ (R− Z)d− A
C2 = I2 + f˜(H) + rA
H = h(s, d) - human capital
A ≥ 0, no borrowing
(3.5)
Here, I1 and I2 are exogenously given incomes in each of the time periods, p is the price of
schooling paid per unit of effort s (including the opportunity cost of schooling), (R−Z) is the
net reward of migration (remittances minus cost of migration) and A is the household savings
that can be transferred to the second period. In the second period the household gets the return
from investment in the child’s human capital, according to the function f˜(H(s, d)) ≡ f(s, d).
One typically assumes that f˜h > 0, f˜hh < 0, Hs > 0, Hss < 0.
This specification introduces several important restrictions having to do with how migra-
tion affects a household’s budget constraint. The first restriction is that the production of
human capital H depends only on the schooling effort and the migration dummy. This means,
for example, that this model does not account for the possibility that malnourished children
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may perform worse in school, because household consumption does not enter the H function.
Another restriction is that cost of schooling p is fixed and does not change with migration.
Therefore, this model does not take into account changes in the opportunity cost of schooling,
which may occur due to changes in the reallocation of labor because of migration.
Migration choice therefore enters the model in only two ways. First, it can have a purely
monetary effect, adding net migration income R− Z to household income in the first period.
Second is the "absence" effect, since migration of a parent can change the level and the first
derivative of the human capital of the child with respect to the schooling effort. In other words,
it may change how much the child will learn and how much harder it is for him to learn more,
given the schooling effort. The combination of monetary and absence effects will determine
whether the total effect of migration will be positive or negative.
It is rather obvious to see that the monetary effect of migration on enrollment will be either
positive or zero (this is shown formally below). The ambiguity of the effect of migration in this
model comes from the absence effect, which theoretically can be either positive (if fsd > 0) or
negative (if fsd < 0). fsd measures by how much migration changes the marginal productivity
of the child at school in terms of future returns. In the papers reviewed so far, it is speculated
that the absence effect is likely to be negative because of the disruption of family life, the
absence of a role model for the child, etc. (Antman, 2008; Hanson and Woodruff, 2003). At
the same time, I can cite two examples where the opposite would hold. First, even if migration
of the father indeed lowers the level of human capital (given the effort), i.e. Hd < 0, the
marginal return from additional schooling effort may still rise, thus actually encouraging the
exertion of more effort. Formally, fsd = f˜hh
−
Hs
+
Hd
−
+ f˜h
+
Hsd
?
and fsd is undetermined. Second,
it may be possible that out-migration of the father may improve the child’s studying prospects,
if the father was abusive, discouraged formal education, or otherwise impeded studying.
In summary, the sign of fsd remains ambiguous. If fsd ≥ 0 then it can be shown straight-
forwardly that conditional demand for schooling effort will be same or higher in case of
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migration (non-negative income effect will be combined with non-negative absence effect).
Keeping this in mind, throughout the rest of the section I examine the solution to the model
for a more complicated and probably more plausible case: when migration of the father lowers
child marginal productivity in school and the overall human capital, given the effort.
The solution to this optimization problem can be found in two stages. During the first
stage we find the optimal schooling efforts sˆ0 and sˆ1 for each of the migration choices: d=0
and d=1. During the second stage we examine which pair of schooling effort and migration
outcomes will bring the highest utility: (sˆ0, 0) or (sˆ1, 1).
First stage of the solution
In each of the two migration choices, the optimal schooling effort will be different depending
on whether the household is bound by the borrowing constraint. I use the notation s¯0,1 for
the internal solution with positive saving (A > 0) in each of the migration cases 0 or 1, and
s˙0,1 for the corner solution with zero saving (A = 0). Altogether, the first order conditions
of the system (3.5) provide four equations that determine optimal s, and two inequalities that
determine whether A is positive or zero:
s¯0 : RS0 ≡ fs(s, 0)− rp = 0 (3.6)
s¯1 : RS1 ≡ fs(s, 1)− rp = 0 (3.7)
s˙0 : DS0 ≡ fs(s, 0)− Uc(I1 − ps)
δUc(I2 + f(s, 0))
p = 0 (3.8)
s˙1 : DS1 ≡ fs(s, 1)− Uc(I1 − ps+R− Z)
δUc(I2 + f(s, 1))
p = 0 (3.9)
d = 0, A = 0 if DA0(s¯0) ≡ Uc(I1 − ps¯
0)
δUc(I2 + f(s¯0, 0))
> r (3.10)
d = 1, A = 0 if DA1(s¯1) ≡ Uc(I1 − ps¯
1 +R− Z)
δUc(I2 + f(s¯1, 1))
> r (3.11)
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The first two equations, (3.6) and (3.7), determine the optimal schooling effort when the
borrowing constraint is not binding. In this case, choice of s depends only on the price of
schooling, the interest rate and the slope of the return-to-schooling-effort function. It does not
depend on income levels or monetary returns from migration.
The second pair of equations, (3.8) and (3.9), characterize choice of s in the presence of
borrowing constraints. In this case, s becomes a function of I1, I2, R−Z, in addition to r and
p.
The two inequalities, (3.10) and (3.11), involve the ratio of marginal utilities of consump-
tion in two periods. This ratio determines whether the household would want to save or
borrow in an unconstrained solution. Two properties of DA(s) will be useful later. First, the
derivative of DA with respect to s is positive: since the numerator is increasing in s and the
denominator is decreasing in s, DAs > 0. Second, DA0(s) > DA1(s) ∀ s.
Let us now compare the values of s¯0, s¯1, s˙0, s˙1 for the given household. Such a comparison
will allow us to evaluate the effect of migration as the difference between the counterfactual
outcomes.
First of all, compare s¯0 and s¯1. Assuming that fsd < 0, i.e. that fs(s, 0) > fs(s, 1), and
from (3.6) and (3.7) it follows that
s¯0 > s¯1 (3.12)
This means that for a household that does not wish to borrow in either migration case, school-
ing effort will be lower in the state of migration. Here, the only effect of migration is the
"price" effect (it lowers the marginal productivity of schooling). Potential extra income from
migration does not play any role.
Whether s˙0 or s¯0 will be greater depends on whether the borrowing constraint (3.10) is
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binding or not. Suppose that constraint is binding, so that DA0(s¯0) > r. Then, we have

DS0(s˙0) = 0, by definition
DS0s = fss−
−DA0s
+
p < 0
DS0(s¯0) = fs(s¯
0, 0)−DA0(s¯0)p = rp−DA0(s¯0)p < 0
(3.13)
⇒ s˙0 < s¯0
Intuitively, effort is determined by equalizing the return from extra education with either
the interest rate or the marginal utility of the foregone consumption. The comparison of s˙1
and s¯1 can be done similarly. Therefore, in both migrant and non-migrant households, if
the household is bound by the borrowing constraint and that constraint is relaxed (i.e. the
household is suddenly allowed to borrow), then the schooling effort would increase. On the
other hand, if the household was initially saving and then forbidden to save, then the schooling
effort would decrease.
Now, let’s turn to s˙0 and s˙1. They are determined as the roots of the equationsDS0(s) = 0
and DS1(s) = 0. I already established above that DS0s < 0 and similarly one can show that
DS1s < 0. The relation between s˙
0 and s˙1 is then determined by the relation between DS0
and DS1, as seen from the following:

DS0(s˙0) = 0, by definition
DS1(s˙1) = 0, by definition
DS1s < 0, DS
0
s < 0
(3.14)
if DS1(s˙0) < DS0(s˙0) = 0⇒ DS1(s˙0) < 0 ⇒ s˙1 < s˙0 (3.15)
if DS1(s˙0) > DS0(s˙0) = 0⇒ DS1(s˙0) > 0 ⇒ s˙1 > s˙0 (3.16)
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of DS0(s) and DS1(s) functions
(a)
Case (3.15)
(b)
Case (3.16)
The interpretation is rather straightforward. DS is the difference between the marginal
benefit of additional schooling effort, fs, and the future value of the marginal cost of schooling
p, where the time discount factor is the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption. The larger
is the first-period marginal utility, the higher is the implicit price of schooling. Altogether DS
is interpreted as the net marginal benefit of schooling effort, s. At the optimum, the marginal
net benefit must be zero. Then the difference between DS0 and DS1, at either s˙0 or s˙1, shows
whether migration raises or lowers the net benefit of schooling. In particular, if DS1(s˙0)
is greater than zero, then migration raises the marginal net benefit of schooling and optimal
effort must increase.
Consider the expression for the difference between DS0 and DS1 at s˙0:
DS0(s˙0)−DS1(s˙0) = (fs(s˙0, 0)− fs(s˙0, 1)
+
)−
 Uc(I1 − ps˙0)
δUc(I2 + f(s˙0, 0))
− Uc(I1 − ps˙
0 +R− Z)
δUc(I2 + f(s˙0, 1))
+
 p
(3.17)
The sign of this difference is generally undetermined, as both the first and the second terms
in brackets are positive. The first term measures the negative price effect of migration: how
much migration hurts the productivity of schooling. This term is positive by the assumption
of the model. The second term measures the combined income effect of migration. The
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second fraction has a lower numerator, because of the extra remittance income, and a larger
denominator, because of the lower income return from schooling, than the first fraction. Both
of these income effects lower the marginal utility in the first period relative to the marginal
utility in the second period, so the implicit price of schooling becomes smaller (schooling
becomes less costly in terms of giving up first period utility). The sign of total net effect
depends on whether the price effect or income effect will be greater.
Finally, compare the values of s¯1 and s˙0. Consider the function RS1(s), which is defined
in (3.7). We know that by definition RS1(s¯1) = 0 and also that RS1s = fss < 0. Therefore,
the relation between s¯1 and s˙0 can be determined by the sign of RS1(s˙0), or equivalently, by
whether fs(s˙0, 1) > rp.
if RS1(s˙0) > 0⇒ fs(s˙0, 1) > rp ⇒ s˙0 < s¯1 (3.18)
if RS1(s˙0) < 0⇒ fs(s˙0, 1) < rp ⇒ s˙0 > s¯1 (3.19)
The interpretation of these conditions is the following — they determine to what extent
migration lowers the marginal return to schooling at the effort level s˙0. We know that if at
no-migration regime the household faces a borrowing constraint, then s¯0 > s˙0 and fs(s˙0, 0) >
fs(s¯
0, 0) = rp. So at no-migration regime, marginal return to schooling is higher than rp.
Migration lowers it down to the level of fs(s˙0, 1). In the case of (3.18), this lower level of
marginal returns is still greater than rp, i.e. the negative effect of migration is not so strong
and schooling effort in case of the migration will be higher. In the case of (3.19), the negative
effect of migration is stronger, and the schooling effort in the case of migration will be lower
than s˙0. It is important to note that neither monetary benefits from migration nor household
exogenous income enter into the above inequality conditions.
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Summary of the pairwise comparisons and empirical implications
In summary, assuming negative absence effect, the model gives one unambiguous prediction
about the total effect of migration: for a household without borrowing constraint, the effect
of father’s migration will be negative. The magnitude of this effect is determined by the
difference in the marginal return to schooling effort function fs because of the migration. In
terms of the empirical specification, effect of migration is interacted with age, gender and other
possible determinants of f(s,m), but there is no interaction with household’s total income.
In contrast, for a household with restricted ability to borrow, effect of migration is am-
biguous in sign, and depends in addition on the marginal utility of household consumption.
If household current income is low and marginal utility of consumption is high, then effect
of migration may become positive. Therefore, effect of migration needs to be interacted with
exogenous measures of household wealth or credit ability (which do not depend on migration).
Second stage of the solution
A household will choose a pair of (sˆd, d) that maximizes utility. Consider the values of utility
in each of the cases so far described. Once again, U˙ denotes the corner solution of A = 0 and
U¯ — internal solution.
U˙0 = U(I1 − ps˙0) + δU(I2 + f(s˙0, 0)) (3.20)
U˙1 = U(I1 − ps˙1 +R− Z) + δU(I2 + f(s˙1, 1)) (3.21)
U¯0 = U(I1 − ps¯0 − Aˆ0) + δU(I2 + f(s¯0, 0) + rAˆ0) (3.22)
U¯1 = U(I1 − ps¯1 +R− Z − Aˆ1) + δU(I2 + f(s¯1, 1) + rAˆ1) (3.23)
I can now describe the behavior of different households in response to increases in R — the
monetary benefits from migration. The change in household behavior can be twofold. First,
there is a change in the optimal schooling effort dsˆ
dR
within a particular state sˆ. Second, there
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could be switches between the optimal states. There are four different cases to consider,
depending on the initial optimal choice of the household.
• Initial state sˆ = s¯1 — a household that chose to send a migrant and had some positive
savings.
⇒ s¯1 → s¯1; ds¯
1
dR
= 0
An increase inRwill only make the migration state more attractive and the household won’t
switch between states. The schooling effort s¯1 does not depend on the level of remittances
R.
• Initial state sˆ = s˙1 — a household that chose to send a migrant and was experiencing
borrowing constraint.
⇒ s˙1 → s¯1; ds˙
1
dR
> 0
An increase in R lowers the value of the corner condition, DA1, and at some point R¯ :
DA1(R¯ = 0) the borrowing constraint will cease to hold. It is easy to see that for the values
of R : R < R¯, the schooling effort would gradually rise to the unconstrained level s¯1 (see
figure 3.4):
Figure 3.4:
• Initial state sˆ = s¯0 — a household that chose not to send a migrant and had positive savings.
⇒ s¯0 → s¯1; ds¯
0
dR
= 0
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Rise in R increases the utility of the migration state, and at some point the household is
going to make a switch into the unconstrained migration state. The schooling effort would
drop from s¯0 to s¯1 (see figure 3.5):
Figure 3.5:
• Initial state sˆ = s˙0 — a household that chose not to send a migrant and was experiencing
the borrowing constraint.
⇒ s˙0 → s˙1 → s¯1;
⇒ s˙0 → s¯1;
ds˙0
dR
= 0
There are two different possibilities here concerning the state transitions: the household
can switch directly to the unconstrained migration case s¯1, or first switch to the constrained
case s˙1 and then to s¯1. Increase in R makes both states U¯1 and U˙1 more attractive, but the
unconstrained utility is always greater than the constrained one: U˙1 > U¯1 — so the level of
remittances needed to encourage the switch to migration is lower in the case of the switch to
109
the unconstrained case (A > 0) than the switch to the constrained case (A = 0). Formally,
R¯01 < R¯01, where
R¯01 : U˙0 = U¯1
R˙01 : U˙0 = U˙1
If it happens that R¯ < R˙01 — then the household would go s˙0 → s¯1.
If it happens that R¯ > R˙01 — then the household would go s˙0 → s˙1 → s¯1 — i.e. the
household would first switch to migration, but the borrowing constraint would still hold and
only with the further increase in R would it relax. Depending on the possible relationships
between s˙0, s˙1 and s¯1, there would be five distinct trajectories of household behavior (see
figures 3.6 and 3.7):
Figure 3.6: R¯ < R˙01
(a)
Case 1
(b)
Case 2
Figure 3.7: R¯ > R˙01
(a)
Case 3
(b)
Case 4
(c)
Case 5
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3.5 Empirical estimation
3.5.1 Econometric models specification
To estimate the relationship between conditional demand for school enrollment and migration
in the household I use the NLSS survey data, described in greater detail in section 3.3.
Let S be the dummy variable for the event of child enrollment, S = { 1 -if enrolled0 -if not enrolled , and
M be the dummy variable for the event of migration of an adult male, M = { 1 -if migrated0 -if not migrated ,
Z - the set of variables that determine migration but do not enter conditional demand func-
tions (discussed in detail on page 117), and X - all other household variables that enter both
migration and enrollment equations (discussed in detail on page 115).
I estimate the effect of migration on school enrollment, as defined in section 3.4, using
several econometric specifications. These specifications vary according to the assumptions
that are made about the model coefficients and distributions of unobservables. I examine
the robustness of my estimates by comparing the estimates of more restrictive specifications
against the less restrictive ones.
I use the probit model as the basic tool to model the probability of discrete outcomes S = 1
andM = 1, i.e. assuming that the probability of each event is a linear function of covariatesX
and that the unobservables have a multivariate normal distribution. The base specification is
obtained by applying the probit model to the theoretical system (3.2) of conditional enrollment
functions.
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Switching probit model

M∗ = Xβm + γZ + m
M = 1 if M∗ > 0,
S∗0 = Xβ0 + 0
S0 = 1 if S∗0 > 0
S∗1 = Xβ1 + 1
S1 = 1 if S∗1 > 0
S = S0I(M = 0) + S1I(M = 1)
m, 1, 2 ≈ N(0,Σ1)
(3.24)
The notation is the same as on page 97, i.e. S0 and S1 are the enrollment demand func-
tions, conditional on no-migration and migration. Since this system models a joint household
decision regarding enrollment and migration, and the migration equation is specified uncon-
ditional on enrollment, all the variables that enter enrollment equation have to be a part of the
migration equation.
Switching probit specification features a full interaction of M with X in the enrollment
functions, which results in two different sets of coefficients. All three error terms may be
correlated and the error terms in the enrollment equations may have different expectations
conditional on migration, E(0|M) 6= E(1|M).
Expected effect of migration for a given household with observables X is calculated by the
formula:
Ê(D) = E(S1 − S0) = P (S∗1 > 0)− P (S∗0 > 0) = Φ(Xβ̂1)− Φ(Xβ̂0) (3.25)
The other estimated specifications are obtained by imposing additional restrictions on this
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base specification.
Independent probit Assumptions: β0 = β1 (except for constant), (0, 1)⊥m. In this
specification, enrollment functions S0 and S1 are different only by constant,M is independent
with the error term and only one equation needs to be estimated.

S∗ = Xβ0 + αM + 0
0 ≈ N(0,Σ2)
(3.26)
Effect of migration is calculated by the formula:
Ê(D) = Φ(Xiβ̂0 + αˆ)− Φ(Xiβ̂0) (3.27)
Switching independent probit Assumptions: (0, 1)⊥m. Migration effect is allowed
to depend on other household observable covariates including child age and sex. The migra-
tion error is not correlated with either of the enrollment error terms. The effect of migration
for a child in a given household is calculated by the same formula as in (3.25).
Bivariate Probit Assumptions: β0 = β1 (except for constant), E(0|M) = E(1|M).
Migration effect is additive, but independence of enrollment and migration error terms is not
assumed. This would be the case when migration and enrollment choices are made jointly.
Since the enrollment demand equation is estimated conditional on migration, but the migra-
tion equation is written down unconditional on enrollment, then all the variables from the
enrollment equation (observable and unobservable) must enter the migration equation. This
will cause the correlation between the error terms in the two equations.
This is the case when there are some common unobserved factors that affect both migration
and conditional enrollment outcomes. For example, just as the observed X variables, all the
113
factors that enter the enrollment equation and are unobserved in the data would enter into the
migration equation too.
The assumption about equal expectations of errors 1 and 2 conditional on migration is
needed to collapse two separate equations into one. Another more strict assumption is often
used, that 0 = 1 (see Heckman et al. (1999)). The system of equations becomes:

S∗ = Xβ0 + αM + 0
M∗ = Xβm + γZ + m
0, m ≈ N(0,Σ3)
(3.28)
General effect of migration is calculated by the same formula as in the independent probit, i.e.
(3.27).
Full interaction bivariate probit Assumptions: E(0|M) = E(1|M). Migration ef-
fect is fully interacted with X . There is only one equation for enrollment, because the error
terms in the enrollment functions are assumed to have the same distribution.
S∗ = Xβ0 +XMα + 0
M∗ = Xβm + γZ + m
0, m ≈ N(0,Σ4)
(3.29)
Effect of migration for a child in a given household with observables X is calculated by
the formula:
Ê(D) = Φ(Xiβ̂0 +Xαˆ)− Φ(Xiβ̂0) (3.30)
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3.5.2 Other econometric aspects:
Definition of the migration event
I construct the male migration dummy M using the information from the household roster.
The dummy is constructed only for 17 to 60 years old males. M is equal to one if one of the
following conditions hold true:
• a household member that is registered in the household roster is said to be absent from
the household for more than 6 months.
• a 17-60 year old married woman is a household member, but her husband is absent and
not in the household roster.
• a 0-16 year old child is a household member, father is alive, but absent from the house-
hold roster.
Right-hand side variables
The choice of right-hand side variables in enrollment equations is guided by both the theoret-
ical model developed in section 3.4 and by the educational attainment literature reviewed in
section 3.2. They suggest that enrollment outcome of a child in a given household depends
on the factors that affect cost of enrollment, marginal benefits of an additional year at school
and the returns to alternative investment (if a household is not credit-constrained). For credit-
constrained households, enrollment would additionally be determined by any other factors
determining household marginal utility of consumption.
Right-hand side covariates in the child enrollment equation include the following vari-
ables:
1. child age and sex (dummies)
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2. number of other children in the household, number of adult women, number of elderly
adults, pre-migration number of adult males, dummy for multiple family household,
ethnic minority dummy.
3. dummies for educational levels of both parents of the child and level of maximum edu-
cation of the other household members (pre-migration)
4. log of lagged agricultural land holdings and dummy for having no land plot
5. log of lagged durables asset index and dummy for having no durables in possession
6. regional level variables
• Census 2000 ward level estimates for share of illiterate adults in ward and share
of population employed in 4 different sectors of economy (the share out of labor
force is ommited)
• NLSS 1995 estimates for average log per capita consumption in the district
7. median interest rate in ward
8. median distance to primary school in ward in kilometers
It is important to note that all the right-hand side variables were constructed so as to be
exogenous to migration. For example, to control for demographic composition, I use the pre-
migration number of adult males which does not change with adult migration. Therefore, to
estimate the effect of migration on enrollment, only the migration dummy M and its interac-
tions with X variables needs to be adjusted.
Right-hand side variables in the migration equation include essentially all the covariates
from the enrollment equations. Indeed, the two-step approach to estimation requires the inclu-
sion of all the covariates from the main equation in the instrumented equation. Child-specific
variables like age, sex and education level of the parents are aggregated on the household level
to be a part of the household level migration equation.
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Identification
In specifications with joint estimation of migration and enrollment outcomes, it is necessary to
establish that the effect of migration (coefficients on M dummy and interactions of M and X)
is identified. Indeed, if there were no instrumental variables Z that enter only the migration
equation, then effect of migration would be identified only through the non-linearity of the
normal probability function, and would not be identified if a linear probability model were
used. However, all the specifications of the migration equations include variables Z, which are
the levels of lagged migrant networks in wards and districts of household residence. Variable
%abroad_mig01 is a Census 2001 estimate of the share of working population in PSU that
was working abroad in 2001. Variable %intern_mig95 is a NLSS-I estimate of the share
of households in the district that received remittances from migrants within Nepal in 1995.
These variables turn out to be strong predictors of migration in all of the estimated models.
The validity of these instruments rests on the assumption that lagged migrant networks are
not correlated with the error terms in the enrollment equations. Let’s examine more closely
whether this assumption is plausible.
First of all, lagged networks must not directly determine enrollment. There are two pos-
sible arguments for the idea that network do directly affect enrollment decisions. One of the
argument asserts that if established networks make migration easier then that fact in turn can
change a household’s perception about the benefits of educating their children. For example,
it is argued that in countries like Mexico, household’s expectation of migration of the children
in the future discourages formal education (Antman, 2008). However, this argument seems
to be less relevant in the context of Nepal, where migration is predominantly short-term and
migrants eventually return to their local labor markets. According to the second argument,
if extensive migrant networks actually lead to a reduction of the cost of migration or to an
increase in the returns of migration (e.g by making the choice set of the migrant larger), then
the networks would affect the budget constraint of the household and would become one of
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the determinants of the enrollment decision.10 In general, to get a definite answer on whether
migrant networks have a monetary effect on the household budget, we must know precisely
how migrant networks do help to encourage migration, and whether the net benefits of migra-
tion are higher or lower in the presence of migrant networks. Unfortunately, the information
on the cost and benefits of migration is not available in the data. I argue that lagged networks
are a proper instrument because they mainly have influence on the psychic costs of migration,
and not on the monetary costs or benefits of migration. In terms of the costs of migration, es-
pecially travel costs, this assumption is quite plausible. In terms of the benefits of migration,
this assumption may be violated if some of the migration destinations (e.g. foreign countries)
have much higher net returns from migration than other destinations (e.g. internal destina-
tions). In this case, it would be better to estimate the effect of migration separately by internal
and foreign migration destinations, and to include the actual monetary costs and returns of
migration. I follow this approach to some extent in my second essay, where I estimate the
effect of migration on poverty separately for internal and international migration. However,
this approach bears a high computational cost as well as the cost of much smaller sample
sizes (once migration is broken down by destination). In this essay I choose not to distinguish
between migration destinations but rather to estimate the average effect of migration for all
destinations.
A separate case in which instrumental variables won’t be valid can occur if migrant net-
works are correlated with location-specific variables that simultaneously determine both mi-
gration decision and enrollment decision. To eliminate the effect of time-variant location-
specific shocks, I use the lagged level of networks in 2001 and 1994-95 so that the lagged level
would not be correlated with the shocks of 2003-04. To control for potential time-persistent
locational effects, I include local labor market and educational characteristics, including the
10In the context of the theoretical model, this example corresponds to equation 3.9, in which variable Z is the
monetary cost of migration and enters the first-order condition for the optimal enrollment outcome s˙
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lagged level of share of illiterate in the district (calculated using 1995 NLSS-I data).
The actual performance of the instruments and tests for their validity are discussed on page
122.
Implicit interaction of effect of migration with X
Probit models have a feature which, although well-recognized, is important to mention in this
context: the implicit interaction of the effect of migration with other covariates, because of
the non-linearity of the probability function. Even in the model without explicit interaction
of M and X , effect of migration will vary for different values of covariates X . Effect of
migration will be lower (in absolute value) for values of X that give either very high or very
low probability of enrollment. Graphically, the relationship between effect of migration and
predicted probability of enrollment (without migration) is shown in figure 3.8
Figure 3.8:
Biased but consistent estimation of effect of migration
Let Di be the effect of migration for particular child i in a family with covariates X . In the
model with additive effect of migration, the expected value of the effect of migration Di for a
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child with observable characteristics Xi is:
E(Di) = E(S
1
i −S0i ) = P (Xiβ0+α+0 > 0)−P (Xiβ0+0 > 0) = Φ(Xiβ0+α)−Φ(Xiβ0)
Expectation is taken over the distribution of unobserved error term 0. In practice, the true
effect is calculated using the estimated coefficients β and α. In general, this will lead to a
biased estimate of the expected effect of migration. Indeed, since Φ is a non-linear function,
E[Φ(Xβˆ0] 6= Φ(E[Xβ0]) = Φ(Xβ0). Therefore, the expected value of Ê(Di) is not equal
to the true value. The bias is larger in the regions where function Φ is more curved, i.e. for
the high and low values of probability of enrollment. However, if β coefficients are estimated
consistently, then Ê(Di) will also be consistent.
Family and ward level clustering
To account for the correlation of the error terms for observations within the household and
within the PSU, I calculate all the standard errors using the robust estimator with clustering
on the PSU level.
3.5.3 Estimation results
Table 3.5 shows the predicted average conditional enrollment rates and average effect of mi-
gration (D) for the five estimated models. These averages are taken over the whole sample
using the sampling weights, i.e. these are the population averages. Estimated coefficients and
details of the estimation are reported in the Tables R1-R5 in the appendix.
All of the estimations show a positive average effect of having a migrant in the family
on child enrollment, estimated with relatively small standard error. Models which do not
control for selection predict migration to increase enrollment by about 6-7 percentage points
on average. However, models that control for selection of migrants show an increase of 26-27
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Table 3.5: Estimated effect of migration, population average
E(S1) E(S0) D Min D Max D Std. Err(D)
(1) (2) (1)-(2)
Assuming independence:
M1: Probit, additive 79 73 6 0 10 1.3
M2: Probit, full interaction 79 73 7 -47 66 1.5
Controlling for selection:
M3: Bivariate probit 90 65 26 0 45 5.0
M4: Bivariate probit, full inter. 91 65 26 -7 78 3.3
M5: Switching probit 93 67 27 -6 82 3.0
Standard errors of D were calculated using parametric bootstrap with 500 replications
percentage points. This is a very large effect in magnitude. For comparison, Table R3 shows
the 0.4 coefficient for the male dummy, which translates to a 10 percentage point increase in
the probability of enrollment for being a boy vs a girl.
It is also apparent that controlling for selection leads to an important correction of the
estimates. Tables R3-R5 show that the estimated correlation of the error terms between the
enrollment and migration equations is negative and large in magnitude, ranging from -.5 to
-0.9. This indicates that there are some unobserved household or regional factors that simul-
taneously increase the probability of migration while pushing down the likelihood of child
enrollment. Ignoring such factors leads to underestimation of the effect of migration.
The specifications with full interaction of M and X give roughly the same prediction
of the average effect, as do the specifications with additive effect only. However, there is a
substantial difference in the range and variance of the effect of migration and in its value for
particular households. Additive models always predict positive effect of migration, and the
only source of variation is the predicted level of enrollment (as plotted on figure 3.8). On the
other hand, interaction models predict migration effect to be negative for some households,
and large and positive for other households. Figure 3.9 shows kernel density plots of the
predicted effect of migration calculated by the five models. There is a noticeable difference
between the two-peak densities of additive models and the single-peak densities estimated by
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interaction models.
Table 3.6: Wald test for model restrictions
H0 Restriction Prob > χ2 Result
Model 5 = Model 4 ρm0 = ρm1 0.1548 Not-Rejected
Model 5 = Model 3 ρm0 = ρm1, MX = 0 0.0000 Rejected
Model 5 = Model 2 ρm0 = ρm1 = 0 0.0075 Rejected
Model 5 = Model 1 ρm0 = ρm1 = 0, MX = 0 0.0000 Rejected
Model 4 = Model 3 MX = 0 0.0001 Rejected
Model 4 = Model 2 ρ = 0 0.0001 Rejected
Model 4 = Model 1 ρ = 0, MX = 0 0.0000 Rejected
Model 3 = Model 1 ρ = 0 0.0063 Rejected
Model 2 = Model 1 MX = 0 0.0000 Rejected
where,
Model 5: Switching probit
Model 4: Bivariate probit with full interaction
Model 3: Bivariate probit
Model 2: Independent probit with full interaction
Model 1: Independent probit
Table 3.6 reports a series of Wald tests on the restrictions applied to all the pairs of the
nested models. Except for the switching probit and bivariate full-interaction pair, none of the
other models could be reduced to their restricted counterparts.
Validity of the instruments
Using the estimates of the bivariate model (reported in table R3), I perform several tests to
check whether my instrumental variables are valid and to see how they perform. First, I test
whether instrumental variables belong to the model. The hypothesis that both of the coeffi-
cients are zero is rejected with P (χ2(2) > 57.36) = 0.000). Second, I reestimate the same
model when instruments are included in the outcome equation. If the exclusion restrictions
are valid, the hypothesis that the instruments do not belong to the outcome equation won’t be
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rejected. The results of the estimation are shown in table R3.3 in the Appendix, and one can
not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the excluded variables are zero at the 5%
level (χ2(2)= 4.54, P = 0.1034).
3.5.4 Interaction of migration dummy with migrant’s characteristics
One of the assumptions used in the theoretical model (3.5) was that the absence of a father
because of migration may hurt the child’s school performance and therefore discourage enroll-
ment. It would be interesting to test this assumption empirically and see if effect of migration
varies by whether the migrant is the father of the child, and by other migrant characteris-
tics, such as age and education. However, since migrants are selected in the household, their
characteristics become endogenous to the model. Therefore, interactions of migrants’ charac-
teristics with the migration dummy cannot be estimated with the models reviewed so far. To
estimate such interactions, I need to estimate a selection of the migrants within the household.
Suppose that a household has N adult males who could potentially be migrants. Let Xi be
the personal characteristics of male i, X−i be a vector of the characteristics of all other males
in the household and Xhh be the common household variables. The probability of migration
for person i will be some function of Xi, X−i and Xhh. Assuming linearity of this function in
X , in a probit model it can be written down as:
M∗i = C +Xiβ1 +X−iβ2 +Xhhβ3 + γZ + mi (3.31)
In the actual estimation I use the following set of individual characteristics Xi: age, level
of education, dummy for being married, education level of spouse (0 if not married), number
of own children. Theoretically, I could use exactly the same variables to construct vector X−i
for the characteristics of other males. In practice, to keep the number of variables manageable,
I use aggregates of those characteristics, e.g.: average age of other males, maximum education
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of other males, number of other married males and number of their children.
It must be noted that the NLSS questionnaire( like a typical Living Standard Monitoring
Survey questionnaire) does not ask direct questions about characteristics of non-members of
the household. In order to reconstruct the individual characteristics Xi of actual migrants, I
had to do a complicated matching of information on the parents of the child with the informa-
tion from remittances and maternity history section.
The set of outcomes for a household with N potential migrants will be estimated by N
simultaneous equations:

M∗1 = C +X1β1 +X−1β2 +Xhhβ3 + γZ + m1
. . .
M∗N = C +XNβ1 +X−Nβ2 +Xhhβ3 + γZ + mN
m1, . . . , mN = N(0,ΣNN)
(3.32)
The next equation shows the general form of the enrollment equation for child c in a family
with N potential migrants, which I can estimate jointly with the system (3.32).
S∗ = Xcβ0 +
N∑
1
α1Mi +
N∑
1
α2MiXi + c (3.33)
In contrast to the bivariate additive specification (3.28), this equation includes interaction of
migrant-specific variables Xi with migration event variables Mi. For example, to estimate the
effect of migration separately for father-migrants and other-migrants, migration dummy Mi is
interacted with dummy for being the father of the child c.
S∗ = Xcβ0 +
N∑
1
α1Mi +
N∑
1
α2Mi(Mi = Father of c) + c (3.34)
In practice, I estimate this equation with just two migration dummy variables, for having a
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father-migrant or having at least one other-migrant. This is a more convenient specification,
and it is practically equivalent to the one shown in (3.34), because only 0.1% of the children
have more than two other-migrants in the family. Then, for a household with K childen and
N migrants the joint system of equations becomes:

S∗1 = Xc1β0 + α1Father migr. + α2Other migr. + c1,f
. . .
S∗K = Xckβ0 + α1Father migr. + α2Other migr. + cK,f
M∗1 = C +X1β1 +X−1β2 +Xhhβ3 + γZ + m1,f
. . .
M∗N = C +XNβ1 +X−Nβ2 +Xhhβ3 + γZ + mN,f
(3.35)
Here subscript f indexes the families in the household. A household can have multiple fam-
ilies, and correlation of observations within a core family may be different that between the
families. Error terms  have a joint normal distribution.
Each particular household will have a different number of equations depending on the
number of school-aged children and potential migrants in the household. For computational
purposes I estimate a maximum of five enrollment equations and five migration equations in
the household. Actually, out of 5051 total number of households there were only 23 house-
holds with more than five school-aged children and 10 households with more than five poten-
tial migrants. In such households I picked the five relevant outcomes using a random draw.
A 10 by 10 variance-covariance matrix of the error terms is estimated with several con-
straints. First, all the diagonal elements are constrained to one as in the typical probit nor-
malization. Second, I restrict the following correlations to be the same: between m’s in
the migration equations, between c’s in the child enrollment and m in the father’s migration
equations, between c’s in the child enrollment and m in the non-father’s migration equations,
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between c’s of the children of the same parent, and between c’s of the children of different
parents. It is convenient to reorder the equations in system (3.35) in the following way, so that
these constraints on the correlations can be presented in the matrix form:

Father 1:
M1 = X1β1 +X−1β2 +Xhhβ3 + γZ + m1
Father 2:
M2 = X2β1 +X−2β2 +Xhhβ3 + γZ + m2
Up to three other males in the household:
M3 = X3β1 +X−3β2 +Xhhβ3 + γZ + m3
M4 = X4β1 +X−4β2 +Xhhβ3 + γZ + m4
M5 = X5β1 +X−5β2 +Xhhβ3 + γZ + m5
Up to four children of the Father 1:
S1 = Xc1β0 + α1F + α2M + c1
. . .
S4 = Xc4β0 + α1F + α2M + c4
A child of the Father 2:
S5 = Xc5β0 + α1F + α2M + c5
(3.36)
Then, the variance-covariance matrix for this system has the following parametrization:11
Σ10 =

1 a a a a b b b b c
a 1 a a a c c c c b
a a 1 a a c c c c c
a a a 1 a c c c c c
a a a a 1 c c c c c
b c c c c 1 d d d e
b c c c c d 1 d d e
b c c c c d d 1 d e
b c c c c d d d 1 e
c b c c c e e e e 1

11This specification includes only one equation for the child from the second family, so some of the observa-
tions had to be excluded from the estimation. However, I always arrange equations in such a way that the largest
group of children makes up the first group, and the smallest makes up the second one. Altogether there were
only 36 households with more than one child in a second group. In these households I used a random draw to
pick which of the children would be included in the estimation sample.
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Here, a is the correlation between equations for potential migrants, b is the correlation
between equations for father-migration and child enrollment, c is the correlation between
equations for migration of non-father and child enrollment, d is the correlation between related
children, and e is the correlation between unrelated children.
Estimation results This system is estimated by Simulated Maximum Likelihood, and in-
volves the calculation of 10-variate normal probabilities. To estimate the model I use the Stata
routine, cmp, developed by Roodman (2008). cmp uses the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane al-
gorithm to calculate multidimensional integrals. Estimates of the coefficients and correlations
of the variance-covariance matrix are reported in Table R6 in the appendix.
In comparison to the bivariate probit estimates (reported in table R4), the coefficients are
rather similar in value, and have expected sign; instruments continue to be a strong predictor
of migration; standard errors in migration equations are smaller than in the bivariate probit
estimates, reflecting perhaps an increase in efficiency due to the larger sample size and control
for within-family correlation. The difference with the bivariate probit estimates is seen with
the estimated correlation coefficients and effects of migration.
The correlation of error terms between children in the family is estimated to be about 0.6
and between adult males to be about 0.25, reflecting the role of unobserved family covariates.
The correlation between father-migration and child-enrollment equations is -0.35; the correla-
tion between other-male migration and child enrollment is -0.11 and not significantly different
from zero (stand. err. = 0.10). In the bivariate probit model, however, the estimated corre-
lation between the migration and enrollment equations was much higher (-0.6). This drop in
correlation between unobserved error terms may be a result of a better specification in the
migration equation. The new specification is done at the individual level, using the detailed
information on the age, education, family history and children of each individual migrant, thus
reducing unobserved error.
Table 3.7 reports the estimated average effect of migration of father and of other males on
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enrollment probability of a child.
Table 3.7: Estimated effect of migration, population average
E(S1) E(S0) D Min D Max D Std. err(D)
Father 87 71 17 0 31 3.6
Other M. 78 71 8 0 12 3.7
Note: Std. errors were calculated using parametric bootstrap with 500 replications
Father-migration on average increases probability of enrollment by 17 percentage points
with the standard error of 3.6. This estimate is significantly less than in the bivariate probit
model estimated earleir. Migration of another male relative increases probability of enrollment
only by 8 percentage points on average. This finding seems to contradict the setup of the
theoretical model 3.5 developed in section 3.4. There, I assumed that migration of a father
might have an additional negative effect on enrollment (holding everything else, including
remittances amount, equal), because of the loss of parental supervision of the child. The
estimated model does not give any specific reasons as to why the effect of father’s migration
is larger than that of another male in the household. However, there are several possible
explanations:
First of all, the difference in effect of migration can be explained by a difference in the
characteristics of migrants with children and with no children. For example, migrants with
children are on average 6 years younger than migrants with no children, and their remittances
earnings could be lower. To see if this is the case, in the next section I estimate the model,
interacting migration dummies with age and education of the migrant. The results in table
R6.2 show that the difference between migration effect of father and other male remains even
controlling for age and education of the migrant in the enrollment equation.
Second, this could be a sign that the collective household model of decision making is
wrong. If individuals in the household maximize their own utility functions and migrants
have a say in deciding how to spend remittances money, then migrant fathers may invest a
greater share of that income in the education of their children.
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Other aggregates of the effect of father’s migration In addition to the population average
effect of migration, I report other interesting aggregates in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: Other aggregates of the effect of father’s migration
D Std. Err(D)
Average D in the population 17 3.5
Average D, weighted by the P(M) 17 3.8
Average D, for landless rural households 21 4.0
LATE effect: Z = Z1|P (M |Z1) = +15% 17 3.6
Average D|Factual = 0 14 2.7
Average D|Factual = 1 20 5.9
Note: Std. errors were calculated using parametric bootstrap with 500 replications
The first line of the table shows the average effect in the population. The second line
shows the average effect weighted by the predicted likelihood of migration, i.e. the effect for
the subgroup of households most likely to migrate. It turns out to be equal to the average
effect in the population.
The third line shows that the average of the effect of migration for rural landless house-
holds is higher than the average population effect, but not significantly different from it. In the
specification reported below, I estimate the variation of the effect of migration by landlessness
directly.
The fourth line shows the LATE effect of a particular policy that changes the probability
of migration. This effect is calculated in two steps. First, I change the levels of instruments
from Z0 to Z1 to get an overall 15% increase in the probability of migration. Then, effect of
migrationD is averaged with weights equal to the increase in predicted probaility of migration
(i.e. those who are more affected by the change get the higher weight). The LATE effect in
this instance coincides in value with the average effect.
The last two lines show the expected average effect of migration on enrollment probability,
given the information on actual migration outcomes. For the individual child, this effect is
calculated as the difference in expected probability of enrollment, conditional on X and actual
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migration outcomes.
[D|X,Factual = 1] = P (S1 = 1|X,Factual = 1)− P (S0 = 1|Factual = 1)
To calculate this effect, I calculate the changes in probability of enrollment conditional on the
migration event, using the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the error terms to compute
the truncated probabilities. For instance, for a child living in a family with two potential
migrants with actual migration outcomes M1 = 1,M2 = 0 I calculate the expression:
P (S1 = 1|M1 = 1,M2 = 0) =
= P (c1 > −Xc1βˆ0 − αˆ1|m1 > −X1βˆm − γˆZ, m2 > −X2βˆm − γˆZ)
where:
ĉorr(c1, m1) = −0.36
ĉorr(c1, m2) = −0.11
ĉorr(m1, m2) = −0.24
Probabilities of dimensions above 2 were calculated using the GHK algorithm. The results
show that effect of migration is 6 percentage points higher for households with actual migrants
than for non-migrant households, although the standard error in the last line of the table is also
6%.
3.5.5 Specifications with additional interactions
I estimate three additional specifications to see if the migration effect varies across the sub-
groups (other than implicit probit-induced variation). The first one includes the interaction of
the migration dummy with age and education of the migrant, to see if this could help explain
the difference in effect of father and non-father migration. The second specification includes
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the interaction of the migration dummy with age and sex of the child. Finally, I interact the
migration dummy with a dummy for a landless rural household. Model 3.5 predicts that the
effect of migration will be larger for poor, credit-constrained households. I use landlessness
as a sign that a household is in the poorest group of households, assuming that migration
would not change the landlessness status. In other words, landlessness can be treated as an
exogenous variable.
The results of the estimation of the coefficients are reported in Tables R6.2, R6.3 and R6.4
in the appendix. Table R6.2 shows that age and education of the migrant are not important for
the effect of migration on enrollment. While age and age square coefficients are jointly sig-
nificant on the 5% level, their magnitude is too small to make any difference in probability of
enrollment. The difference in effect by relationship to the child remains even after controlling
for age and education of the migrant.
Table R6.3 shows that there is no difference in the average effect of migration by gender
of the child, i.e girls benefit from it as much as boys. There is a slight difference relating to the
age of a child: the coefficient in age and migration interaction is 0.02. The interaction effect
is not large; it results in an additional 0.5% point increase in probability of enrollment due to
migration for each additional year of the child’s age, adding up for the 5% difference in the
effect of migration between ages 6 and 16.
Table R6.4 reports the estimated coefficients for the model in which migration is interacted
with a dummy for landless rural households. As shown in the Table 3.9, average effect of
father’s migration for landless households increases enrollment probability by 28 points (from
53% to 81%), in contrast to the 15 point increase for other household types. This estimate is
consistent with the theoretical result, that effect of migration on enrollment should be larger
for poorer, credit-constrained households.
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Table 3.9: Estimated effect of migration, interacted with land ownership
E(S1) E(S0) D
Landless Rural hh. 53 81 28
Other households 76 91 15
3.6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the effect of work-related migration of adults in Nepal on the enroll-
ment outcomes of their children who remain at home. The importance of this question stems
from the fact that work-migration is very common in Nepal and there are concerns that, de-
spite the increase in income from remittances and per capita consumption that comes with
migration, absence of a parent may hurt children’s educational outcomes.
I find that the opposite is the case: migration of a father increases the probability of enroll-
ment by about 16% points on average, and migration of a brother or uncle increases enrollment
probability by 7% points. I find that this effect is similar in value regardless the gender and
age of the child. I also find that positive effect of migration is greater for poor households.
Among landless rural households, migration of a father raises the probability of the child’s
enrollment by 28%.
This paper contributes something new to the existing migration literature by treating the
migration event at the individual level rather than on the household level, commonly used in
the previous literature. Most of the literature models migration at the household level, because
of the lack of information available in a typical household survey concerning the migrant. I
demonstrate that it is possible to recover information concerning the migrant’s age, education,
marital status and relationship to other household members, using the information from a
typical LSMS survey. This in turn allows me to use migrant characteristics as explanatory
variables in the enrollment equation, and treat the endogenous nature of these variables by
modeling the selection of migrants within households at the individual level.
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Appendix
Figure 3.9: Kernel density of estimated effect of migration
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Notation: Enrolled Not-enrolled Description Comment
child level
hasmigrant 0.28 0.24 migrant in the family 
age6 0.07 0.16 6 years old ommited dummy
age7 0.09 0.10 7 y.o
age8 0.10 0.08 8 y.o
age9 0.10 0.06 9 y.o
age10 0.11 0.07 10 y.o
age11 0.09 0.05 11 y.o
age12 0.12 0.09 12 y.o
age13 0.09 0.06 13 y.o
age14 0.09 0.10 14 y.o
age15 0.08 0.11 15 y.o
age16 0.06 0.10 16 y.o
male 0.56 0.37 male dummy 
ethnic 0.37 0.63 ethnic minority dummy
father_illiterate 0.42 0.73 father's educ: illiterate ommited dummy
father_primary 0.24 0.15 primary or less
father_second 0.15 0.07 secondary
father_college 0.19 0.04 above secondary
mother_illiterate 0.81 0.95 mother's educ: illiterate ommited dummy
mother_primary 0.08 0.03 primary or less
mother_second 0.05 0.02 secondary
mother_college 0.05 0.01 above secondary
maxedadults 1.54 0.84 max educ. of other adult males Calc. before migration
fatherdeceased 0.04 0.06 father deceased dummy
nothkids1316 0.62 0.44 # of other children 13-16
nothkids612 1.16 1.35 # of other children 6-12
household level
nkids05 0.75 1.12 # of children 0-5
multifamily 0.16 0.19 multiple family household dummy
nmen0 0.04 0.04 zero adult males Calc. before migration
nmen1 0.57 0.55 one adult male ommited dummy
nmen2 0.25 0.28 two adult males
nmen3 0.09 0.09 three adult males
nmen4 0.05 0.04 four and more adult males
nwomen 1.58 1.42 # of adult women
nelderly 0.31 0.28 # of elderly
no_durables 0.35 0.56 no durable assets
ln_durables 4.32 2.42 ln(durable assets)
no_land_ur 0.06 0.03 no owned land, urban 
ln_land_ur -0.05 -0.04 ln(owned land), urban
no_land_ru 0.14 0.25 no owned land, rural 
ln_land_ru -0.43 -0.63 ln(owned land), rural
ward level
prc_illit01 0.57 0.68 ward % of illiterate (15+ y.o)
prc_wage_agr01 0.04 0.08 ward % of empl. in wage labor, agriculture
prc_wage_nag01 0.08 0.06 ward % of empl. in wage labor, nonagriculture
prc_selfe_agr01 0.47 0.43 ward % of self empl. in agriculture
prc_selfe_nag01 0.05 0.05 ward % of self empl. in non-agricult.
ln_exp1995 8.71 8.64 district ln(mean expenditure), 1995 
interest_rate 0.30 0.37 ward median interest rate 
km2school 1.72 1.96 ward distance to primary school, km
Number of obs 5516 obs 1666 obs
Table S1: Enrollment equation: variables and sample means
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Table 3.10: Net enrollment rates in 1995-2003
primary NER low secondary NER secondary NER
NLSS1: NLSS2: NLSS1: NLSS2: NLSS1: NLSS2:
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
Regions
Kathmandu 78 72 85 86 46 40 66 61 38 36 35 32
Other urb. areas 65 77 83 81 33 34 41 40 18 7 40 27
Rural west hills 70 50 88 82 22 16 28 20 10 2 11 11
Rural east hills 72 55 76 67 25 11 32 27 9 10 10 9
Rural west terai 68 47 82 70 15 5 26 31 6 0 17 7
Rural east terai 59 31 69 49 24 16 28 18 18 8 17 15
Urban
Urban 69 76 84 82 37 36 47 47 26 19 38 29
Rural 67 45 77 65 22 13 29 23 12 5 13 11
Quintile
Poorest 51 27 65 47 7 3 8 8 2 2 2 1
Second 60 36 76 62 15 6 17 13 9 1 10 2
Third 71 52 84 77 28 8 35 26 11 3 11 6
Fourth 76 63 84 79 29 25 43 42 12 9 23 21
Richest 82 69 86 83 36 33 54 53 28 13 35 32
Ethnicity
Brahman/Chhetri 78 63 85 85 30 21 43 43 17 10 26 23
Terai Middle Caste 62 27 75 50 24 13 27 11 5 11 28 22
Dalits 69 43 85 84 11 3 17 14 4 0 2 3
Newar 74 64 93 86 28 22 56 37 19 15 16 24
Hill Janajatis 65 47 75 66 16 11 29 19 6 1 12 7
Terai Janajatis 59 34 84 65 13 9 15 30 13 4 15 5
Muslim 46 32 58 38 8 0 11 1 0 0 0 0
Other Minorities 60 36 73 51 29 14 28 18 17 2 18 15
Total 67 46 78 67 23 14 31 26 13 6 17 13
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Notation: Migrant hh Non-migrant hh Description Comment
household level
nkids612 1.90 1.89 # of children 6-12
nkids1316 0.95 0.93 # of children 13-16
maxedu_illiter 0.29 0.33 maximum educ of adult males: illiterate ommited dummy
maxedu_primary 0.17 0.22 primary or less Calc. before migration
maxedu_seconda 0.39 0.28 secondary
maxedu_college 0.16 0.17 above secondary
medageofmales 33 35 median age of adult males Calc. before migration
ethnic 0.45 0.43 ethnic minority dummy
nkids05 1.0 0.78 # of children 0-5
multifamily 0.3 0.12 multiple family household dummy
nmen0 0 0.05 zero adult males
nmen1 0.4 0.64 one adult male 
nmen2 0.4 0.21 two adult males
nmen3 0.2 0.06 three adult males
nmen4 0.1 0.03 four and more adult males
nwomen 1.8 1.45 # of adult women
nelderly 0.3 0.30 # of elderly
no_durables 0.4 0.41 no durable assets
ln_durables 4.0 3.82 ln(durable assets)
no_land_ur 0.0 0.06 no owned land, urban 
ln_land_ur 0.0 -0.06 ln(owned land), urban
no_land_ru 0.2 0.17 no owned land, rural 
ln_land_ru -0.5 -0.46 ln(owned land), rural
ward level
prc_illit01 0.6 0.59 ward % of illiterate (15+ y.o)
prc_wage_agr01 0.1 0.05 ward % of empl. in wage labor, agricult.
prc_wage_nag01 0.1 0.07 ward % of empl. in wage labor, nonagri.
prc_selfe_agr01 0.5 0.46 ward % of self empl. in agriculture
prc_selfe_nag01 0.0 0.05 ward % of self empl. in non-agriculture
ln_exp1995 8.7 8.70 district ln(mean expenditure), 1995 
interest_rate 0.3 0.31 ward median interest rate 
km2school 1.8 1.78 ward distance to primary school, km
instruments
%_abroad_mig01 0.15 0.10 ward % of adult males living abroad,01 
%_intern_mig95 0.14 0.12 district % of households with internal migrants, 95
Number of obs 1798 obs 5384 obs
Table S2: Migration equation household level variables and sample means
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coef se
HasMigrant 0.256*** 0.06
Age7 0.638*** 0.09
Age8 0.895*** 0.08
Age9 1.070*** 0.09
Age10 1.054*** 0.08
Age11 1.013*** 0.10
Age12 0.874*** 0.09
Age13 0.700*** 0.10
Age14 0.489*** 0.09
Age15 0.291*** 0.09
Age16 0.011 0.09
Male 0.450*** 0.04
Ethnic -0.332*** 0.06
Father_Primary 0.375*** 0.06
Father_Second 0.552*** 0.07
Father_College 0.606*** 0.09
Mother_Primary 0.075 0.10
Mother_Second 0.082 0.14
Mother_College 0.166 0.17
MaxEdAdults 0.070*** 0.02
FatherDeceased -0.458*** 0.12
Nothkids1316 0.068* 0.04
Nothkids612 -0.087*** 0.02
Nkids05 -0.168*** 0.03
MultiFamily 0.057 0.10
Nmen0 0.255* 0.15
Nmen2 -0.315*** 0.07
Nmen3 -0.482*** 0.12
Nmen4 -0.524*** 0.16
Nwomen 0.198*** 0.04
Nelderly -0.093** 0.04
No_durables 0.039 0.18
Ln_durables 0.045** 0.02
No_land_UR -0.244** 0.10
Ln_land_UR 0.129** 0.05
No_land_RU -0.358*** 0.08
Ln_land_RU 0.100*** 0.03
Prc_illit01 -1.125*** 0.18
Prc_wage_agr01 -0.311 0.35
Prc_wage_nag01 -0.080 0.54
Prc_selfe_agr01 0.282 0.20
Prc_selfe_nag01 -0.612 0.59
Ln_exp1995 0.055 0.08
Interest_rate -0.871*** 0.24
Km2school -0.079*** 0.02
Constant 0.274 0.73
NOBS 7,182
note:  *** p<.01, ** p<.05 * p<.10
Table R1:Independent probit 
P(S=1)
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coef se coef se diff se
Age7 0.674*** 0.09 0.549*** 0.171 -0.125 0.192
Age8 0.874*** 0.09 0.984*** 0.172 0.110 0.200
Age9 1.097*** 0.10 1.052*** 0.173 -0.044 0.204
Age10 1.099*** 0.10 0.878*** 0.160 -0.222 0.181
Age11 1.049*** 0.11 0.970*** 0.180 -0.079 0.208
Age12 0.903*** 0.10 0.773*** 0.181 -0.130 0.206
Age13 0.671*** 0.11 0.726*** 0.200 0.054 0.219
Age14 0.447*** 0.11 0.515*** 0.175 0.068 0.207
Age15 0.291*** 0.11 0.178 0.176 -0.112 0.202
Age16 -0.068 0.11 0.163 0.191 0.231 0.211
Male 0.473*** 0.05 0.413*** 0.089 -0.060 0.103
Ethnic -0.383*** 0.06 -0.134 0.107 0.249** 0.119
Father_Primary 0.455*** 0.07 0.020 0.119 -0.435*** 0.143
Father_Second 0.619*** 0.09 0.379*** 0.144 -0.240 0.175
Father_College 0.643*** 0.11 0.412** 0.183 -0.231 0.223
Mother_Primary 0.098 0.11 0.026 0.188 -0.072 0.219
Mother_Second 0.192 0.16 -0.329 0.282 -0.521 0.318
Mother_College 0.442** 0.22 -0.493* 0.300 -0.935** 0.369
MaxEdAdults 0.059*** 0.02 0.116*** 0.030 0.056 0.037
FatherDeceased -0.481*** 0.12 -0.367 0.272 0.114 0.300
Nothkids1316 0.021 0.04 0.209*** 0.075 0.189** 0.087
Nothkids612 -0.107*** 0.03 0.001 0.042 0.108** 0.049
Nkids05 -0.195*** 0.03 -0.125** 0.051 0.069 0.058
MultiFamily -0.151 0.12 0.336** 0.150 0.487** 0.191
Nmen0 0.257* 0.15
Nmen2 -0.298*** 0.09 -0.361*** 0.121 -0.063 0.152
Nmen3 -0.425*** 0.16 -0.561*** 0.172 -0.136 0.237
Nmen4 -0.370** 0.18 -0.583** 0.259 -0.213 0.317
Nwomen 0.298*** 0.05 -0.006 0.072 -0.303*** 0.084
Nelderly -0.059 0.05 -0.201*** 0.073 -0.142 0.090
No_durables 0.031 0.20 -0.062 0.373 -0.093 0.428
Ln_durables 0.046* 0.03 0.031 0.044 -0.015 0.052
No_land_UR -0.290*** 0.11 0.051 0.267 0.341 0.292
Ln_land_UR 0.144** 0.06 0.091 0.125 -0.053 0.141
No_land_RU -0.393*** 0.08 -0.291* 0.151 0.102 0.166
Ln_land_RU 0.096*** 0.03 0.124** 0.052 0.028 0.059
Prc_illit01 -1.145*** 0.21 -1.115*** 0.291 0.029 0.335
Prc_wage_agr01 -0.137 0.39 -0.767 0.477 -0.630 0.522
Prc_wage_nag01 -0.510 0.59 1.625 0.994 2.135** 1.074
Prc_selfe_agr01 0.221 0.22 0.732** 0.320 0.510 0.345
Prc_selfe_nag01 -0.382 0.61 -0.662 1.152 -0.280 1.167
Ln_exp1995 0.032 0.09 0.155 0.158 0.123 0.179
Interest_rate -0.912*** 0.28 -0.829** 0.388 0.083 0.451
Km2school -0.074*** 0.02 -0.123*** 0.030 -0.049 0.035
Constant 0.471 0.81 -0.339 1.448 -0.810 1.645
note:  *** p<.01, ** p<.05 * p<.10 NOBS: 7,182
P(S^0=1) P(S^1=1) beta1-beta0
Table R2: Switching independent probit
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coef se coef se
HasMigrant 1.206*** 0.242 Ethnic -0.032 0.071
Age7 0.580*** 0.083 MultiFamily 0.222** 0.101
Age8 0.811*** 0.086 Nkids05 -0.015 0.035
Age9 0.973*** 0.095 Nkids612 -0.040 0.029
Age10 0.954*** 0.096 Nkids1316 -0.108*** 0.042
Age11 0.916*** 0.100 MaxEdu_Primary -0.030 0.083
Age12 0.790*** 0.090 MaxEdu_Seconda 0.197** 0.080
Age13 0.660*** 0.096 MaxEdu_College -0.035 0.101
Age14 0.460*** 0.087 MedAgeofMales -0.000 0.002
Age15 0.284*** 0.087 Nmen2 0.712*** 0.069
Age16 0.041 0.087 ` Nmen3 0.960*** 0.123
Male 0.406*** 0.049 Nmen4 1.075*** 0.168
Ethnic -0.290*** 0.058 Nwomen -0.007 0.043
Father_Primary 0.330*** 0.057 Nelderly -0.025 0.051
Father_Second 0.446*** 0.079 No_durables 0.065 0.196
Father_College 0.533*** 0.097 Ln_durables 0.002 0.024
Mother_Primary 0.061 0.088 No_land_UR -0.258* 0.155
Mother_Second 0.058 0.125 Ln_land_UR 0.105* 0.062
Mother_College 0.165 0.157 No_land_RU 0.021 0.099
MaxEdAdult 0.061*** 0.016 Ln_land_RU -0.082*** 0.031
FatherDeceased -0.428*** 0.108 Km2school -0.007 0.015
Nothkids1316 0.091*** 0.035 %_illit01 -0.119 0.229
Nothkids612 -0.066*** 0.025 %_wage_agr01 -0.143 0.349
Nkids05 -0.144*** 0.029 %_wage_nag01 0.457 0.640
MultiFamily -0.040 0.091 %_selfe_agr01 -0.131 0.227
Nmen0 0.222 0.135 %_selfe_nag01 -1.854** 0.755
Nmen2 -0.509*** 0.081 Ln_exp1995 0.092 0.082
Nmen3 -0.750*** 0.129 Interest_rate 1.021*** 0.300
Nmen4 -0.799*** 0.170 %_abroad_mig01 1.277*** 0.169
Nwomen 0.174*** 0.040 %_intern_mig95 0.808** 0.384
Nelderly -0.074* 0.040 Constant -2.096*** 0.761
No_durables 0.049 0.165
Ln_durables 0.044** 0.020
No_land_UR -0.115 0.117
Ln_land_UR 0.080 0.053 /athrho -0.703*** 0.254
No_land_RU -0.327*** 0.077 rho: -0.606
Ln_land_RU 0.121*** 0.026
%_illit01 -0.931*** 0.200
%_wage_agr01 -0.223 0.333
%_wage_nag01 -0.175 0.531
%_selfe_agr01 0.259 0.187
%_selfe_nag01 -0.071 0.566
Ln_exp1995 0.013 0.078
Interest_rate -1.119*** 0.231
Km2school -0.068*** 0.020
Constant 0.421 0.676 NOBS: 7,182
note:  *** p<.01, ** p<.05 * p<.10
P(S=1) P(M=1)
Table R3: Bivariate probit
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coef se M*coef se coef se
Age7 0.616*** 0.088 -0.133 0.169 Ethnic -0.035 0.070
Age8 0.798*** 0.089 0.048 0.179 MultiFamily 0.226** 0.102
Age9 1.010*** 0.097 -0.098 0.182 Nkids05 -0.017 0.035
Age10 1.006*** 0.093 -0.246 0.160 Nkids612 -0.042 0.029
Age11 0.957*** 0.102 -0.110 0.184 Nkids1316 -0.113*** 0.042
Age12 0.825*** 0.094 -0.157 0.182 MaxEdu_Primary -0.022 0.083
Age13 0.650*** 0.103 -0.021 0.196 MaxEdu_Seconda 0.201** 0.079
Age14 0.427*** 0.101 0.028 0.184 MaxEdu_College -0.030 0.100
Age15 0.285*** 0.099 -0.107 0.178 MedAgeofMales -0.000 0.002
Age16 -0.029 0.099 0.187 0.188 Nmen2 0.712*** 0.069
Male 0.429*** 0.052 -0.060 0.091 Nmen3 0.956*** 0.122
Ethnic -0.339*** 0.063 0.235** 0.105 Nmen4 1.071*** 0.167
Father_Primary 0.407*** 0.066 -0.395*** 0.129 Nwomen -0.005 0.042
Father_Second 0.515*** 0.087 -0.250 0.156 Nelderly -0.023 0.051
Father_College 0.568*** 0.107 -0.204 0.197 No_durables 0.066 0.196
Mother_Primary 0.086 0.103 -0.078 0.193 Ln_durables 0.002 0.024
Mother_Second 0.159 0.143 -0.495* 0.284 No_land_UR -0.268* 0.157
Mother_College 0.430** 0.194 -0.866*** 0.327 Ln_land_UR 0.108* 0.062
MaxEdAdult 0.051*** 0.020 0.052 0.033 No_land_RU 0.017 0.100
FatherDeceased -0.433*** 0.114 0.064 0.259 Ln_land_RU -0.083*** 0.031
Nothkids1316 0.049 0.041 0.167** 0.076 Km2school -0.006 0.015
Nothkids612 -0.084*** 0.028 0.103** 0.044 %_illit01 -0.129 0.228
Nkids05 -0.168*** 0.032 0.063 0.052 %_wage_agr01 -0.113 0.351
MultiFamily -0.202* 0.106 0.374** 0.171 %_wage_nag01 0.415 0.646
Nmen0 0.225 0.139 %_selfe_agr01 -0.144 0.227
Nmen2 -0.474*** 0.089 -0.146 0.132 %_selfe_nag01 -1.841** 0.752
Nmen3 -0.670*** 0.162 -0.216 0.209 Ln_exp1995 0.094 0.083
Nmen4 -0.641*** 0.171 -0.283 0.274 Interest_rate 1.022*** 0.304
Nwomen 0.260*** 0.048 -0.263*** 0.078 %_abroad_mig01 1.267*** 0.168
Nelderly -0.048 0.048 -0.118 0.079 %_intern_mig95 0.797** 0.374
No_durables 0.033 0.186 -0.074 0.371 Constant -2.117*** 0.765
Ln_durables 0.043* 0.024 -0.012 0.045
No_land_UR -0.165 0.118 0.352 0.265
Ln_land_UR 0.095* 0.056 -0.064 0.121
No_land_RU -0.365*** 0.081 0.118 0.148 /athrho -0.713*** 0.183
Ln_land_RU 0.116*** 0.028 0.034 0.051 rho: -0.612
%_illit01 -0.954*** 0.208 0.065 0.290
%_wage_agr01 -0.082 0.363 -0.484 0.463
%_wage_nag01 -0.562 0.551 1.931* 1.000
%_selfe_agr01 0.218 0.198 0.420 0.307
%_selfe_nag01 0.146 0.579 -0.099 0.999
Ln_exp1995 -0.003 0.086 0.077 0.158
Interest_rate -1.130*** 0.255 -0.002 0.412
Km2school -0.065*** 0.022 -0.041 0.030
Constant 0.537 0.756 0.602 1.436 NOBS: 7,182
note:  *** p<.01, ** p<.05 * p<.10
P(M=1)P(S=1)P(S=1)
Table R4: Bivariate probit with full interaction of M and X
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coef se coef se coef se
Age7 0.634*** 0.091 0.401*** 0.141 Ethnic -0.034 0.070
Age8 0.824*** 0.094 0.692*** 0.181 MultiFamily 0.222** 0.102
Age9 1.039*** 0.100 0.748*** 0.188 Nkids05 -0.018 0.034
Age10 1.037*** 0.096 0.614*** 0.167 Nkids612 -0.043 0.029
Age11 0.987*** 0.105 0.687*** 0.190 Nkids1316 -0.114*** 0.041
Age12 0.850*** 0.098 0.553*** 0.163 MaxEdu_Primary -0.025 0.080
Age13 0.658*** 0.106 0.511*** 0.163 MaxEdu_Seconda 0.196** 0.078
Age14 0.434*** 0.104 0.363** 0.154 MaxEdu_College -0.033 0.099
Age15 0.286*** 0.102 0.147 0.137 MedAgeofMales 0.000 0.002
Age16 -0.042 0.102 0.127 0.146 Nmen2 0.713*** 0.068
Male 0.445*** 0.054 0.326*** 0.070 Nmen3 0.965*** 0.123
Ethnic -0.353*** 0.064 -0.080 0.089 Nmen4 1.077*** 0.167
Father_Primary 0.424*** 0.068 0.020 0.093 Nwomen -0.005 0.042
Father_Second 0.547*** 0.090 0.199* 0.116 Nelderly -0.022 0.050
Father_College 0.595*** 0.111 0.314** 0.145 No_durables 0.072 0.195
Mother_Primary 0.089 0.107 0.002 0.142 Ln_durables 0.003 0.024
Mother_Second 0.169 0.148 -0.315 0.218 No_land_UR -0.274* 0.156
Mother_College 0.436** 0.202 -0.389* 0.236 Ln_land_UR 0.110* 0.062
MaxEdAdult 0.054*** 0.020 0.092*** 0.023 No_land_RU 0.018 0.099
FatherDeceased -0.450*** 0.118 -0.340* 0.202 Ln_land_RU -0.084*** 0.031
Nothkids1316 0.044 0.042 0.204*** 0.060 Km2school -0.007 0.015
Nothkids612 -0.090*** 0.029 0.023 0.034 %_illit01 -0.136 0.226
Nkids05 -0.176*** 0.032 -0.086* 0.046 %_wage_agr01 -0.106 0.347
MultiFamily -0.195* 0.109 0.086 0.133 %_wage_nag01 0.425 0.645
Nmen0 0.240* 0.144 %_selfe_agr01 -0.143 0.226
Nmen2 -0.446*** 0.096 -0.691*** 0.105 %_selfe_nag01 -1.863** 0.747
Nmen3 -0.632*** 0.170 -0.963*** 0.146 Ln_exp1995 0.095 0.082
Nmen4 -0.597*** 0.178 -1.017*** 0.233 Interest_rate 1.025*** 0.303
Nwomen 0.272*** 0.049 -0.006 0.057 %_abroad_mig01 1.246*** 0.172
Nelderly -0.051 0.049 -0.140** 0.059 %_intern_mig95 0.760** 0.383
No_durables 0.033 0.191 0.010 0.299 Constant -2.132*** 0.760
Ln_durables 0.044* 0.024 0.034 0.036
No_land_UR -0.195 0.120 0.203 0.250
Ln_land_UR 0.108* 0.058 0.004 0.094
No_land_RU -0.376*** 0.082 -0.205 0.128 /atanhrho_m0 -0.557*** 0.211
Ln_land_RU 0.113*** 0.029 0.147*** 0.041 /atanhrho_m1 -1.319** 0.553
%_illit01 -1.008*** 0.214 -0.715*** 0.262
%_wage_agr01 -0.096 0.373 -0.393 0.431 rho_m0: -0.55
%_wage_nag01 -0.558 0.561 1.126 0.940 rho_m1: -0.88
%_selfe_agr01 0.223 0.203 0.542* 0.279
%_selfe_nag01 0.037 0.593 0.331 0.844
Ln_exp1995 0.005 0.089 0.041 0.130
Interest_rate -1.104*** 0.268 -1.152*** 0.377
Km2school -0.068*** 0.022 -0.089*** 0.023
Constant 0.523 0.775 1.620 1.175 NOBS: 7,182
note:  *** p<.01, ** p<.05 * p<.10
Table R5: Switching probit 
P(S^0=1) P(S^1=1) P(M=1)
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coef se coef se
HasMigrant 0.782 0.560 Ethnic -0.023 0.073
Age7 0.622*** 0.091 MultiFamily 0.268** 0.105
Age8 0.874*** 0.089 Nkids05 -0.018 0.036
Age9 1.043*** 0.100 Nkids612 -0.038 0.029
Age10 1.027*** 0.103 Nkids1316 -0.101** 0.045
Age11 0.987*** 0.105 MaxEdu_Primary -0.048 0.085
Age12 0.851*** 0.095 MaxEdu_Seconda 0.185** 0.092
Age13 0.694*** 0.102 MaxEdu_College -0.062 0.110
Age14 0.487*** 0.091 MedAgeofMales -0.000 0.002
Age15 0.293*** 0.093 Nmen2 0.694*** 0.069
Age16 0.024 0.093 ` Nmen3 0.937*** 0.124
Male 0.438*** 0.050 Nmen4 1.019*** 0.168
Ethnic -0.318*** 0.059 Nwomen -0.010 0.043
Father_Primary 0.365*** 0.060 Nelderly -0.011 0.052
Father_Second 0.516*** 0.094 No_durables 0.024 0.195
Father_College 0.590*** 0.103 Ln_durables -0.001 0.024
Mother_Primary 0.071 0.095 No_land_UR -0.335** 0.160
Mother_Second 0.073 0.136 Ln_land_UR 0.132** 0.065
Mother_College 0.166 0.169 No_land_RU -0.006 0.097
MaxEdAdult 0.068*** 0.018 Ln_land_RU -0.097*** 0.032
FatherDeceased -0.447*** 0.114 Km2school -0.013 0.016
Nothkids1316 0.083** 0.037 %_illit01 -0.234 0.234
Nothkids612 -0.079*** 0.028 %_wage_agr01 -0.140 0.373
Nkids05 -0.160*** 0.030 %_wage_nag01 0.175 0.714
MultiFamily 0.007 0.110 %_selfe_agr01 0.002 0.235
Nmen0 0.243* 0.144 %_selfe_nag01 -1.664** 0.785
Nmen2 -0.425*** 0.127 Ln_exp1995 0.160* 0.088
Nmen3 -0.639*** 0.190 Interest_rate 1.021*** 0.310
Nmen4 -0.686*** 0.211 Constant -2.384*** 0.803
Nwomen 0.191*** 0.041
Nelderly -0.084** 0.042
No_durables 0.043 0.171
Ln_durables 0.045** 0.021
No_land_UR -0.185 0.130
Ln_land_UR 0.108* 0.059 /athrho -0.331 0.388
No_land_RU -0.349*** 0.079 rho: -0.3194
Ln_land_RU 0.113*** 0.029
%_illit01 -1.053*** 0.215
%_wage_agr01 -0.275 0.351
%_wage_nag01 -0.111 0.538
%_selfe_agr01 0.277 0.194
%_selfe_nag01 -0.337 0.610
Ln_exp1995 0.032 0.087
Interest_rate -1.021*** 0.283
Km2school -0.075*** 0.021
Constant 0.367 0.721 NOBS: 7,182
note:  *** p<.01, ** p<.05 * p<.10
Table R3.2: Bivariate probit, no instruments
P(S=1) P(M=1)
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coef se coef se
HasMigrant 0.677** 0.339 Ethnic -0.035 0.072
%_abroad_mig01 0.447 0.262 MultiFamily 0.223** 0.102
%_intern_mig95 -0.438 0.318 Nkids05 -0.017 0.035
Age7 0.629*** 0.085 Nkids612 -0.041 0.030
Age8 0.874*** 0.081 Nkids1316 -0.112*** 0.042
Age9 1.059*** 0.091 MaxEdu_Primary -0.035 0.086
Age10 1.036*** 0.088 MaxEdu_Seconda 0.175** 0.086
Age11 0.999*** 0.096 MaxEdu_College -0.063 0.105
Age12 0.860*** 0.087 MedAgeofMales -0.001 0.002
Age13 0.703*** 0.101 Nmen2 0.717*** 0.069
Age14 0.476*** 0.092 ` Nmen3 0.959*** 0.123
Age15 0.288*** 0.094 Nmen4 1.067*** 0.167
Age16 0.013 0.093 Nwomen -0.003 0.043
Male 0.442*** 0.045 Nelderly -0.026 0.051
Ethnic -0.325*** 0.056 No_durables 0.073 0.197
Father_Primary 0.360*** 0.058 Ln_durables 0.004 0.024
Father_Second 0.533*** 0.079 No_land_UR -0.265* 0.157
Father_College 0.604*** 0.099 Ln_land_UR 0.113* 0.064
Mother_Primary 0.050 0.097 No_land_RU 0.012 0.101
Mother_Second 0.049 0.137 Ln_land_RU -0.081*** 0.031
Mother_College 0.152 0.173 Km2school -0.008 0.015
MaxEdAdult 0.070*** 0.017 %_illit01 -0.152 0.233
FatherDeceased -0.459*** 0.113 %_wage_agr01 -0.162 0.353
Nothkids1316 0.074** 0.037 %_wage_nag01 0.439 0.649
Nothkids612 -0.080*** 0.025 %_selfe_agr01 -0.118 0.229
Nkids05 -0.166*** 0.028 %_selfe_nag01 -1.877** 0.761
MultiFamily 0.010 0.097 Ln_exp1995 0.096 0.084
Nmen0 0.243* 0.145 Interest_rate 0.998*** 0.305
Nmen2 -0.400*** 0.096 %_abroad_mig01 1.225*** 0.179
Nmen3 -0.607*** 0.151 %_intern_mig95 1.004*** 0.371
Nmen4 -0.632*** 0.182 Constant -2.109*** 0.769
Nwomen 0.198*** 0.039
Nelderly -0.088** 0.041
No_durables 0.029 0.173
Ln_durables 0.044** 0.021 /athrho -0.278 0.221
No_land_UR -0.195* 0.108 rho: -0.271
Ln_land_UR 0.109** 0.053
No_land_RU -0.342*** 0.076
Ln_land_RU 0.118*** 0.026
%_illit01 -0.982*** 0.191
%_wage_agr01 -0.210 0.337
%_wage_nag01 -0.028 0.547
%_selfe_agr01 0.193 0.192
%_selfe_nag01 -0.522 0.559
Ln_exp1995 0.051 0.082
Interest_rate -0.946*** 0.250
Km2school -0.075*** 0.020
Constant 0.212 0.704 NOBS: 7,182
note:  *** p<.01, ** p<.05 * p<.10
Table R3.3: Bivariate probit with instruments in the enrollment equation
P(S=1) P(M=1)
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Equations 1-5: Equations 6-10:
coef se coef se
Father_migrant 0.797*** 0.195 Age 0.095*** 0.014
Other_migrant 0.315* 0.165 Age_sq -0.156*** 0.019
Age7 0.633*** 0.078 Ethnic 0.017 0.050
Age8 0.821*** 0.072 Ed<=Primary -0.016 0.056
Age9 0.978*** 0.082 Ed_Second 0.223*** 0.060
Age10 0.987*** 0.079 Ed_College -0.411*** 0.076
Age11 0.967*** 0.089 Spouse_Primary 0.154** 0.069
Age12 0.848*** 0.082 Spouse_Second 0.337*** 0.080
Age13 0.706*** 0.096 Spouse_College 0.364*** 0.091
Age14 0.478*** 0.085 Married 0.073 0.066
Age15 0.285*** 0.091 Nownchild05 -0.076*** 0.027
Age16 0.016 0.093 Nownchild612 -0.076*** 0.024
Male 0.453*** 0.043 Nownchild1316 -0.095** 0.043
Ethnic -0.327*** 0.058 Notherchildr016 0.037** 0.016
Father_Primary 0.345*** 0.060 AgeotherMales 0.006** 0.002
Father_Second 0.428*** 0.078 MaxEdotherMales 0.002 0.013
Father_College 0.603*** 0.091 NotherMarried -0.113** 0.053
Mother_Primary 0.076 0.095 Nmen2 -0.050 0.100
Mother_Second 0.011 0.140 Nmen3 -0.008 0.116
Mother_College 0.053 0.171 Nmen4 0.170 0.126
MaxEdAdult 0.074*** 0.017 Nwomen 0.019 0.028
FatherDeceased -0.394*** 0.115 Nelderly 0.029 0.034
Nothkids1316 -0.073*** 0.023 No_durables 0.128 0.128
Nothkids612 0.082** 0.037 Ln_durables 0.002 0.016
Nkids05 0.067 0.093 No_land_UR -0.363*** 0.091
MultiFamily -0.149*** 0.026 Ln_land_UR 0.045 0.042
Nmen0 0.345** 0.144 No_land_RU -0.027 0.067
Nmen2 -0.337*** 0.077 Ln_land_RU -0.049** 0.022
Nmen3 -0.556*** 0.124 %_illit01 -0.397** 0.175
Nmen4 -0.632*** 0.180 %_wage_agr01 -0.201 0.254
Nwomen 0.171*** 0.038 %_wage_nag01 0.265 0.419
Nelderly -0.121*** 0.039 %_selfe_agr01 0.009 0.167
No_durables -0.021 0.174 %_selfe_nag01 -1.373** 0.604
Ln_durables 0.038* 0.022 Ln_exp1995 -0.005 0.061
No_land_UR -0.165 0.104 Interest_rate 1.071*** 0.206
Ln_land_UR 0.110** 0.054 Km2school -0.021 0.015
No_land_RU -0.342*** 0.075 %_abroad_mig01 1.102*** 0.160
Ln_land_RU 0.103*** 0.026 %_intern_mig95 0.653** 0.262
%_illit01 -1.012*** 0.179 Constant -2.395*** 0.589
%_wage_agr01 -0.215 0.323
%_wage_nag01 -0.064 0.532 correlations coef se
%_selfe_agr01 0.225 0.190 d related children       0.57 0.03
%_selfe_nag01 -0.502 0.577 e unrelated children      0.25 0.12
Ln_exp1995 0.034 0.080 b child - father migr              -0.36 0.11
Interest_rate -1.027*** 0.231 c child - other migr -0.11 0.10
Km2school -0.070*** 0.018 a migration equation                  0.24 0.04
Constant 0.433 0.704 NOBS: 14,568
note:  *** p<.01, ** p<.05 * p<.10
note: standard errors adjusted for clustering on PSU level 
Table R6: Effect of migration of father
P(Enr=1) P(Mig=1)
144
Equations 1-5: Equations 6-10:
coef se coef se
Father_migrant 0.630*** 0.226 Age 0.091*** 0.014
Other_migrant 0.233 0.183 Age_sq -0.151*** 0.019
Migrant's_age 0.001 0.012 Ethnic 0.011 0.050
Migrant's_age2/100 0.025 0.023 Ed<=Primary -0.026 0.058
Migrant's_educlev -0.004 0.023 Ed_Second 0.210*** 0.061
Age7 0.631*** 0.078 Ed_College -0.393*** 0.077
Age8 0.836*** 0.075 Spouse_Primary 0.175** 0.071
Age9 0.983*** 0.083 Spouse_Second 0.343*** 0.082
Age10 0.960*** 0.079 Spouse_College 0.369*** 0.093
Age11 0.951*** 0.092 Married 0.043 0.068
Age12 0.836*** 0.084 Nownchild05 -0.075*** 0.027
Age13 0.690*** 0.096 Nownchild612 -0.069*** 0.024
Age14 0.479*** 0.086 Nownchild1316 -0.092** 0.043
Age15 0.272*** 0.088 Notherchildr016 0.041** 0.017
Age16 0.027 0.090 AgeotherMales 0.005** 0.002
Male 0.432*** 0.043 MaxEdotherMales 0.002 0.013
Ethnic -0.306*** 0.058 NotherMarried -0.097* 0.055
Father_Primary 0.343*** 0.063 Nmen2 -0.045 0.098
Father_Second 0.400*** 0.077 Nmen3 -0.003 0.113
Father_College 0.614*** 0.089 Nmen4 0.148 0.130
Mother_Primary 0.072 0.093 Nwomen 0.017 0.028
Mother_Second -0.023 0.136 Nelderly 0.020 0.034
Mother_College 0.012 0.166 No_durables 0.111 0.131
MaxEdAdult 0.069*** 0.017 Ln_durables -0.002 0.017
FatherDeceased -0.374*** 0.113 No_land_UR -0.352*** 0.092
Nothkids1316 -0.080*** 0.023 Ln_land_UR 0.039 0.041
Nothkids612 0.070* 0.037 No_land_RU -0.011 0.069
Nkids05 0.058 0.090 Ln_land_RU -0.052** 0.023
MultiFamily -0.150*** 0.026 %_illit01 -0.368** 0.174
Nmen0 0.374*** 0.144 %_wage_agr01 -0.211 0.266
Nmen2 -0.329*** 0.077 %_wage_nag01 0.167 0.421
Nmen3 -0.541*** 0.127 %_selfe_agr01 -0.009 0.168
Nmen4 -0.613*** 0.176 %_selfe_nag01 -1.387** 0.606
Nwomen 0.160*** 0.038 Ln_exp1995 0.005 0.062
Nelderly -0.105*** 0.038 Interest_rate 1.030*** 0.206
No_durables -0.039 0.176 Km2school -0.02 0.016
Ln_durables 0.035 0.022 %_abroad_mig01 1.133*** 0.157
No_land_UR -0.141 0.104 %_intern_mig95 0.643** 0.267
Ln_land_UR 0.109** 0.054 Constant -2.383*** 0.599
No_land_RU -0.360*** 0.074
Ln_land_RU 0.112*** 0.026 correlations coef se
  
%_illit01 -0.934*** 0.176 d related children       0.58 0.04  
%_wage_agr01 -0.191 0.309 e unrelated children      0.29 0.11
%_wage_nag01 0.020 0.525 b child - father migr              -0.48 0.10  
%_selfe_agr01 0.219 0.185 c child - other migr -0.15 0.10
%_selfe_nag01 -0.383 0.566 a migration equation                  0.21 0.04
Ln_exp1995 0.041 0.079
Interest_rate -1.099*** 0.227
Km2school -0.067*** 0.017
Constant 0.334 0.696 NOBS: 14,568
note:  *** p<.01, ** p<.05 * p<.10
note: standard errors adjusted for clustering on PSU level 
Table R6.2: Effect varying by migrant age and education 
P(Enr=1) P(Mig=1)
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Equations 1-5: Equations 6-10:
coef se coef se
Father_migrant 0.629*** 0.203 Age 0.091*** 0.015
Other_migrant 0.082 0.182 Age_sq -0.150*** 0.019
ChildAge_migrant 0.027** 0.011 Ethnic 0.011 0.051
Boy_migrant 0.006 0.095 Ed<=Primary -0.023 0.057
Age7 0.636*** 0.079 Ed_Second 0.212*** 0.061
Age8 0.838*** 0.076 Ed_College -0.391*** 0.077
Age9 0.986*** 0.084 Spouse_Primary 0.174** 0.071
Age10 0.954*** 0.081 Spouse_Second 0.342*** 0.082
Age11 0.939*** 0.094 Spouse_College 0.371*** 0.093
Age12 0.815*** 0.086 Married 0.042 0.068
Age13 0.662*** 0.099 Nownchild05 -0.073*** 0.027
Age14 0.439*** 0.091 Nownchild612 -0.069*** 0.024
Age15 0.223** 0.092 Nownchild1316 -0.094** 0.043
Age16 -0.025 0.096 Notherchildr016 0.040** 0.017
Male 0.436*** 0.048 AgeotherMales 0.006** 0.002
Ethnic -0.315*** 0.058 MaxEdotherMales 0.001 0.013
Father_Primary 0.347*** 0.062 NotherMarried -0.096* 0.056
Father_Second 0.416*** 0.076 Nmen2 -0.043 0.099
Father_College 0.597*** 0.089 Nmen3 -0.001 0.114
Mother_Primary 0.075 0.094 Nmen4 0.150 0.131
Mother_Second -0.006 0.138 Nwomen 0.017 0.028
Mother_College 0.032 0.169 Nelderly 0.022 0.034
MaxEdAdult 0.073*** 0.016 No_durables 0.109 0.131
FatherDeceased -0.401*** 0.113 Ln_durables -0.002 0.017
Nothkids1316 -0.078*** 0.023 No_land_UR -0.352*** 0.092
Nothkids612 0.074** 0.037 Ln_land_UR 0.040 0.041
Nkids05 0.065 0.091 No_land_RU -0.012 0.069
MultiFamily -0.152*** 0.026 Ln_land_RU -0.052** 0.023
Nmen0 0.380*** 0.145 %_illit01 -0.375** 0.174
Nmen2 -0.334*** 0.077 %_wage_agr01 -0.208 0.267
Nmen3 -0.560*** 0.126 %_wage_nag01 0.164 0.422
Nmen4 -0.622*** 0.174 %_selfe_agr01 -0.008 0.168
Nwomen 0.165*** 0.038 %_selfe_nag01 -1.378** 0.605
Nelderly -0.108*** 0.039 Ln_exp1995 0.005 0.062
No_durables -0.030 0.177 Interest_rate 1.021*** 0.206
Ln_durables 0.036 0.022 Km2school 0.015 0.020
No_land_UR -0.157 0.106 %_abroad_mig01 1.133*** 0.160
Ln_land_UR 0.109** 0.055 %_intern_mig95 0.668** 0.265
No_land_RU -0.363*** 0.075 Constant -2.386*** 0.601
Ln_land_RU 0.112*** 0.026
%_illit01 -0.961*** 0.177 correlations coef se
%_wage_agr01 -0.193 0.317 d related children       0.57 0.04
%_wage_nag01 0.024 0.530 e unrelated children      0.29 0.12
%_selfe_agr01 0.222 0.188 b child - father migr              -0.41 0.10
%_selfe_nag01 -0.391 0.568 c child - other migr -0.15 0.10    
Ln_exp1995 0.043 0.080 a migration equation                  0.21 0.04
Interest_rate -1.078*** 0.229
Km2school -0.068*** 0.018
Constant 0.350 0.706 NOBS: 14,568
note:  *** p<.01, ** p<.05 * p<.10
note: standard errors adjusted for clustering on PSU level 
Table R6.3: Effect varying by child age and sex 
P(Enr=1) P(Mig=1)
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Equations 1-5: Equations 6-10:
coef se coef se
Father_migrant 0.807*** 0.189 Age 0.091*** 0.015
Other_migrant 0.299* 0.162 Age_sq -0.150*** 0.019
LandlessRur_migrant 0.254* 0.138 Ethnic 0.010 0.051
Age7 0.638*** 0.080 Ed<=Primary -0.023 0.057
Age8 0.847*** 0.076 Ed_Second 0.211*** 0.061
Age9 1.001*** 0.084 Ed_College -0.392*** 0.077
Age10 0.975*** 0.080 Spouse_Primary 0.174** 0.071
Age11 0.968*** 0.093 Spouse_Second 0.340*** 0.082
Age12 0.851*** 0.085 Spouse_College 0.371*** 0.093
Age13 0.705*** 0.098 Married 0.044 0.068
Age14 0.488*** 0.088 Nownchild05 -0.073*** 0.027
Age15 0.279*** 0.090 Nownchild612 -0.070*** 0.024
Age16 0.029 0.093 Nownchild1316 -0.092** 0.043
Male 0.437*** 0.043 Notherchildr016 0.041** 0.017
Ethnic -0.311*** 0.058 AgeotherMales 0.006** 0.002
Father_Primary 0.347*** 0.062 MaxEdotherMales 0.001 0.013
Father_Second 0.417*** 0.077 NotherMarried -0.095* 0.056
Father_College 0.594*** 0.089 Nmen2 -0.048 0.100
Mother_Primary 0.076 0.095 Nmen3 -0.007 0.115
Mother_Second -0.005 0.138 Nmen4 0.144 0.131
Mother_College 0.034 0.170 Nwomen 0.017 0.028
MaxEdAdult 0.076*** 0.017 Nelderly 0.022 0.034
FatherDeceased -0.387*** 0.114 No_durables 0.110 0.131
Nothkids1316 -0.078*** 0.023 Ln_durables -0.002 0.017
Nothkids612 0.073* 0.037 No_land_UR -0.352*** 0.092
Nkids05 0.067 0.092 Ln_land_UR 0.040 0.041
MultiFamily -0.153*** 0.026 No_land_RU -0.018 0.069
Nmen0 0.348** 0.145 Ln_land_RU -0.052** 0.023
Nmen2 -0.341*** 0.078 %_illit01 -0.377** 0.175
Nmen3 -0.564*** 0.128 %_wage_agr01 -0.209 0.268
Nmen4 -0.644*** 0.181 %_wage_nag01 0.157 0.422
Nwomen 0.165*** 0.038 %_selfe_agr01 -0.007 0.168
Nelderly -0.107*** 0.039 %_selfe_nag01 -1.375** 0.604
No_durables -0.015 0.177 Ln_exp1995 0.005 0.062
Ln_durables 0.038* 0.022 Interest_rate 1.023*** 0.206
No_land_UR -0.174 0.106 Km2school 0.012 0.030
Ln_land_UR 0.111** 0.055 %_abroad_mig01 1.131*** 0.160
No_land_RU -0.425*** 0.080 %_intern_mig95 0.671** 0.267
Ln_land_RU 0.110*** 0.026 Constant -2.382*** 0.600
%_illit01 -0.968*** 0.178
%_wage_agr01 -0.215 0.319 correlations coef se
%_wage_nag01 0.031 0.525 d related children       0.57 0.04
%_selfe_agr01 0.223 0.188 e unrelated children      0.28 0.11
%_selfe_nag01 -0.395 0.572 b child - father migr              -0.40 0.11
Ln_exp1995 0.040 0.081 c child - other migr 0.12 0.10    
Interest_rate -1.071*** 0.230 a migration equation                  0.21 0.04
Km2school -0.068*** 0.018
Constant 0.364 0.710 NOBS: 14,568
note:  *** p<.01, ** p<.05 * p<.10
note: standard errors adjusted for clustering on PSU level 
Table R6.4: Effect varying by landlessness for rural households 
P(Enr=1) P(Mig=1)
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